Entrepreneurial clusters in knowledge-driven economies : an essay on their evolutionary dynamics by Ueda, Mitsuyuki, 1971-
 
Entrepreneurial Clusters in Knowledge-Driven Economies: 
An Essay on Their Evolutionary Dynamics 
 
by 
 
Mitsuyuki Ueda 
 
M.E., Aeronautics and Astronautics 
University of Tokyo, 1997 
 
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
Master of Science in Management of Technology 
at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
 
June 2003 
 
Copyright 2003 Mitsuyuki Ueda.  All rights reserved. 
 
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and to distribute publicly 
paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part. 
 
 
 
Signature of Author: ______________________________________________________ 
Management of Technology Program 
Sloan School of Management 
May 9, 2003 
 
Certified by _____________________________________________________________ 
Henry Birdseye Weil 
Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management 
Thesis Supervisor 
 
Accepted by _____________________________________________________________ 
David A. Weber 
Director, Management of Technology Program 
Sloan School of Management 
2 
3 
 
Entrepreneurial Clusters in Knowledge-Driven Economies: 
An Essay on Their Evolutionary Dynamics 
 
by 
 
Mitsuyuki Ueda 
 
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management 
on May 9, 2003 in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science in 
Management of Technology 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Technology-based entrepreneurship tends to cluster in certain regions.  The most 
famous examples include Silicon Valley and the Route 128 area of Boston.  The results 
of this study provide insight into why and how such entrepreneurial clusters have 
evolved to generate more entrepreneurial opportunities than others.  With a proposed 
framework, the thesis first examines their evolutionary dynamics along with the 
System Dynamics models and the Silicon Valley case.  The results show their self-
reinforcing characteristics and the implication that those clusters wont start their 
self-reinforcing process easily at the beginning of the evolution.  Subsequently, the 
thesis compares three case studies of Cambridge, Munich, and Tokyo, in addition to 
the case of Silicon Valley.  The results show a similar pattern of a series of abnormal 
events in the history of each cluster that prompted the start of the self-reinforcing 
process.  Throughout the study, the framework demonstrates its usefulness to 
streamline many factors involved, state the conditions of the entrepreneurial clusters, 
and extract the characteristics of the evolutionary dynamics of those clusters. 
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1 Introduction 
Having the turn of the new century, it seems that a growing number of countries 
have come to renew their interpretation on entrepreneurship.  Many governments 
around the world including European counties, Japan, Singapore, Korea, Mexico, and 
China have introduced over the past years initiatives to promote the creation of 
startups and new technology-based firms with the hope of having another engine of 
the economic growth and innovation.  This widely spreading recognition is surprising 
because it was just up until recently that many believed large firms were the key 
players responsible for the economic growth and innovation. 
The challenge to that belief comes from the strong economy of the United States 
and findings on the country: more than 95 percent of the wealth in the country has 
been created by entrepreneurs since 1980; new and smaller firms are responsible for 
50 percent of all innovations and 95 percent of all radical innovations in the country 
since the World War II; 77 percent of the eight million new jobs created in the 
country between 1993 and 1996 were done by just 5 percent of the young and fastest 
growing companies (Timmons 1994, 1999); and so on.  While developed large 
economies such as Germany and Japan have wondered at their long-lasting low 
economic growth in the last decade, the United States seems to fully enjoy the 
benefits of the advent of the knowledge-driven economy, where technology 
increasingly matters, with its famous historical asset of entrepreneurship. 
Once it comes to a mix of entrepreneurship and technology, it tends to be seen as 
concentrations in certain geographical areas, not everywhere in the country.  Only 
three regions of Silicon Valley, Southern California, and the Boston area 
accommodate 86 percent of the telecommunications firms and 45 percent of the 
computer firms in the United States.  Of the semiconductor startups founded around 
the world between 1977 and 1989, 55 percent were located in Silicon Valley (Cooper 
and Folta 2000).  Silicon Valley with only one percent of the population of the 
country gathers twenty percent of the total venture capital investments in the United 
States.  This astonishing phenomenon is where this research started questioning.  
Why has a certain region like Silicon Valley evolved as a place full of 
entrepreneurship and technology, and not elsewhere in the same country?  How has a 
region become capable of progressively attracting people and capital, and delivering 
another wave of growing firms and knowledge?  Is it possible for other countries to 
emulate Silicon Valley in their own soil? 
This thesis studies the regions with entrepreneurship and technology, first by 
exploring the conditions and the characteristics of them, then by examining the 
evolutionary dynamics of them.  It is argued that those regions have the 
characteristics of the self-reinforcing system in their ability to let create 
entrepreneurial opportunities, that those regions wont start their reinforcing process 
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easily at the beginning of the evolution, and that it is a series of abnormal events in 
the history of the region that prompt the start of the reinforcing process. 
The subsequent chapter overviews the literature of entrepreneurship.  In Chapter 
3, a framework to study those regions is proposed and used to discuss the dynamics of 
them along with the System Dynamics models and the Silicon Valley case.  In 
Chapter 4, three case studies of Cambridge, Munich, and Tokyo are presented, and 
findings are discussed. 
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2 Overview: Entrepreneurship and Knowledge-Driven 
Economies 
2.1 Entrepreneurship and Economy 
The concept of entrepreneurship has drawn scholarly attention for a long time.  
Psychologists and sociologists have explored characteristics and social backgrounds of 
entrepreneurs.  Economists and management researchers have examined 
opportunities and performance of entrepreneurial activities.  The attracting nature of 
entrepreneurship, which has induced a pile of research, seems to rest in the notion 
that it is an essential driver of growth and change in our society.  Although there is 
very little that generates consensus in the field of entrepreneurship (Verheul et al. 
2002; Schoonhoven and Romanelli 2001), it is widely believed that entrepreneurs are 
important contributors to our society in various ways. 
In his famous textbook for contemporary entrepreneurs, Timmons (1994) lists 
their contributions in variety.  They include leadership; management, economic, and 
social renewal; innovation; research and development effectiveness; job creation; 
competitiveness and productivity; the formation of new industries; and regional 
economic development.  From earlier years, Joseph Schumpeter, an eminent 
economist, sees the entrepreneur as the key impulse to set and keep the capitalist 
economy engine in motion in its process of creative destruction:  the function of 
entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an 
invention or, more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new 
commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of 
supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry and so 
on. (Schumpeter 1962, p. 132) 
As Schumpeters words depict, what entrepreneurs are doing essentially is, upon 
recognizing opportunities, creating value by exploiting new possibilities and 
capturing value by offering value-added or value-created commodities (i.e., products 
and services) to customers in certain markets through the whole process of business, 
which may result in various contributions on the society as Timmons lists.  
Schematically this process is expressed like Figure 2-1 with the various contributions. 
In this regard, we can simply categorize the ways entrepreneurs anchor 
opportunities, along with types of commodities and markets, largely into four: (1) 
introduce a new commodity to form a novel market; (2) introduce a new commodity 
to an established market; (3) introduce an old commodity in a new way to an 
established market; and (4) expand to another market with an old or new commodity 
(Table 2-1).  These categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  In reality, we 
may often see overlapping characteristics of the way entrepreneurs introduce 
commodities. 
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Table 2-1  Four ways that entrepreneurs capture value 
Market  
Established Novel Another 
Old Developing Market - Commodity 
New Expanding Market Creating Market 
Invading Market 
 
The four categories have different levels of impact on the economy.  First, to 
introduce a new commodity to form a novel market is to offer new value to a whole 
new market that never existed.  Entrepreneurs introduce a commodity that is 
unfamiliar to anybody and that does not belong to any established market.  An 
example of this category would be personal computers in their infant age.  There were 
few adopters who could imagine that personal computers would become such great 
gadgets as to be used in all kinds of lives in the future.  This is to say creating market.  
Second, to introduce a new commodity to an established market is to offer new value 
to an extension of an established market.  Entrepreneurs introduce a new commodity 
that existing customers and potential customers feel new about.  An example would 
be personal computers with higher clock speed.  This is to say expanding market.  
Third, to introduce an old commodity in a new way to an established market is to 
offer an established market with new value such as low price and convenience.  This 
is to say developing market.  Finally, to expand to another market with an old or new 
commodity is to offer new value to different customers.  Entrepreneurs bring 
commodities to another market where customers are unfamiliar with them. 
Figure 2-1  The process and contributions of entrepreneurial activity  
Creating value Capturing value
- Offering new 
value to 
customers 
- Exploiting 
new possibilities 
 
• Leadership 
• Management 
• Job creation
• Competitiveness 
and productivity 
• Formation of new 
industries 
• Regional economic 
development 
• R&D effectiveness 
• Economic renewal 
• Social renewal 
Opportunities 
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This is to say invading market.  Obviously creating market has the highest impact on 
the economy (Figure 2-2), firstly because the novel market may eventually become a 
huge market such as personal computers from virtually nothing, and more 
importantly because it is a totally new way of wealth creation to human kind.  
Expanding market, developing market, and invading market have impact on the 
economy to a lesser extent compared with creating market. 
Progressing globalization and capitalism have made it almost mandatory for all 
economies to continuously seek higher productivity.  Developing economies, by 
adopting technology, achieve productivity growth through manufacturing products 
and developing services with cheaper labor.  But as their standards of living improve, 
they have to seek another source of productivity growth.  Advanced economies, often 
losing manufacturing functions to developing economies, always possess compulsive 
incentive to seek another source of productivity through exploiting new technology.  
All economies are migrating, or seeking to migrate, toward higher levels of 
productivity where knowledge increasingly matters.  In this knowledge-driven 
economy that has to migrate, inventing new ways of wealth creation through creating 
market (probably expanding market also contributes to it to a lesser extent) is 
invaluable. 
The invention of new ways of wealth creation is a disruptive process.  In his book 
Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, Utterback (1994) portrays S-curves of the 
progress of product performance improvements.  The performance of a product leaps 
up exponentially from the level of its fluid phase during its transitional phase, then 
gradually saturating in its specific phase.  This established product, which seems to 
enjoy its high level of performance, is eventually susceptible to being surpassed by 
another S-shaped progress of an invading product, which started its fluid phase from 
a lower level of performance than the established product.  Disruptiveness of the 
invading product is a threat to the established product, but it is the invading product 
that actually becomes the winner.  The question is who will invent the invading 
product, and create new market.  Christensen (1997), in his book The Innovators 
Figure 2-2  The impacts of entrepreneurial activity 
    Creating Market 
    Expanding Market 
    Developing Market 
    Invading Market 
Impact 
Economy Migration 
Economy 
Development 
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Dilemma, describes the disruptive technological innovation as a capturing process of 
the low end of the market that has over-served by the progress of sustaining 
technologies.  Established firms often tend to trace a path of the technological 
progress that an established market demands, failing to capture the disruptive 
technological innovation.  While he is describing as capturing the low end of the 
market, capturing it by a new business model is in fact what seems to be creating 
market. 
This is where entrepreneurship exercises its power.  Successful entrepreneurs (and 
even established firms that succeed to have entrepreneurial activities) can create 
market with disruptive innovation, and eventually and aggregately become a huge 
migrating force that upgrades knowledge-driven economies.  What made a difference 
in economic development between the United States and other advanced economies 
in the 1990s since the expansion of globalization and capitalism after the Berlin Wall 
collapse seems to be this process of migration and upgrading, or creative destruction, 
of its economy itself.  And the entrepreneurship that has high impact is the key to 
mobilize economies toward successful migration and upgrade toward new wealth 
creation. 
This thesis discusses high impact entrepreneurship that can create new market.  
And in this knowledge-driven economy, it increasingly involves new technologies 
and highly-specialized knowledge.  Therefore, the author uses technology 
entrepreneurship as an identical notion of high impact entrepreneurship in this thesis.  
The definition of entrepreneurship succumbs to Schumpeters definition mentioned 
above.  Further, when comparison among nations is needed, the author will use 
advanced countries with larger population, because (1) advanced nations with higher 
standards of living better match characteristics of knowledge-driven economies; and 
(2) when entrepreneurship in a community is studied, the size of the community is 
considered to matter (it might be unfair to compare extremely small populations with 
large populations).  Nations with GDP per capita (PPP) higher than US$ 20,000 and 
population larger than 30,000,000 in 2000 are the United States, Canada, Japan, 
Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.  They are in fact the G7 countries. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 Measurement and Impact of Entrepreneurship 
Comparing the level of entrepreneurship across locations is difficult because there 
is no generally accepted definition of entrepreneurship.  Therefore, it is complicated 
by the absence of a universally agreed upon set of indicators (Verheul et al. 2002; 
Wennekers et al. 2002; OECD 1998). 
Yet there are some measurements.  There seem to be two types of the 
measurements: static and dynamic.  The static measurement is the number or the 
fraction of entrepreneurs in a location, which doesnt concern how young those 
entrepreneurial activities are.  It includes unincorporated business owners, 
incorporated business owners, and small and medium-sized enterprises.  It is mostly 
the stock measurement.  The other one is the dynamic measurement, which concerns 
how young entrepreneurial activities are.  It is the number or the fraction of nascent 
enterprises within a certain period of operation or incoming and outgoing 
entrepreneurs during a certain period.  It includes nascent startups, incorporation 
registrations, establishment registrations, tax registrations, and deregistrations of 
those.  It is either the stock measurement or the flow measurement.  By using both, 
sometimes the entry rate, exit rate, or the combination of them is calculated. 
Verheul et al. (2002) presents a static data set of business owner rate across 
countries done by EIM, an independent research organization in the Netherlands 
(Table 2-2 shows those of selected countries among 23 OECD countries they present). 
 
 
Table 2-2  Static measurement: business owners as a percentage of the labor work 
force (EIM) 
 1972 1984 1998 
USA 8.0 10.4 10.3 
Canada 7.9 10.0 14.1 
Italy 14.3 16.5 18.2 
United Kingdom 7.8 8.6 10.9 
Germany* 7.6 6.8 8.5 
France 11.3 9.8 8.5 
Japan 12.5 12.6 10.0 
Notes: Definition  Business owners are owners of both incorporated and 
unincorporated businesses, but excluding the so-called unpaid family 
workers and wage-and-salary workers operating a side-business as a 
secondary work activity as well as business owners in the agricultural sector. 
   * The data for Germany refer to West Germany for the period 1972-1990. 
Source:  EIM: COMPENDIA 2001.1 (Verheul et al. 2002). 
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The measurement is the number of business owners divided by the labor force, in 
which entrepreneurs are defined broadly, including the owners of both incorporated 
and unincorporated businesses, but excluding so-called unpaid family workers and 
wage-and-salary workers operating a side-business as a secondary work activity as 
well as business owners in the agricultural sector.  This measurement includes all 
types of heterogeneous activities across sectors.  For example, unincorporated 
businesses and incorporated businesses have different aspects of activities.  People 
leading an unincorporated business usually draw no salary but use the profits of the 
enterprise to cover personal expenses.  They have full personal liability for the 
conduct of the business.  On the contrary, people leading an incorporated business are 
owner-managers who gain a share of the profits as well as a salary.  They run a risk 
equal to his/her share of the invested capital in the business (Verheul et al. 2002).  It 
seems that the high impact entrepreneurship that this thesis concerns fits better to 
the profile of incorporated businesses because those businesses are ready to grow. 
Data of dynamic indicators of entrepreneurship are scarce (Verheul et al. 2002).  
Reynolds et al. (2002) are leading an initiative, called Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor, to describe and analyze entrepreneurial processes within a wide range of 
nations.  Their Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) index is based on the surveys of 
representative samples of the adult population in nations.  The TEA measurement is 
the sum of those individuals involved in the startup process (nascent entrepreneurs) 
and individuals active as owner-managers of firms less than 42 months old, and those 
who qualified for both are counted only once.  From 1,000 to 16,000 individuals were 
interviewed in each nation, and the measurement is a statistical estimate. 
 
 
Table 2-3  Dynamic measurement: people with entrepreneurial activity as a 
percentage of the labor work force (GEM TEA index) 
 2000 2001 2002 Average 
USA 12.7 11.7 10.5 11.6 
Canada 7.9 11.0 8.8 9.2 
Italy 5.7 10.2 5.9 7.3 
United Kingdom 5.2 7.7 5.4 6.1 
Germany 4.7 7.0 5.2 5.6 
France 2.2 7.2 3.2 4.2 
Japan 1.3 5.1 1.8 2.7 
Note: Definition  People with entrepreneurial activity are those individuals 
involved in the startup process (nascent entrepreneurs) and individuals 
active as owner-managers of firms less than 42 months old (those who 
qualified for both are counted only once). 
Source:  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. 
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Table 2-4  Dynamic measurement: enterprise entry rates and exit rates in the period 
of 1995-2000 (averages per year) (non-harmonized data) 
 # of Entries Entry 
rate 
(%) 
# of Exits Exit rate 
(%) 
USA 594,133 10.9 529,123 9.7 
Japan1 92,811 4.5 80,435 3.3 
Singapore2 8,807 11.0 4,416 5.3 
Austria 20,341 7.4 13,369 4.9 
Belgium 57,900 8.4 56,398 8.2 
Finland 24,946 12.3 21,684 10.6 
France 273,084 11.6 248,250 n.a. 
Germany3 443,600 15.7 352,200 12.6 
Greece4 87,423 11.0 61,702 7.8 
Ireland5 21,015 14.2 11,923 8.2 
Italy 352,121 8.1 280,364 6.5 
The Netherlands 75,351 10.2 40,962 5.5 
Portugal6 28,744 13.2 19,449 9.1 
Spain7 327,564 13.3 282,035 11.4 
Sweden 36,238 8.2 9,259 2.0 
United Kingdom8 175,888 10.9 166,132 10.3 
Iceland 2,534 8.2 764 2.6 
Switzerland 29,512 7.5 20,217 5.1 
Notes: Entry and exit rates are percentages of the total stock at the end of the previous year, and 
are expressed as annual averages.  USA  Units are employer firms.  Years start at March 
of the previous years.  Japan  Units are establishments covered by unemployment 
insurance.  Years start at April (FY).  Singapore  Units are companies.  Austria through 
Switzerland  Units are enterprises/establishments/VAT units. 
1 # of entries and exits are averages of FY1999 and FY2000.  2 Data are from 1996 to 
2000.  3 No data on 1995 exist; rates start from 1997.  4 No data on 1998 and 2000 exist. 
 5 No data on 2000 exist.  6 Entries have been calculated until 1998; data on exits until 
1997.  7 Rates have been calculated from 1996 onwards.  8 Data only until 1999. 
Sources: Japan  Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare; Annual Report on Unemployment 
Insurance Programs. 
 USA  U.S. Small Business Administration; Statistics of US Businesses. 
 Singapore  Registry of Companies and Businesses. 
 Austria through Switzerland  European Commission; Observatory of European SMEs 
2002/No 5. 
 
Measurements of the TEA index are available for 20 countries in 2000, 20 
countries in 2001, and 37 countries in 2002.  Table 2-3 shows the TEA indices of 
selected countries.  According to Reynolds et al., the TEA index is the only one in 
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existence to provide a direct measure of individual-level, grassroots entrepreneurial 
processes, which can be used as a basis for reliable international comparisons.  The 
two data sets of EIM and GEM exhibit a contrast, especially for Italy and Japan.  The 
measurements of Table 2-3 are much lower than the measurements of Table 2-2 for 
the two countries.  This is probably due to that those countries have large fractions of 
unincorporated businesses. 
Another dynamic measurement is entry rates and exit rates.  The entry rates and 
exit rates are often used for examining the trend of entrepreneurship for a location in 
a span of certain time period.  The difficulty for comparing across countries is that the 
indicators are not harmonized across countries.  Some countries have the data on 
establishments that register for value added tax (VAT); others have the data on 
establishments that resister for unemployment insurances; and so on.  Table 2-4 is a 
collection of the data of the countries relatively easily available to the author.  The 
definitions of the measurements differ among countries.  Therefore it makes little 
sense to compare the number of entries and exits, but entry rates and exit rates are 
rather more comparable because they measure dynamic changes of the each countrys 
status of business activities no matter what definitions are used.  We can see high rate 
of entry and exit, or turbulence, in business activities in such countries as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany; and low turbulence in Japan. 
 
The impact of entrepreneurship on economic development, especially the process 
of how it impacts, is controversial.  Thurik et al. (2002) explore the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and economic performance with several historical case 
studies.  They conclude that the explanatory power of the various determinants and 
the weight of the various consequences differ between historical periods. 
Yet, economic evidence suggests that entrepreneurship is a vital determinant of 
economic growth.  The positive and statistically robust link between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth has been indisputably verified across a wide 
spectrum of units of observation, spanning the establishment, the enterprise, the 
industry, the region, and the country (Audretsch et al. 2002; Reynolds et al 2002). 
Reynolds et al. (2002) study the association between the level of entrepreneurship 
activity and economic growth by using the Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) 
index and GDP growth.  The correlation of the TEA index is zero with the two-year 
previous economic growth, low but nearing statistical significance with the prior-year 
and current-year growth, statistically significant and moderately positive with the 
following-year growth, a clearly statistically significant positive correlation with the 
second-following-year growth, and a positive but not statistically significant 
relationship with the third-following-year growth.  This association infers that the 
high level of entrepreneurial activity leads to the positive change in economic growth 
in about two years after.  Reynolds et al. say that it indicates that changes in the 
economic structure and market processes within a country that lead to economic 
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growth may occur more quickly when an active entrepreneurial sector is available to 
implement such changes. 
Here as a trial to follow these observations, the association between the entry 
rates and GDP growth is presented in Figure 2-3.  The entry rates are the annual 
averages during 1995-2000 from Table 2-4 and GDP growth is the annual averages 
during the same period.  Although we should take a note that entry rates are based on 
non-harmonized data, we see a nearing statistically significant positive correlation 
(p=0.06). 
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Figure 2-3  An example of correlation between entry rates and GDP growth 
Note: Based on non-harmonized data.  Y = 0.31 X + 0.35 (R square = 0.20). 
Sources: Table 2-4.  GDP data  World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
2.2.2 Determinants of Entrepreneurship 
Some studies have been conducted to assess the origins or determinants of 
entrepreneurship to explain the level of entrepreneurship across times or locations, 
although at the level of individuals, many studies span a wide spectrum of theories 
and explanations. 
Wennekers et al. (2002) explore the determinants of variations in 
entrepreneurship, both historically and across nations, at the macro-level analysis.  
They illustrate differences in aggregate conditions, such as technology, level of 
economic development, institutions, culture, and demography, causing differences in 
opportunities, resources, skills and preferences with regard to entrepreneurship using 
Dutch case of the 17th century and Britain case of Industrial Revolution. 
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Verheul et al. (2002) introduces the Eclectic Theory as a framework for 
understanding and analyzing what determines entrepreneurship.  The Eclectic 
Theory integrates factors shaping the demand for entrepreneurship (product market 
perspective, carrying capacity of the market) on the one hand, with those influencing 
the supply of entrepreneurs (labor market perspective) on the other hand, which can 
be referred to as pull and push factors.  The Eclectic Theory involves all levels of 
consideration such as micro (individual entrepreneurs), meso (sectors of business), 
and macro (national economy) perspective.  Figure 2-4 shows their framework.  
Demand represents the opportunities for entrepreneurship.  The greater the diversity 
of consumer demand, the more room is created for entrepreneurs.  The opportunities 
are also influenced strongly by industrial structure.  Supply of entrepreneurship is 
dominated by the characteristics of the population.  Key elements are the resources 
and abilities of individuals and their attitudes towards entrepreneurship (preferences).  
The cultural and institutional environment influences the supply side of 
entrepreneurship.  Risk-reward profile is based on the demand factors and the supply 
factors.  Then the occupational choices of individuals are made on the basis of their 
risk-reward profile.  At the aggregate level these choices materialize as entry and exit 
rates, which form the rate of entrepreneurship.  Government can influence various 
factors. 
Figure 2-4  Verheul et al. (2002), Eclectic Theory framework 
 
Reynolds et al. (2002) present a conceptual model of the determinants of 
entrepreneurship as well as the economic impacts of it.  Figure 2-5 contains 
entrepreneurial framework conditions, which span from financial conditions to 
cultural/social norms, that influence the emergence or presence of market 
opportunities and the capacity of the people to initiate new firms in pursuit of those 
opportunities, leading venture creation.  As an impact, the role of entrepreneurship in 
Demand   Opportunities 
 
Supply    Resources 
    Abilities 
    Preferences 
Risk-
reward 
profile
Entry /
Exit 
Actual rate of 
entrepreneurship / 
Equilibrium rate of 
entrepreneurship 
Industrial 
structure 
Diversity 
of demand 
Government 
21 
the creation and growth of new firms is considered one of the primary sources of 
national economic progress, with the role of large established firms. 
 
Figure 2-5  Raynolds et al. (2002), GEM conceptual model 
 
2.2.3 Clusters and Technology Entrepreneurship 
Clusters are geographically proximate groups of interconnected companies and 
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities (Porter 1990, 1998).  Clusters have been drawing more attention 
than ever although expanding globalization allows us to gain goods, capital, and 
information more cost effectively from the world.  Clustering can be seen in a lot of 
particular fields from traditional industries to high tech industries in various levels of 
geographic areas such as winery in Northern California, video games in Tokyo, 
ceramic tiles in Italy, telecommunications in the Nordic countries, and so many 
examples.  Porter sees that even though old reasons for clustering have diminished in 
importance with globalization, new roles of clusters in competition have taken on 
growing importance in an increasingly complex, knowledge-based, and dynamic 
economy.  With his excellent model (Figure 2-6) of Diamond Theory, Porter explains 
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the competitive advantages of a location lying in the quality of the environment it 
provides for achieving high levels of productivity.  Four aspects of a national (and 
state or local) environment that define the context for growth and innovation and 
productivity are: factor conditions (basic inputs of factors of production); the context 
for strategy and rivalry (context of rules, social norms, and incentives fostering 
investment); demand conditions (characters of local markets); and related and 
supporting industries (local presence of capable suppliers and related industries).  He 
has been proving that the four types of location-based advantages together constitute 
a dynamic system that drives the competitive advantage of a location. 
 
 
Figure 2-6  Porter (1990, 1998), Diamond Theory framework 
 
Concerning the question if entrepreneurship itself tends to be geographically 
concentrated, Cooper and Folta (2000) cite academic findings showing that there is a 
positive relationship between new firm formation and regional population density, 
and that higher firm entry rates and exit rates tend to go together and are found in 
regions characterized by greater economic diversity, more population growth, more 
volatile industries, and where greater personal wealth and more mid-career 
experienced adults are found. 
Yet what we often see is that technology startups cluster particularly in certain 
regions, probably much higher concentration than all startups.  However, few have 
considered why some clusters may have higher rates of new venture formation than 
others (Cooper and Folta 2000). 
At the same time, technology entrepreneurship is a relatively unexplored topic 
(Shane and Venkataraman 2003).  Reviewing related literature, Shane and 
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themselves when considering technology entrepreneurship because of the role of 
technology, technical systems, and institutions in the founding processes of firms. 
Several articles show interesting locational aspects of technology entrepreneurship.  
Gregorio and Shane (2002) examine the rate of new firm formation with exploitation 
of university patents in the U.S.  By statistical analysis of 101 universities, they find 
that three university characteristics influence this entrepreneurial activity from 
universities: intellectual eminence of universities; policies of making equity 
investments in start-ups; and policies of giving inventors a low share of royalties.  
What is interesting about their findings, though, is that the availability of venture 
capital proximate to universities doesnt have statistical significant effect on the 
formation rate of startups. 
Stuart and Sorenson (2003) examine the founding rates of new biotechnology 
firms from 1978 to 1996 in the U.S. in association with proximity to resources that 
entrepreneurs would need.  The resource factors include proximity to universities 
with biotech-relevant departments, proximity to biotech patents, proximity to 
venture capital firms, and proximity to established biotech firms.  Their statistical 
analysis shows that the areas with high density of established biotech firms 
experience the highest rate of new biotech firm creation, so do the areas with high 
density of venture capital firms.  They argue that biotech firms concentrate because 
entrepreneurs find it difficult to leverage social ties necessary to access to expertise 
workforce when they reside far from those resources.  Also concerning biotechnology, 
Prevezer (1997) examines several states in the U.S. that have a significant number of 
biotechnology firms, and finds that the founding rate of biotech firms is strongly 
correlated with the number of employment in the related science base such as 
universities and research institutions in each state. 
Some literature examines the characteristics of particular clusters of technology 
entrepreneurship.  Saxenian (1996) compares Silicon Valley and the Route 128 area of 
Boston, and observes the regional advantage of rapid growth of Silicon Valley over 
the Route 128 area.  She argues that it rests in a regional network-based industrial 
system of Silicon Valley that promotes collective learning and encourages more 
experimentation and entrepreneurship, which the Route 128 area in contrast lacks 
due to a small number of relatively integrated corporations.  We will examine 
particular clusters in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 with other studies on the clusters such 
as Silicon Valley and Cambridge of the United Kingdom (e.g. Segal 1986; Garnsey and 
Smith 1998). 
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2.3 Entrepreneurial Clusters 
From the literature review, we can understand that (1) the level of 
entrepreneurship varies across locations and times; (2) the level of entrepreneurship 
has positive association with economic growth; (3) some studies have explored the 
determinants of entrepreneurship and presented wide arrays of factors and conditions, 
but not specifically those of technology entrepreneurship; and (4) technology 
entrepreneurship has dynamic tendency to cluster in particular locations with some 
determinants such as university characteristics and the presence of existing firms and 
science base.  There seems to be, however, no comprehensive explanation of the 
determinants and dynamics of technology entrepreneurship in light of the strong 
clustering nature of it.  There needs to be a systematic way of understanding the 
nature of entrepreneurial activities in knowledge-driven economies often 
concentrated and evolved in a specific geographic region, a way which enables us to 
see those entrepreneurial activities from a different perspective from the 
entrepreneurship research on individuals or Porters general Diamond Theory of 
clusters. 
This thesis treats this area first presenting a framework to analyze it.  The 
framework is to capture the determinants and dynamics of entrepreneurial activities 
that have the high impact and technology-involving nature, and tend to cluster in 
specific regions.  The author calls those geographic concentrations of technology 
entrepreneurship entrepreneurial clusters.  In this knowledge-driven economy, 
technology entrepreneurship is becoming a center of interests for achieving economic 
growth and migration.  The author thinks that understanding the nature of 
entrepreneurial clusters is an important and useful approach to serve those interests. 
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3 Entrepreneurial Diamond 
3.1 Opportunities 
Before exploring factors and conditions that drive dynamics of entrepreneurial 
clusters, it is useful to review insights of entrepreneurship education because it is 
ultimately microeconomics that determines aspiring entrepreneurs decisions to settle 
and start their businesses. 
In his textbook of entrepreneurship education, Timmons (1994, 1999) provides a 
useful analytical model that isolates three primary forces behind successful venture 
creation: team (founders), opportunity, and resources (Figure 3-1).  Timmons says 
that by assessing and influencing these forces, an aspiring entrepreneur can improve 
the chance of success.  This process is a core, fundamental entrepreneurial process 
that accounts for the substantially higher success pattern. 
 
 
Figure 3-1  Timmons (1994, 1999), model of entrepreneurial process 
 
First, the entrepreneurial process starts with opportunity.  It is a business 
opportunity from underlying market demand.  Entrepreneurs create, shape, recognize, 
and seize the opportunity.  While at the center of an opportunity is always an idea, 
not all ideas are opportunities.  Successful new ventures are anchored in good 
opportunities with rewarding margins and free cash flow.  Second, to execute the 
opportunity requires identifying, attracting, and managing the resources such as assets, 
key people, business plan, and financial resources.  Timmons says that entrepreneurs 
approaches are to minimize and control the resources, not necessarily own the 
resources.  Third, the team, consisted of a lead entrepreneur and an entrepreneurial 
team, is a key ingredient in the higher potential venture.  Timmons emphasizes that 
founders are more important than the technology even for high-technology 
companies.  There is a saying among venture capitalists that a grade A entrepreneur 
and team with grade B idea is preferred over a grade B team with a grade A idea.  
Quality management team is critically important to the chances of survival and 
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expansion of new ventures.  Finally, Timmons says that successful entrepreneurs seek 
fit and balance among the three forces throughout the startup processes. 
Different environments surrounding entrepreneurs offer different levels of 
difficulty to manage all of those success criteria: it may be easier for entrepreneurs to 
recognize business opportunities at some locations in some time; entrepreneurs may 
encounter difficulty to find resources at a location they live; and entrepreneurs at 
some locations may have little chances to meet candidates for their founding 
colleagues.  In this regard, the manageability of all of the three criteria of the 
entrepreneurial process is characterized by opportunities in a broad sense that an 
environment surrounding entrepreneurs can offer.  Timmons opportunity is 
business opportunities or market opportunities that entrepreneurs can recognize from 
their environments.  The difficulty to identify and attract the resources depends on 
the availability of the opportunities to access them.  The probability of forming good 
founding teams is affected by the opportunities to meet bright people with common 
interests.  With this importance of opportunities in mind, a framework for 
entrepreneurial clusters is introduced in the next section. 
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3.2 Entrepreneurial Diamond: A Framework 
Why is a certain region like Silicon Valley full of high impact entrepreneurial 
activities and not elsewhere in the same country?  Why is a region capable of 
progressively attracting quality people, firms, and capital?  Why do we often see 
intensive knowledge creation and innovation flourish from a region? 
A key to answer these questions can be found in opportunities.  Opportunities are 
not inherently given to a location.  Opportunities concerning entrepreneurial 
activities are recognized and seized by people and through their interactions.  A 
successful entrepreneurial cluster like Silicon Valley is a place full of entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  Some are attracted to the region by the hope of seizing opportunities.  
Some are inspired by opportunities arising in the region.  Then, a part of them are 
successful enough to anchor the opportunities to create high impact growing ventures.  
As is the case far back in the age of Gold Rush, opportunity is what fascinates human 
nature deeply. 
To understand the capability of a region to let create entrepreneurial 
opportunities and analyze the dynamics of entrepreneurial activities, a comprehensive 
framework embracing determinants of technology entrepreneurship is useful.  A 
proposed framework (Figure 3-2) is to help work with entrepreneurial clusters.  The 
framework consists of four broad attributes of a region: Input Conditions, 
Entrepreneurial Context, Networking Conditions, and Market Conditions.  These 
attributes, independently and as a system, drive opportunities, and evolutionary 
dynamics of entrepreneurial clusters.  The author calls it Entrepreneurial Diamond 
framework. 
Figure 3-2  Entrepreneurial Diamond framework 
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INPUT CONDITIONS are the availability conditions of what people involved in 
entrepreneurial activities need to get throughout the whole process of 
entrepreneurship.  Factors relating the input conditions include inputs such as 
technical knowledge, founding colleagues, management skills, employees, loans, risk 
money, mentors, office spaces, lawyers, accountants, suppliers, and so on.  The 
availability of those inputs to form entrepreneurial opportunities is a crucial matter to 
high impact entrepreneurship. 
Among those, several factors are what distinctively shape a profile of the input 
conditions favorable for high impact entrepreneurial clusters.  First, a number of 
quality people in a region enhance the chance of encountering good entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  Here, quality people are those with specialized knowledge, good 
management skills, or proactive energy for innovation.  A technology startup that has 
included quality people simply has a greater chance of success.  Further, in a region, 
sophisticated conversations among them may generate good ideas and business 
chances.  Interactions of them may give a birth to a promising founding team.  Some 
of them may become an insightful mentor and financier that back another startup.  
The availability of quality people and the chances of interactions among them are a 
positive force to drive startup creation and growth.  Universities, research institutions, 
and business schools play an important role to provide a base of quality people. 
Second, getting finance is one of the central opportunities that technology 
entrepreneurs seek.  However, the risk profile of technology startups, whose principle 
assets are often merely ideas, knowledge, and human resources, is different from the 
risk profile of other enterprises that have substantial real assets.  A failed technology 
startup leaves virtually no residual assets, although rewards of success of technology 
startups are very high.  Money that assumes such risk and return are different from 
that of ordinary banks.  Risk money providers such as venture capital partnerships 
and individual investors, often called angels, are an important factor of technology 
entrepreneurship.  Because of the huge risk, risk money needs close monitor and 
mentoring so that successes more than make up for failures.  It requires them to 
understand technology, know how to structure the business, and physically locate 
proximate to their investment.  Proximity further matters because technology often 
involves tacit knowledge that face-to-face communication better transfers.  Another 
aspect of risk money is that venture capitalists and angels can provide not only money 
but also mentoring.  These backers often coach founders who lack management 
know-how and advice, and provide social networks to experienced candidates for 
executives or business services that founders networks cannot reach. 
Third, knowledge that is created in a region intensifies opportunities for 
technology entrepreneurship by being transmitted or exploited.  It is created in 
technology ventures, established firms, universities, and research institutions such as 
public laboratories.  High context technical knowledge, which drives innovation and 
new wealth creation in the knowledge-driven economies, is often intangible, 
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uncertain knowledge.  It is best transmitted via face-to-face interactions and through 
frequent contacts.  This aspect of knowledge, rendering the importance of geographic 
proximity, works in entrepreneurial clusters paradoxically in the age of globalization 
where information transfer to a distant place gets cheaper and faster. 
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL CONTEXT is social and regulatory frameworks that either 
encourage or discourage entrepreneurial activities.  Factors that shape the 
entrepreneurial context include stigma of failure, prestige, familiarity, success stories, 
failure stories, cultural features, labor mobility, laws and regulations governing 
startup process or bankruptcy, tax system permitting concentrations of wealth, and so 
on. 
Although social part of this attribute is often called a climate or a culture, we can 
identify several factors that play different roles in it.  First, the so-called stigma of 
failure hangs over would-be entrepreneurs as a powerful deterrent to starting 
ventures because the majority of technology ventures are considered to fail.  We 
sometimes hear the difference of the level of entrepreneurship across regions 
explained by the difference of the level of the stigma of failure, but nasty image 
toward failures is universal in all cultures in the world.  Failures are failures.  
However, if we consider it practically, what distinguishes some regions with 
generosity toward failures from others seems to be in part the existence of another 
chance from a failure.  People can not be generous toward an unsuccessful person if 
the person has no chance and motivation to climb up again.  Growing economies 
create growing job opportunities even for a person with the stigma of failure attached 
to him.  Knowledge-driven economies with various knowledge-based sectors tend to 
suffer from shortage of specialized workforce constantly.  A successful 
entrepreneurial cluster like Silicon Valley matches both characters of growing 
economies and knowledge-driven economies, having a plentiful of chances from a 
failure for those who are eager to succeed and have specialized knowledge or skills.  
Thus the existence of another chance from a failure plays an important role for 
shaping social part of the entrepreneurial context. 
Second, the prestige attached to entrepreneurs and the familiarity with 
entrepreneurs is the catalysts for aspiration of entrepreneurs.  The high prestige in a 
society attracts followers of quality people.  The familiarity affects would-be 
entrepreneurs decisions of entry.  Role models often strongly affect followers.  These 
factors along with factors such as success stories and failure stories tend to shape the 
perception and mental models of people toward entrepreneurial activities.  We will 
examine these factors and their interactions in the next section. 
Finally, there are some cultural features that are notable.  Results-oriented 
meritocracy is a cultural feature that can be seen in some companies and nations as 
well as in an entrepreneurial cluster.  Lee et al. (2000) describe this feature in Silicon 
Valley.  In the Valley, talent and ability are king.  In todays Silicon Valley, ethnicity, 
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age, seniority, and experience are not what dictate opportunity or responsibility  
The regions merit-based system removes obstacles for immigrant entrepreneurs.  
Further, they describe open business environment.  Although companies in Silicon 
Valley fiercely compete, there is also an attitude that all can gain from sharing 
knowledge that is not company-secret Within this open environment, individuals 
are open to win-win exchanges of knowledge.  Whether in formal or informal 
settings, interactions among people with overlapping networks of relations are 
continuous and intense.  What can be said from these cultural features is that both 
are enhancing opportunities; opportunities for talented minority and opportunities 
for exchanges of knowledge to exploit.  A favorable entrepreneurial context in a 
region is what enhances the entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 
NETWORKING CONDITIONS are the existence and usability conditions of 
social/personal networks or networking opportunities.  Factors involved in the 
networking conditions include universities, institutions, personal networks among 
entrepreneurs, academic/industry collaboration, seminars and conferences, ethnic 
identity, and so on. 
Networks arise from many overlapping kinds of associations.  People may have 
been colleagues at an established firm, or share university ties.  They may share an 
ethnic identity and belong to a group, or they may share a professional identity.  
Networks among different associations are also formed by active involvement in daily 
life activities such as external jobs, joint projects, academic/industry collaboration, 
and seminars and conferences.  Another noteworthy generation process of networks 
is spin-offs.  Spin-off is a new company that arises from a parent organization.  
Typically, employees leave the parent organization, taking along a technology that 
serves as the entry ticket for the new company in a high-tech industry (Carayannis et 
al. 1998).  By generating ties in the process of spin-offs among entrepreneurs and 
investors, as well as maintaining ties with the parent organizations, spin-offs 
contribute to the construction of dense social networks of entrepreneurs, investors, 
research institutions, and established firms.  Finally, universities play a very 
important role.  For graduates and many spin-offs from universities, universities are 
the place they can rely on for the consultancy of latest knowledge and the source of 
specialized workforce.  Universities are the center of peoples social ties as well as the 
center of knowledge, therefore, the anchors for networks. 
Networks convey information on various things.  Information on people through 
networks makes it productive to hire employees, to find founding colleagues, to 
explore potential customers and suppliers, or to evaluate potentials of technology 
ventures.  Information of knowledge and ideas goes through networks to generate 
another knowledge and collective learning.  Information on success stories inspires 
would-be entrepreneurs and attracts money.  Information of risk money and 
mentoring becomes available through networks reaching venture capitalists and 
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angels.  These kinds of information are so central to technology ventures that it is not 
an exaggeration to say that the chance of success for a technology venture can be 
determined by effective networks that it possesses. 
Geographic proximity promotes repeated interactions and mutual trust needed to 
sustain effective networks.  Sensitive information on people and high context 
knowledge is best transmitted by face-to-face communications.  In fact, the most 
strategic relationships are often local because of the importance of timeliness and 
face-to-face communication for rapid innovation.  Tight links built over time by the 
accumulation of shared conversations yield rich and productive relationships, which 
facilitate the critical flow of knowledge and ideas, people, and capital.  Effective 
networks themselves seem to have an affinity with critical entrepreneurial 
opportunities clustering in a region. 
 
MARKET CONDITIONS are the existence, potential, and accessibility conditions 
of markets for goods and services, as well as equity stocks of ventures.  The market 
conditions are directly related with market opportunities.  Factors concerning the 
market conditions include innovativeness of demand, diversity of demand, 
development stage of new technologies, government procurement and R&D contracts, 
related industries as customers, and equity market. 
Many new ventures run out of money before they find enough customers for their 
products or services.  It is crucial for entrepreneurs to timely seize market 
opportunities.  General observation is that the more imperfect the market is, the more 
abundant the market opportunities are.  There are some implications from this 
observation.  First, innovativeness of demand matters.  The first customers for high 
impact ventures, innovators and early adopters as defined in the adoption theory, 
have to be willing to assume risks involving information asymmetries and 
inconsistencies of information.  Geographic concentration of the adopters of such 
characteristics offers an advantage for nearby entrepreneurs to seize this market 
opportunity.  Second, entrepreneurs are more likely to find niche markets when they 
are familiar with demographic population that has diversity in demand because gaps 
in demand offer more room for niche markets. 
New technology itself is a market opportunity.  Government procurement and 
contracts, especially from the military, may serve as early demands of new 
technologies in an early development stage.  Government may set high standards for 
the technologies and be willing to take the risk involved in the technologies with a 
lump sum of finance.  Related industries that run in the same development stage of a 
new technology field as technology ventures are collaborators with whom 
entrepreneurs can share knowledge, as well as customers that entrepreneurs may find 
dependable. 
Finally, an access to a developed equity market for technology ventures is an 
important requisite for technology entrepreneurship.  By selling growing ventures, 
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entrepreneurs and risk money providers can retrieve the awards they deserve.  
Without such an exit, risk money cannot make investments in young ventures. 
 
Dynamics of the Diamond 
 
The four attributes of a region constitute the four nodes of the entrepreneurial 
diamond.  Each attribute includes necessary conditions for the success of a region as 
an entrepreneurial cluster, and the cluster fosters entrepreneurial activities when all 
the attributes have more or less favorable profiles.  No matter how favorable three of 
them are, entrepreneurial activities will be limited if the cluster leaves one attribute 
awkward.  For example, a cluster that has favorable profiles of the input conditions, 
the entrepreneurial context, and the market conditions, but no favorable networking 
conditions may not create a lot of opportunities because close interactions and 
communications do not happen.  The diamond works as a system. 
Moreover, the favorable four attributes are self-reinforcing.  A favorable diamond 
fosters entrepreneurial activities, and creates new ventures continuously.  Some 
portion of the new ventures will eventually grow to the level where they have high 
impact on economies.  These high impact ventures will influence on the profile of the 
diamond where they were born. 
Figure 3-3 shows the dynamics of a cluster from the broadest level.  The high 
impact ventures influence on many things.  Among them, three of the Diamond 
nodes are affected directly.  First, high impact venture creation improves the profile 
of the input conditions.  New growing ventures add to the number of growing 
companies in the cluster.  Because of the growth, a larger number of growing 
companies attract more equity investment, which improves risk money availability.  
New growing ventures also deliver success entrepreneurs.  Success entrepreneurs tend 
to provide capital and mentoring to new ventures, thus improving risk money and 
mentoring availability.  Thus the input conditions are improved.  Second, the 
accumulation of the successes of high impact ventures and entrepreneurs also leads to 
the improvement of prestige, meaning the higher profile of the entrepreneurial 
context.  A larger number of growing companies lead to more jobs, enhancing 
chances from a failure, another factor of the entrepreneurial context.  Third, because 
high impact ventures created or expanded markets, more market opportunities must 
have arisen.  And a larger number of growing companies form or develop an equity 
stock market for technology ventures.  The market conditions are also improved. 
Once the improvement of the profile of the nodes of the diamond occurred, it has 
ripple effects on other nodes.  Examples are the following. 
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Figure 3-3  Self-reinforcing loops of entrepreneurial clusters 
 
The entrants of quality people change the perception of entrepreneurs little by 
little to accumulate to the improved prestige (input conditions to entrepreneurial 
context).  More quality people may open new market opportunities (input conditions 
to market conditions).  Entrants of quality people and risk money providers along 
with success entrepreneurs enhance networking opportunities (input conditions to 
networking conditions).  The improvement of prestige attracts quality people 
(entrepreneurial context to input conditions).  People who get another chance from a 
failure move to other firms (entrepreneurial context to networking conditions).  
Improved entrepreneurial context, along with factors of the input conditions, 
prompts more entrepreneurs to try to shape another market opportunity 
(entrepreneurial context to market conditions).  Opened market opportunities attract 
more quality people and risk money (market conditions to input conditions).  We can 
list such a number of effects as the first ripple effects.  Furthermore, among the 
second ripple effects, the improved networking opportunities attract quality people 
and venture capitalists (networking conditions to input conditions).  It also enhances 
job opportunities by conveying information on people, influencing another chance 
from a failure and labor mobility (networking conditions to entrepreneurial context).  
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Finally, it prompts, by rich interactions of people, more entrepreneurs to try to shape 
another market opportunity (networking conditions to market conditions). 
Above are the effects of the high impact venture creation.  With ripple effects 
among the diamond, it improves all the profiles of the diamond nodes.  The improved 
profiles of the diamond, then, foster another wave of high impact venture creation, 
thus creating a self-reinforcing loop through waves of high impact venture creations.  
Because we traced only a limited number of factors, this analysis may sound a little 
simple.  (We will examine causal relationships of several factors with more details in 
the next section.)  But the factors we used are among the most important factors 
identified in each of the attributes.  Therefore, the overall dynamics of the diamond 
itself should have been well traced.  Or rather, by this simplicity, we are able to 
overview the dynamics of the diamond. 
There is in fact another self-reinforcing loop.  It is a loop with spin-off creation 
(Figure 3-3).  Spin-offs produce another set of effects on the diamond.  Here, spin-off 
creation is defined as mere entries of spin-offs.  Therefore, spin-offs do not have to be 
successfully grown at this moment of analysis, unlike high impact venture creation.  
Grown spin-offs can be considered as high impact ventures. 
First of all, the favorable profiles of the diamond nodes foster spin-off creation, 
like new venture creation.  Then, spin-off creation has three direct effects.  As we saw 
previously, the entries of spin-offs contribute to the construction of dense social 
networks.  This effect on the network conditions is the major effect of spin-offs.  The 
second effect is on the market conditions.  Because spin-offs created or expanded 
markets, more market opportunities must have arisen.  Finally, the third effect is the 
impact on the labor mobility.  Spin-offs themselves are transferring labor from a firm 
to another firm.  It accrued to the accumulation of the labor mobility, influencing on 
the profile of the entrepreneurial context.  The improved profiles of the three 
attributes then cause ripple effects within the diamond.  The improved profiles of the 
diamond, then, foster another wave of spin-off creation, thus creating a self-
reinforcing loop of spin-offs. 
These self-reinforcing loop models of high impact venture creation and spin-off 
creation explain the basics of their dynamics.  Favorable attributes of a region foster 
the creation of technology ventures and their successes.  In turn, they improve the 
attributes of the region.  It is usually hard to let fast positive flows of self-reinforcing 
loops happen instantly from where they are static or the flows are very slow.  This is 
why many regions emulating Silicon Valley are frustrated by the little improvement 
in short-term, whereas a successful region like Silicon Valley evolves its attributes 
themselves seemingly faster and faster than those who emulate.  Further, because 
self-reinforcing loops are positive feedback loops, once a down turn flow occurs, the 
positive feedback loops self-reinforce negative flows that undermine the attributes. 
Then the next question is; what is the threshold of the beginning of positive self-
reinforcing?   It will be discussed in the next section.  Another question is; how far is 
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this self-reinforcing loop going around?  And are there balancing loops that limit the 
self-reinforcing loops?  Things such as the limit of human resources from the national 
level, the saturation of the growth of the prestige and the familiarity, the technology 
maturity, the market saturation, and the limit of time that individuals can spare for 
networking are considered some of the factors that constitute balancing loops, but 
further research is required in order to understand the limitation of the self-
reinforcing dynamics.  For the sake of the objectives of this thesis we will focus on the 
beginning of the self-reinforcing dynamics. 
Finally, there are two arrows seeming to be missing in Figure 3-3; arrows from the 
market conditions to the entrepreneurial context and the networking conditions.  
There seem no direct causal relationships concerning them.  However, this does not 
mean that the importance of the attribute of the market conditions in the diamond is 
undermined.  First, the diamond works as a system to foster entrepreneurial activities.  
The self-reinforcing loops of high impact venture creation and spin-off creation, 
which treat the whole diamond as one factor within the loops, are more important 
than the two direct relationships that are buried among a countless of ripple effects.  
Second, as we will discuss later, the market conditions are among the only attributes 
which government can influence directly by its procurements.  Government can 
influence the other attribute, but it is indirect and government must wait until 
market mechanisms will settle the influence. 
 
Regional Level and National Level 
 
The discussion was focused on a region or a cluster so far.  The entrepreneurial 
activities are affected by regional factors such as availability of inputs or usability of 
networks.  But laws and regulations governing startup process and bankruptcy, or tax 
system permitting concentrations of wealth are mostly determined at the national 
level.  The availability of quality people depends on the settlement of the graduates of  
Figure 3-4  Geographic levels for analysis 
Groups of Nations
Nations
Regions 
36 
regional universities as well as the aggregate quality and number of graduates in a 
nation that is often shaped by national policies. 
The analyses of entrepreneurial activities have to be aware of the distinction that 
there are regional level analysis and national level analysis.  The environment of 
entrepreneurial activities is on the one hand shaped at the national level.  On the 
other hand, there is the regional environment, under the influence of the national 
environment, shaped at the regional level (Figure 3-4).  Like European Union, 
sometimes the policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises are shaped at the 
higher level of groups of nations. 
The framework used in the analysis at the regional level can be called the 
entrepreneurial cluster diamond that has been discussed so far.  The framework used 
in the analysis at the national level is the entrepreneurial national diamond.  The 
cluster diamond works under the influence of the national diamond.  Like this, we 
must analyze entrepreneurial activities according to different geographic levels. 
 
Role of Government 
 
The national government, the state government, and the regional government 
play large roles to influence attributes of both national diamond and cluster diamond. 
 
 
Figure 3-5  Role of government in entrepreneurial cluster 
 
Government is a rule maker, a financier, or a buyer in different settings.  In the 
area of entrepreneurial activities where opportunities are floated and captured, and a 
self-reinforcing mechanism is embedded, what government primarily can do is to 
create a favorable environment that can foster, or at least does not undermine, 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  Entrepreneurial clusters are the ecological systems in 
this sense.  Then the government can think about how to stimulate a positive flow in 
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the self-reinforcing mechanism, or the sprouting power of the ecology.  Some of the 
policies to create a favorable environment, that is, the favorable four attributes of the 
diamond, include the following. 
Input Conditions.  The appropriate education for knowledge-driven economy is 
one of the first agenda.  Advanced and specialized education at higher educational 
institutions and management education is central to provide the economy with 
quality people.  Government can funnel funds to universities, business schools, 
professional schools, and professional training institutions, as well as encourage them 
to adapt themselves to the rapid change of the economy. 
Knowledge creation and intellectual property protection is another first agenda.  
Because of the nature of knowledge as public goods and the inappropriability of it, 
government assumes large roles to facilitate knowledge creation so that entrepreneurs 
can shape opportunities from it.  Entrepreneurs often have little asset other than their 
intellectual properties, it is critically important that intellectual properties are 
protected by appropriate legal framework. 
Concerning risk money, government has the ability to set rules for encouraging 
risky investments.  For example, in the United States the lowering of the top capital 
gains tax rate from 49 percent to 28 percent in 1978 and then to 20 percent in 1981 
made risky investments more attractive (Rowen 2000).  Allowing corporate pension 
funds to risky investments is another way.  Encouraging risky investment increases 
angels as well as funds available to venture capital partnerships.  Further, government 
can modify restrictions on the institutional investors holding of unlisted equity so 
that institutional investors also offer risk money.  Rules encouraging activities of 
venture capital partnerships are also important because it is a risky business that 
otherwise many entities hesitate to engage in.  Government can limit the liability of 
limited partners to the money they invest.  It also can make firms financial status 
more transparent by improving accounting rules.  Permitting or encouraging firms to 
have outsiders sitting on the boards makes it easier for risk money providers to 
monitor as well as to mentor. 
Subsidies or subsidized loans to startups or risk money are controversial.  They 
create new entrepreneurial opportunities.  But they may also distort opportunities, or 
the environment generating opportunities, by letting somebody have easy money 
that is not well thought-out and expelling private businesses of risk money providers.  
They may serve as an initial kick to let the self-reinforcing loop start rotating, but too 
much of the subsidies may stifle the sprouting power of the ecology. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  Government can influence social frameworks in several 
ways.  Concerning labor mobility, deregulation of labor markets, through changes in 
rules such as that employment is at the choice of either employer or worker, makes 
wage and employment more insecure and stimulates labor mobility.  For firms in 
California the unenforceability of non-compete clauses in labor contracts further 
encourages worker mobility (Rowen 2000). 
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Bankruptcy law shapes personal financial risk of entrepreneurs.  In the United 
States, owners of failed businesses are not required to pay off their debts with the 
exception of their pay roll taxes (Verheul et al. 2002).  In other countries, 
entrepreneurs that go bankrupt are required to settle the businesses debts. 
Many advanced nations adopt progressive taxation systems.  Changing taxation on 
personal income permitting concentration of wealth, if permitted, makes more room 
for success entrepreneurs to be rich, and create more role models that inspire 
followers.  Entrepreneurship education from primary education enhances the 
familiarity and the prestige.  Government can set up honorable recognitions awarded 
to success entrepreneurs.  It signals the importance of entrepreneurship to citizens 
and enhances the prestige. 
Concerning regulatory frameworks for startups and their growth, government is 
directly responsible.  Government can change laws and regulations governing startup 
process.  Small businesses are relatively sensitive to the administrative costs.  The 
administrative burdens are not only a barrier to entry but also an obstacle to firm 
growth.  Government also can give startups corporate tax exemptions to encourage 
entrepreneurial activities.  Stock options are good awards and incentives to encourage 
motivation among employees at growing startups.  Some countries tax on stock 
options only when exercised, not when granted.  Taxed when granted, option 
awardees have to pay cash even though options still dont turn into money. 
Networking Conditions.  Government can facilitate networking opportunities by 
various ways.  Among them, encouraging universities to be more open to industries is 
very important because universities can work as anchors of knowledge-based 
networks.  Government can financially support technology licensing activities.  It can 
mitigate regulations on universities, especially public universities, such as the ones 
limiting corporate donations and prohibiting faculty to sit on the board, and 
encourage universities to lower administrative burden for academic/industry 
collaboration. 
Government can provide funds for formal networking activities.  For example, 
government can support finance for the institutions that facilitate networking 
opportunities.  Holding seminars and conferences does not cost huge money, but 
those institutions are often sensitive to those costs. 
Market Conditions.  Knowledge creation is a main factor of the input conditions, 
but it also opens up new possibilities of markets.  Government is often responsible for 
the new technologies that are eventually exploited by entrepreneurs.  Government as 
a financier can funnel public money into universities and research institutions such as 
public laboratories and into private companies by R&D contracts or subsidies for new 
knowledge creation.  Government can also have a direct influence on the diamond 
through providing attractive market opportunities as procurements with private 
companies including technology startups.  As a buyer, it can make procurement deals 
with private companies for high context technologies.  Procurements, if carefully 
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designed, benefit both governments for gaining the latest technologies and 
encouraging innovation, and startups for securing steady and lump-sum finance. 
Monopoly may permit established firms to invest in long-term R&D, but it may 
also hinder the innovations that come through competitions among private firms. 
Especially, monopoly gives little chances to entrepreneurial activity that may create 
new markets.  In order to facilitate entrepreneurial opportunities, promoting 
competition by anti-trust regulatory frameworks should be taken into account.  It will 
enhance opportunities of entries for startups.  Finally, concerning equity market, 
government can deregulate stock market and prompt lowering requirements for 
listing stocks of firms that do not include having a history of profits. 
 
Enhancing Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
 
Not only government but also private firms and institutions can improve the 
profile of the diamond.  Although there are competitions among private firms, 
collective actions, or collaboration, can influence their business environment in the 
positive direction.  Here, collective actions in discussion are not a type of 
collaboration such as political influence over government to seek protection from 
foreign competitors, which may hinder the innovation in the long run.  The type of 
collaboration in discussion is to improve their business environment, which may 
foster things such as activities of risky investors, availability of quality people, 
interactions of people, collective learning, exchange of ideas, and so on.  The 
important criterion is if the action enhances entrepreneurial opportunities in an 
entrepreneurial cluster or not. 
Like the governments roles, many examples can be derived.  Firms in a cluster 
can influence government to improve regulatory frameworks governing 
entrepreneurial activities by collective actions.  They can prompt government to set 
up policies toward fostering entrepreneurship.  They can improve the input 
conditions by forming funds to open related courses at professional schools and 
establishing an institution for research interests in common.  They can improve the 
entrepreneurial context by awarding entrepreneurs for social philanthropy.  They can 
improve the networking conditions by creating an institution that convenes various 
programs that facilitate networking.  They can improve the market conditions by 
promoting the concept of their innovative products to customers.  By collective 
actions to enhance entrepreneurial opportunities, all can benefit in the cluster. 
Those collaborations should include government and other entities such as non-
profit organizations.  They may help the collaborations via funding and other means.  
Although collaborations may not be necessary conditions for the presence of 
entrepreneurial clusters, they can enhance the strength of the clusters.  The 
important thing, and probably somewhat difficult thing, is that the constituents in the 
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cluster have the common vision and some kind of cohesion in mind toward 
enhancing entrepreneurial opportunities. 
 
Use of the Framework 
 
The entrepreneurial diamond framework is to help researchers, constituents, and 
policy makers understand the conditions and characteristics of the entrepreneurial 
clusters of interest.  It can be used as a tool to overview the conditions of an 
entrepreneurial cluster, to understand the dynamics of the cluster, to identify the 
strengths and the weakness of the cluster, to set a priority to enhance entrepreneurial 
opportunities of the cluster, and to generate consensus on it among the constituents of 
the cluster. 
After the next section that goes further into the dynamics of the diamond, we will 
apply the framework to Silicon Valley, perhaps the most famous entrepreneurial 
cluster in the world, to demonstrate its usefulness for analyzing and understanding 
the determinants and dynamics of technology entrepreneurship.  Further in the 
following chapter, we will examine several evolving entrepreneurial clusters around 
the world using the framework. 
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3.3 Deterrents of the Evolution 
The four attributes of the entrepreneurial diamond constitute self-reinforcing 
loops with high impact venture creation and spin-off creation.  Once a positive flow 
occurs, these positive feedback loops reinforce the positive flow further.  However, 
many regions emulating Silicon Valley often see little change.  This is probably 
because some of the four attributes have unfavorable profiles, but even if the four 
attributes have favorable, or at least moderate profiles, the positive flow may only be 
a slow, tiny indication at the beginning, taking a long time to become a massive flow. 
However, an input to the system may provoke a vigorous flow from a tiny 
indication.  The input may be a noise but a positive input that starts the engine of the 
self-reinforcing loop.  In reality, some chance event may become this input: a venture 
that had endeavored on a dangerous voyage, making a strike success with some luck; a 
genius that grabbed a tremendous market opportunity, becoming a millionaire; an 
article spotting a light on a hidden success in the shade, becoming widely recognized; 
and so on.  However, why is a flow of an indication so slow and small in spite of 
successes and efforts to materialize them?  This is considered due to inertia.  The 
larger the economy is, the bigger the force of inertia is.  Sometimes, this force of 
inertia is called deterrents in the real economy. 
The deterrents to forbidden new venture creation include a lot of things.  Lets 
take an example of Japan, where entrepreneurship is considered underdeveloped and 
the entry rate of new ventures continues to decline in recent decades.  One 
measurement indicates that the fraction of the people with entrepreneurial activities 
Figure 3-6  Reasons for falling entry rate in Japan 
Note:  Total exceeds 100 due to multiple responses. 
Source:  Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, Japan; White Paper 1999. 
Reasons for falling entry rate in Japan 
(A survey on venture capitalists and other backers) 
• Risk of impact on lives in case of failure 65.1% 
• Strong preference for salary man lifestyle 42.5% 
• Low level of management skills  41.4% 
• Low prestige for starting a business 36.0% 
• Increase in startup costs   19.4% 
• Greater competition   17.7% 
• Regulations    17.2% 
• Difficult entry due to business practices 12.9% 
• No business seeds to speak of  12.9% 
• High level of specialist knowledge required  9.7% 
• Family unsupportive     5.1% 
• Other reasons      5.9% 
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in the labor work force is only 1.8% in 2002 (Table 2-3), considerably lower than 
other counties.  Figure 3-6 shows a result of a survey asking the reasons for falling 
entry rate in Japan.  From the top reasons, 65.1 percent of venture capitalists 
answered risk of impact on lives in case of failure; 42.5 percent answered strong 
preference for salary man lifestyle; 41.4 percent answered low level of management 
skills; and 36 percent answered low prestige for starting a business.  As should be 
along with these four main reasons, in this chapter, we will examine the risk of 
impact on lives, the psychological barrier to change from salary man to entrepreneurs, 
the availability of quality people with management skills, and the low prestige of 
entrepreneurs as the representative deterrents that hinder the vigorous flow in the 
self-reinforcing loop of technology entrepreneurship. 
 
Personal Financial Risk and Social Risk 
 
The risk that may destroy lives in case of failure includes personal financial risk 
and social risk.  An entrepreneur who had appropriated large personal loans for his 
ventures equity may have to pay the debt even after he has no salary from the failed 
venture.  An entrepreneur who failed may have to assume the severe reality that gives 
no other job and cold attitudes from friends and relatives from whom he had 
borrowed his startup finance. 
Figure 3-7 shows a System Dynamics model of personal financial risk.  The model 
consists of variables and causal links that represent causal relationships.  Causal links 
with plus marks indicate positive links, that is, variables at the heads of arrows 
increase/decrease in the same direction as variables at the bottoms of arrows.  Causal 
Figure 3-7  System Dynamics model of personal financial risk 
Note:  Networking conditions and market conditions are omitted. 
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links with minus marks indicate negative links, meaning that variables at the heads of 
arrows increase/decrease in the opposite direction as variables at the bottoms of 
arrows.  Boxes represent stocks, into which flows accumulate, and from which flows 
spill over.  The four boxes and flows at the bottom are entrepreneurial activities.  
From Potential Base, Aspires accumulate to Aspiring Entrepreneurs in a region.  By 
Entries, Aspiring Entrepreneurs form Nascent Startups, and Successes turn Nascent 
Startups into Growing Startups.  For the sake of simplicity, important factors such as 
the networking conditions and the market conditions are omitted in the models in 
this section. 
Successes accumulate into Success Entrepreneurs.  A larger number of Growing 
Startups attract more Equity Investments because investors see a big chance in a 
region with a lot of growing firms.  More Equity Investments lead to improved Risk 
Money Availability.  If risk money is available to aspiring entrepreneurs, they dont 
have to borrow personal loans for all of the needed capital at the startup stage.  Then 
even if the venture fails, entrepreneurs themselves are free from the part of the loss of 
the equity which risk money invested.  By these causal relationships, Personal 
Financial Risk is lowered by Successes, and the lowered Personal Financial Risk 
prompts entries, thus influencing on the increase in the number of Successes.  These 
links constitute a reinforcing loop of Free from Personal Debt. 
The model indicates that once a lot of successes of startups occur, it is likely for 
personal financial risk to be lowered.  With other things equal, personal financial risk 
Figure 3-8  System Dynamics model of personal social risk 
Notes:  Networking conditions and market conditions are omitted. 
* Detailed causal links are shown in other relevant figures. 
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remains to be a deterrent to entries if successes dont happen.  This is an aspect of the 
nature of the deterrent.  Because of the force of inertia concerning this reinforcing 
loop, personal financial risk remains to seem a big obstacle that is hard to remove. 
Figure 3-8 shows a model of personal social risk.  More Successes are likely to 
increase Labor Mobility by me too reaction of followers.  More Growing Startups 
create more jobs, increasing Another Chance from a Failure together with the 
increased Labor Mobility.  On the other hand, Familiarity is increased by the 
increased number of entrepreneurial activities (details will be shown in a following 
figure), so is Prestige.  The improved Familiarity and Prestige are likely to enhance 
Understanding from Family and Informal Private Loans with Understanding of Risk 
so that a failed entrepreneur may not have to worry about the attitudes of his family 
and the people from whom he borrowed startup loans because they had understood 
high possibility of failures and a significance of entrepreneurship.  This understanding 
of surrounding people, coupled with the improved availability of another chance 
from a failure, is likely to lower Personal Social Risk involved in entrepreneurial 
activities, thus leading to more entries.  These loops are reinforcing loops. 
The model indicates that once a lot of successes of startups occur, it is likely for 
personal social risk to be lowered.  However, with other things equal, personal social 
risk remains to be a deterrent to entries if successes dont happen. 
 
Psychological Barrier 
 
The psychological barrier to entrepreneurship hinders people to think positively 
about entrepreneurial opportunities.  It can be modeled that with this barrier, people 
tend to think that they will remain to what they are now.  Figure 3-9 shows a model 
of psychological barrier.  Psychological Barrier is likely to be lowered if Prestige of 
entrepreneurs is higher; people hear a lot of success stories; and people are familiar 
with entrepreneurs.  Familiarity is the accumulation of contacts with entrepreneurs 
and news of successes and failures.  News of both successes and failures accumulate to 
Familiarity, leading to lowered Psychological Barrier, because by them people know 
and understand what the bright side and dark side of entrepreneurial activities are.  
Familiarity as a stock is going to saturate as it grows.  On the other hand, Failure 
Stories themselves raise Psychological Barrier because the negative perception of the 
dark side of entrepreneurial activities is emphasized.  The lowered Psychological 
Barrier is likely to prompt aspires and entries, influencing on the increase in Successes 
and the number of entrepreneurs.  These loops, except for the one with Failure 
Stories, are reinforcing loops.  The model indicates that once a lot of aspires and 
entries occur, it is likely for psychological barrier to be lowered.  However, with 
other things equal, psychological barrier remains to be a deterrent to both aspires and 
entries.  
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Figure 3-9  System Dynamics model of psychological barrier 
Notes:  Networking conditions and market conditions are omitted. 
* Detailed causal links are shown in other relevant figures. 
 
Quality People 
 
Figure 3-10 shows a model of entrants of quality people.  Entrants of Quality 
People are likely to be raised when Prestige, Familiarity, and the number of Success 
Stories are high; and the number of Failure Stories is not large.  Prestige is the 
accumulation of News of Successes.  The incident of Philanthropy by success 
entrepreneurs also accumulate to Prestige.  But News of Failures works in the 
opposite way so that the accumulation of them lowers Prestige.  Entrants of Quality 
People are in turn likely to raise Prestige.  Prestige as a stock is going to saturate as it 
grows.  As Entrants of Quality People increase, Chance of Encountering Quality 
People increases.  Therefore, the chance of forming good founding teams is enhanced, 
leading to the increase in Success Rate.  Increased quality people also increase the 
number of Aspires.  We see a reinforcing loop of Quality People, as well as a 
reinforcing loop of Smart People Gather. 
The model indicates that once a lot of successes occur, it is likely for quality 
people to enter entrepreneurial activities.  Further, once the prestige is raised by the 
entrants of quality people, it attracts quality people more.  However, with other 
things equal, the low availability of quality people remains to be a deterrent to both 
aspires and entries if successes dont happen, and the prestige remains low. 
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Figure 3-10  System Dynamics model of entrants of quality people 
Notes:  Networking conditions and market conditions are omitted. 
* Detailed causal links are shown in other relevant figures. 
 
All of the representative deterrents we examined have characteristics of the self-
reinforcing loop.  Because of the force of inertia, the positive flow may be only a slow, 
tiny indication at the beginning.  Especially, the bigger the economy is, the heavier 
the force of inertia is.  This is why many regions emulating Silicon Valley tend to lose 
their temper before the motion of the system becomes noticeable.  However, the 
characteristics of the reinforcing loop with the force of inertia also mean another 
aspect: a tiny indication and the accumulation of successes may eventually become a 
noticeable flow of the system; and inputs in the positive direction may fuel the flow 
and change the situation rapidly.  It is possible that inputs such as chance events and 
government policies may become striking inputs and trigger a vigorous flow in the 
self-reinforcing loop of the entrepreneurial diamond. 
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3.4 Silicon Valley Case 
On January 1, 1939, two classmates at Stanford University launched from a one-
car garage in Palo Alto an electronic measuring device company.  Six decades later 
their company, Hewlett-Packard, led the Valley in revenues, with $47.1 billion in 
1999.  In April 1994, another pair of Stanford students worked during their spare time 
to build Yet Another Hierarchical Officious Oracle.  Today their firm is called 
simply Yahoo! and is the first and leading web search engine, with a market 
capitalization of $70 billion (Lee et al. 2000). 
Silicon Valley is a region in 
Northern California that spans from its 
heart in Palo Alto of Santa Clara 
County to San Mateo County in the 
north and Santa Cruz County in the 
south.  Within this region, 2.3 million 
people live and total jobs amount to 
1.35 million.  The driving industry 
clusters are computer and 
communication hardware manu-
facturing, semiconductor and 
equipment manufacturing, electronic 
component manufacturing, bio-
medical, software, innovation services, 
creative services, and corporate offices1.  
The beauty of the San Francisco Bay 
Area, its proximity to open spaces and 
the urban amenities of San Francisco, 
and the intellectual qualities of its 
leading universities historically have 
been major attractions2. 
Silicon Valley has experienced a sharp decline after the Internet babble around 
2000.  It lost 127,000 jobs since the first quarter of 2001.  The venture capital 
investment in Silicon Valley companies declined from over $20 billion in 2000, the 
record high, to $4.8 billion in 2002, equivalent level of 1998 and 1999.  Yet, overall 
value added per employee in Santa Clara County steadily reached $184,300, much 
higher than the U.S. average of $82,300.  The portion of the Valleys workforce in 
R&D-related jobs hovered around 10 percent, a full 2½ times the national average.  
And the venture capital investment in the region remains to account around 20 
                                                
1 Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, 2003 Index of Silicon Valley. 
2 Lee et al. (2000) 
Source: Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network
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percent of the national venture capital investment3.  Still, Silicon Valley reigns as the 
leading cluster of innovation and entrepreneurship that virtually any region in the 
world wants to emulate. 
 
National Level Analysis 
 
Even at the national level, the United States is widely considered to have 
favorable attributes for entrepreneurial activities.  In fact, the entrepreneurial activity 
of the country is high.  Concerning Total Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) index, 
which measures the fraction of the people with entrepreneurial activities in the labor 
work force, the United States has 11.6% for the average of 2000-2002 (Table 2-3), 
exhibiting the highest level among the G7 countries.  Figure 3-11 shows the entry and 
exit rate in the U.S. in the last decade.  Except for 1991 when the GDP growth was 
negative, we can see the steady level of the entry rate exceeding the exit rate.  
Although the two measures dont distinguish technology entrepreneurship from the 
overall entrepreneurial activities, the high level entrepreneurial activities are a 
positive factor to nurture technology entrepreneurship. 
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Figure 3-11  Entry/exit rate and GDP growth of the United States 
Notes: Entry and exit rates are percentages of the total stock (employer firms) at the end of 
the previous year.  Years start at March of the previous years. 
Sources: U.S. Small Business Administration, Statistics of US Businesses. 
GDP data  World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
In order to assess the four attributes of the national diamond, it is desirable to 
have objective benchmarking measures across countries.  Although it is considered 
practically impossible to gather harmonized numerical measurements of the factors 
                                                
3 Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, 2003 Index of Silicon Valley. 
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from risk money availability to labor mobility, World Economic Forum, an 
independent international organization, succeeds in measuring various factors 
concerning the microeconomic competitiveness across countries, by adopting the 
country ranking system based on a survey (World Economic Forum 2002). 
 
 
 
Figure 3-12  Country rankings concerning the entrepreneurial diamond of the U.S. 
Notes: Values are relative positions among 75 countries.  Ranks are determined basically by 
the average of the scaled points scored by senior business leaders in the 75 countries. 
The United States ranks 1st on Company Operations and Strategy and 2nd on 
Quality of the National Business Environment.  () indicates rankings among the G7 
countries.  * The value is ranked opposite to the favorable direction.  (Prestige of 
Entrepreneurs) is a complement measure. 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
 
It is conducting a detailed survey across 75 countries about the quality of the 
microeconomic business environment and the sophistication of company operations 
Input Conditions 
Quality of Management School         1 (1)
Availability of Scientists and Engineers  8 (1)
Venture Capital Availability         1 (1)
Ease of Access to Loans          6 (1)
Quality of Scientific Research 
     Institutions           1 (1)
Company Spending on R&D         3 (2)
Patents per Capita (2000)          1 (1)
Intellectual Property Protection         2 (2)
Local Availability of Specialized 
     Research and Training Services         1 (1)
Market Conditions
Technological Sophistication       1 (1) 
Buyer Sophistication        3 (2) 
Extent of Marketing        1 (1) 
Entry into Local Markets        8 (3) 
Intensity of Local Competition       1 (1) 
Effectiveness of Anti-Trust Policy       4 (2) 
Government Procurement of 
     Advanced Technology Products    13 (5)
Local Equity Market Access      16 (6)
Entrepreneurial Context
(Prestige of Entrepreneurs)               (1)
Hiring and Firing Practices            6 (1)
Administrative Burden for Start-ups        3 (1)
Days to Start a Firm           19 (3)
*Extent of Bureaucratic Red Tape          12 (3)
Networking Conditions
University/Industry Research 
     Collaboration              7 (2) 
Decentralization of Corporate Activity    1 (1)
Willingness to Delegate Authority           4 (1)
United States 
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and strategy.  The survey involves more than 4,700 respondents, mainly senior 
business leaders, from those countries and about 70 criteria.  The ranking among 
countries for each criterion is determined by the average of the scaled points scored 
by respondents.  For example, a criterion of Venture Capital Availability is scored by 
the question that Entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects can generally find 
venture capital in your country (1=not true, 7=true).  Among over 70 criteria, the 
author chose about 25 as related to the entrepreneurial diamond.  Figure 3-12 shows 
those criteria and their rankings about the United States. 
Further, the author chose another criterion concerning the prestige of 
entrepreneurs in order to complement those criteria.  There is a survey across 
countries done by Global Entrepreneurship Monitor in 1999.  The survey asked about 
1,000 people in each country that Do you think starting a new business is a respected 
occupation in your community?  The result of the survey is presented in Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1  A survey result concerning the prestige of entrepreneurs 
 Percentages who 
think entrepreneurs 
are respected 
USA 91 
Canada 86 
Italy 68 
United Kingdom 38 
Germany 73 
France 83 
Japan 8 
Note: Percentages of respondents who answered yes on Do you think 
starting a business is a respected occupation in your community? 
Source:  Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, Adult Population Survey 1999. 
 
The rankings of the countries and the complementary survey result might not be 
perfect criterion for assessing the profiles of the four attributes of the national 
diamond, but those are the objective benchmarking measures that are usually not 
easily available across nations and are very valuable for the sake of this study.  At least, 
we can get some sense of relative strengths and weaknesses of the profiles of the 
national diamond by using those relative-positioned measures. 
 
Input Conditions.  Concerning the quality people with management skills, the U.S. 
is ranked 1st on Quality of Management Schools, inferring a good availability of them.  
The U.S. is ranked 8th on Availability of Scientists and Engineers, and this is the top 
position among the G7 countries.  Concerning the risk money, the U.S. is ranked 1st 
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on Venture Capital Availability, leading other G7 countries far ahead (the second is 
Canada ranked 8th).  Concerning the knowledge creation, Quality of Scientific 
Research Institutions of the U.S. is ranked 1st and Company Spending on Research and 
Development is ranked 3rd, second among the G7 countries only to Japan ranked 2nd.  
The U.S. has the 1st position on the patents per capita granted in the U.S., which is 
considered a measure of international patents.  The United States has the most leading 
position among the G7 countries on the profile of the input conditions. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  Concerning the prestige, 91 percent say that 
entrepreneurs are respected, stunningly higher fraction compared with other G7 
countries.  The higher fraction of people with entrepreneurial activity (TEA index) 
and the steady entry rate in the last decade indicates that the familiarity with 
entrepreneurs is also high among the G7 countries.  Concerning the labor mobility, 
the U.S. is ranked 6th on Hiring and Firing Practices that indicates the flexibility of 
hire and fire without impedance of regulations.  Although this is not the only 
measure of the labor mobility, the rank that is far higher than other G7 countries 
(Canada positions the second by the 24th rank and France is the worst by the 74th rank) 
infers higher labor mobility.  Concerning the regulatory frameworks, although the 
median response of the Days to Start a Firm is 30 days and ranked 19th (lagging behind 
the United Kingdom and Canada), Administrative Burden for Startups is considered 
light and ranked 3rd, the top position among the G7 countries.  On the contrary, the 
U.S. is ranked 12th on Extent of Bureaucratic Red Tape, which measures how much 
time senior management spends working with government agencies/regulations.  This 
is the third worst behind Japan and Germany, and might influence the growth of 
startups. 
Networking Conditions.  Because virtually nobody monitors the amount and 
quality of communications and interactions, it is generally difficult to quantify the 
networking conditions.  Yet some criteria of World Economic Forum give insights.  
University/Industry Research Collaboration criterion asked In its R&D activity, 
business collaboration with local universities is: (1=minimal or nonexistent, 
7=intensive and ongoing).  The U.S. is ranked 7th, second among the G7 countries to 
Canada ranked 6th.  The culture of corporate operations such as Decentralization of 
Corporate Activity and Willingness to Delegate Authority gives us inference on the 
condition of inter-corporate networks because more open corporate culture facilitates, 
or at least permits, more open interactions across employees in different firms.  The 
U.S. is ranked 1st on Decentralization of Corporate Activity and 4th on Willingness to 
Delegate Authority that is the top position among the G7 countries.  It can be said 
that the United States has higher possibility of having favorable networking 
conditions than the other G7 countries. 
Market Conditions.   A countrys position in Technological Sophistication is a 
broad measure for the innovativeness of market demand and market opportunities.  
The U.S. is ranked 1st on this.  Buyer Sophistication, which asked Buyers in your 
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country are: (1=unsophisticated and choose based on the lowest price, 
7=knowledgeable and demanding and buy innovative products), is another measure.  
The U.S. is ranked 3rd, the top position among the G7 countries.  Extent of Marketing, 
which asked The extent of marketing in your country is: (1=limited or primitive, 
7=high and among the worlds most sophisticated), enhances the diversity of market 
demand.  The U.S. is ranked 1st on this.  Further, the pro-competition conditions of 
markets make it more possible to create market opportunities.  The U.S. is ranked 8th 
on the occurrence of Entry into Local Market, third among the G7 countries to 
Germany and the United Kingdom.  Intensity of Local Competition is ranked 1st, and 
Effectiveness of Anti-Trust Policy is ranked 4th, second to Germany ranked 2nd.  The 
United States has the top position on the innovativeness and diversity of market 
demand within the G7 countries, and among the highest on pro-competition 
conditions.  On the other hand, concerning Government Procurement of Advanced 
Technology Products, which directly enhances the market opportunities for 
technology entrepreneurship, the U.S. is ranked 13th, 5th among the G7 countries.  
Finally, concerning the equity stock market, the United States has developed stock 
markets for growing new ventures such as NASDAQ.  However, Local Equity Market 
Access, which asked Raising money by issuing shares on the local market is: 
(1=nearly impossible, 7=quite possible for a good company), is ranked 16th, the 
second worst to Japan among the G7 countries.  It is not an only measure, but it is 
relatively hard to raise money in local equity market in the U.S. 
Overall, from the view point of this analysis, the United States has the very strong 
profile of the entrepreneurial national diamond among the G7 countries.  Summary is 
shown in Figure 3-13. 
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Figure 3-13  Analysis of the entrepreneurial national diamond of the U.S. 
 
Early Evolution of Silicon Valley 
 
Many observe the origins of Silicon Valley traced back to the establishment of 
Hewlett-Packard in 1939 at a small Palo Alto garage, and a notable individual, 
Fredrick Terman.  Frederick Terman, who moved to Stanford University to become 
an electrical engineering professor after his graduation from MIT, encouraged his 
graduate students William Hewlett and David Packard to commercialize an audio-
oscillator that Hewlett had designed while working on his masters thesis (Saxenian 
1996).  It was his frustration with the lack of jobs for graduates of the Stanford 
electrical engineering department that led him to energetically encourage several of 
his former pupils to start their own businesses (Gibbons 2000).  Terman lent Hewlett 
and Packard $538 to start producing the machine, he helped them find work to 
finance their initial experiments, and he arranged a loan from a Palo Alto bank which 
allowed them to begin commercial production (Saxenian 1996).  Here we can see an 
early wave of entrepreneurship evolution stimulated by an eager individual within 
the vicinity of Stanford University. 
National Level
• Highest prestige of 
entrepreneurs among G7 
countries and high 
familiarity. 
• Labor mobility high. 
• Low administrative burden 
for startups but existence of 
bureaucratic red tape. 
National Level
• Highest level of university/ 
industry research collaboration 
among G7 countries. 
• More open corporate culture 
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networks.
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quality people. 
• Highest availability of risk 
money among G7 countries. 
• Top level of knowledge 
creation. 
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• Highest level of 
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countries. 
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but relatively hard to raise 
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However, this kind of entrepreneurial episode does not seem to have happened 
from nothing.  Sturgeon (2000) points out that it grew out of a historically and 
geographically specific context.  Sturgeon traces the origin of a context for electronics 
innovation and entrepreneurship to the earliest days of the twentieth century.  In 
1909 in Palo Alto, a graduate from Stanford University named Cyril Elwill established 
a radio transmission company, later called Federal Telegraph Corporation (FTC).  
Upon the establishment, he turned to the president of Stanford and the head of Civil 
Engineering Department to finance a new company, which illustrates an earlier 
example of the involvement of Stanford University than Terman (note that Stanford 
University was established in 1891).  He built and demonstrated a wireless voice 
transmission system, and impressed San Francisco financiers invested in the company.  
The transmitters were adopted later by the U.S. Navy, and with the large orders from 
the Navy during World War I, FTC grew.  The Stanford High Voltage Laboratory was 
of great assistance to FTCs efforts to improve the technology.  More interestingly, 
FTC generated some spin-off companies such as Magnavox, Fisher Research 
Laboratories and Litton Industries in the area.  For example, Litton Industries was 
established in 1932 by a Stanford graduate who had worked for FTC.  Like Hewlett-
Packard, it made a fortune during World War II, becoming a major manufacturer of 
military electronics systems.  Further, in the early 1920s a young Frederick Terman 
spent a summer there at FTC as an intern.  FTC continued to be one of the key 
players in the early San Francisco Bay Area electronics industry through the early 
1930s (Sturgeon 2000).  In this regard, Frederick Termans activities encouraging 
entrepreneurship did not arise in a vacuum; rather, he can be better understood as a 
catalyst and a booster in an already prepared environment (Kenney 2000). 
The early commercial successes of firms such as Hewlett-Packard and Litton 
Industries consolidated Northern Californias position as an emerging center of 
electronics production.  However, the scale of industrial activity was insignificant 
compared to that of the East Coast at that time.  In fact, some of the regions leading 
companies moved east during the 1930s when radio became a national medium 
(Saxenian 1996). 
Terman, later Dean of Engineering Department and Provost of Stanford, seems to 
have continued his pivotal role.  He had strongly encouraged William Shockley, a 
Novel Prize laureate in physics and a native of Palo Alto, to locate his new Shockley 
Semiconductor Laboratory in the universitys vicinity (Lecuyer 2000) in 1956, leading 
to the foundation of Fairchild Semiconductor, which would be the second major 
inflection point of Silicon Valley after Hewlett-Packard and Terman. 
 
Fairchild Semiconductor was established in Palo Alto in 1957 by a group of eight 
physicists and engineers from Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory to manufacture 
advanced silicon transistors.  Among these famous eight, including Gordon Moore 
and Robert Noyce, later founders of Intel, five had PhDs in the physical sciences from 
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eminent universities such as MIT and Cal Tech, and other three were engineers, one 
of which was a Stanford graduate.  A year earlier, the group had joined the Shockley 
Semiconductor Laboratory founded by William Shockley.  The eight were attracted to 
the laboratory by an interesting opportunity for young and ambitious scientists with 
an interest in the promising semiconductor field, and also by the Bay Areas beauty 
and proximity to the Sierra Nevada Mountains (Lecuyer 2000).  They soon were 
increasingly unhappy with Shocklys heavy-handed management style, and started 
seeking another opportunity, intent upon staying in the area and keeping the group 
together.  They could not easily find jobs in the area, but socialized in academic 
science rather than entrepreneurship, they had never thought of establishing their 
own firm (Lecuyer 2000).  They asked Hayden, Stone & Company, a small investment 
bank in New York with which one of them had a contact, to help them find a 
corporation interested in hiring them collectively.  Arthur Rock and his colleague at 
Hayden Stone, interested in developing new types of financial services for new firms 
and attracted by the groups intellectual abilities and the potential of the 
semiconductor business, suggested that the group establish its own corporation and 
offered to secure capital among corporate backers.  However, Rock encountered 
considerable difficulties in raising the needed capital from East Coast large firms.  
Only Fairchild Camera and Instrument, a medium-sized military contractor based in 
Long Island, expressed an active interest.  Exploiting Fairchild Cameras keen interest 
in reorienting the company toward electronics, Hayden Stone negotiated one of the 
first venture capital agreements on the West Coast.  Fairchild Camera financed the 
establishment of a new firm, Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, with a loan of 
$1.38 million for its first year and a half of operation (Lecuyer 2000). 
By gaining a large share of high-performance silicon transistors for the military 
which the founders reasoned would have the financial resources to buy such complex 
and expensive products, Fairchild emerged as the leading silicon manufacturer in the 
late 1950s and very early 1960.  It revolutionized the industrys products by 
introducing high-performance and reliable devices that other firms later copied 
(Lecuyer 2000).  Fairchild Semiconductor was successfully sold to Fairchild Camera in 
1959. 
Fairchild Semiconductor had an enormous impact on Silicon Valley.  Fairchilds 
founders and Hayden Stone played a major role in the formation of the venture 
capital industry in the area.  Arthur Rock co-established the Peninsulas first venture 
capital partnership, Davis and Rock, in 1961, raising monies among Bay Area 
industrialists.  Four Fairchilds founders, each of whom had received $250,000 after 
the sale of the company, invested in his fund.  In addition to their investments in 
Rocks partnership, Fairchild founders also independently financed new science-
based firms in the area.  Out of these activities emerged yet another venture capital 
partnership, Kleiner Perkins.  These funds were rapidly emulated.  As a result, the San 
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Francisco Peninsula became one of the largest centers for venture capital in the 
nation in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Lecuyer 2000). 
The rise of the venture capital industry, along with Fairchilds spectacular success 
and the numerous business and technical opportunities arising from its research and 
development efforts, led to an extraordinary entrepreneurial expansion on the 
Peninsula in the 1960s.  Twenty-six silicon firms were founded in the area between 
1960 and 1969.  They were almost all established by former Fairchild engineers and 
managers.  Among the most notable was Intel, founded by Noyce and Moore in 1968.  
While Fairchild had a workforce of 1,400 in 1960, the firm and its spin-offs employed 
12,000 technicians, engineers, and operators on the Peninsula ten years later (Lecuyer 
2000).  Now many Silicon Valley firms have a genealogy chart, first developed by a 
journalist and later maintained by the trade association SEMI, hanging in their lobbies, 
tracing their ancestry back to Fairchild (Castilla et al. 2000). 
  Fairchild also developed new corporate culture that was later widely adopted by 
other silicon firms.  It had a vision for this newly emerging industry that explicitly 
rejected the hierarchical East Coast corporate culture.  For example, there was no 
reserved parking at Fairchild, which was conceived of as a democratic community 
rather than a hierarchical workplace.  And this new approach diffused as employees 
from Fairchild spun off to start their own companies (Castilla et al. 2000).  These spin-
offs led to rapid technological breakthroughs created by networks of scientists and 
engineers building on the accumulated knowledge of their predecessors, and their 
experience in previous firms. 
 
The Entrepreneurial Diamond 
 
Silicon Valley exhibits a perfect profile of the favorable diamond for 
entrepreneurial activities.  Some of the examples that indicate it, along with the 
summary of the early evolution, include the following. 
Input conditions.  Although Stanford University had produced trained quality 
people such as electronics engineers long since its foundation in 1891, there had not 
been ample risk money from the earliest days of Silicon Valley.  It was impressed local 
financiers who backed FTC, Terman-arranged local banks who backed Hewlett-
Packard, and sympathetic individuals at a NY bank who arranged finance of Fairchild 
Semiconductors.  But it was the success entrepreneurs of Fairchild who triggered the 
formation of venture capitals in the 1960s, and the emulation and success models have 
accumulated since then, now to the state where the venture capital investment in the 
region accounts around 20% of the national venture capital investment. 
Today Stanford University has continued to be an eminent university for 
education and knowledge creation within the region among other Bay Area 
universities such as University of California at Barkeley.  Stanford itself has 14,000 
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undergraduates and graduate4.  Stanford is ranked 2nd in the top business schools and 
2nd in the top engineering schools on Americas Best Graduate Schools5.  Stanford 
startups accounted for about 60 percent of total Silicon Valley revenues in both 1988 
and 1996 (Gibbons 2000).  The number of science, engineering, math and computer 
science degrees awarded by Bay Area postsecondary institutions is 5,2946 annually.  
Further, Silicon Valley has an array of support services for new high-tech businesses 
that include venture capitalists and bankers, lawyers, headhunters, accountants, 
consultants, and a host of other specialists (Lee et al. 2000).  About half of the six 
hundred venture capital firms in the United States are in Silicon Valley, and one 
group of 120 industry executives, known as the Band of Angels, has helped launch 
sixty startups (Cooper and Folta 2000). 
Entrepreneurial context.  It is notable that there had been early entrepreneurs 
since the early 20th century, which are considered to have generated the prepared 
context to produce such an eager encouragement of entrepreneurship by Terman.  
Through the encouragement of startups and the subsequent successes of startups such 
as Hewlett-Packard since the late 1930s, they are considered the first inflection point 
of Silicon Valley that evolved the entrepreneurial context.  Fairchild and its success 
entrepreneurs since the early 1960s are considered the second inflection point that 
propagated spin-off creation and open corporate culture that accumulated into the 
favorable profile of the entrepreneurial context. 
Today with the accumulation of 40 years since then, the engineers in the Valley 
move frequently from one project or company to another (Castilla et al. 2000).  Lee et 
al. (2000) depicts a climate in Silicon Valley that rewards risk-taking and tolerates 
failure.  Certainly a distinctive  and to many observers, unique  feature of Silicon 
Valley in comparison with other regions, especially non-U.S. ones, is the degree to 
which its business climate encourages risk-taking and tolerates failure In Silicon 
Valley, there are many examples of entrepreneurs who have failed and successfully 
started over.  These entrepreneurs (and their financiers) usually view failure as a 
learning experience. 
Networking conditions.  We saw Stanford University working as an anchor of 
networking opportunities with graduation ties to ask financial support and faculty to 
provide incubator roles even before the WWII.  The genealogy chart of Fairchild 
indicates broad and substantial networks its spin-offs have created since the 1960s.  
Today at both Stanford University and U.C. Berkeley, lively exchanges regularly 
occur among industry professionals, faculty, and students at seminars and conferences 
(Lee et al. 2000).  Its network-based industrial system promotes collective learning 
and flexible adjustment among specialist producers of a complex of related 
                                                
4 Stanford University website.  March 2003. 
5 U.S. News & World Report, Americas Best Graduate Schools 2004. 
6 Ibid. 
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technologies (Saxenian 1996).  Further, in Silicon Valley, networks have so special 
importance in the movement of labor, the evolution of influence and power, and the 
actual production of innovation that there is a saying the most crucial aspect of 
Silicon Valley is its networks (Castilla et al. 2000).  The institutions such as Joint 
Venture also promote cohesion and networking opportunities among members. 
Market Conditions.  It was the defense-related government procurement that gave 
rises to FTC, Hewlett-Packard, Fairchild Semiconductors, and others in Silicon Valley.  
It encouraged technology-intensive efforts of expensive complexity with rewards of 
large purchases of the military demand.  Further, Rowen (2000) argues that the 
advances in technology and markets generally in the latter half of the 20th century 
have fitted the Valleys industrial structure particularly well (Rowen 2000).  Today, 
although the military procurement might not be a large player, high density of high-
tech companies such as computer and information technology and biotechnology are 
themselves the source of the innovative demand.  The population of 2.3 million with 
34 percent of immigrants, and per capita income 66 percent higher than the national 
average also account a favorable profile of the market conditions of Silicon Valley. 
 
A narrative summary of the analysis is presented in Figure 3-14.  Silicon Valley 
from this analysis shows several important features of the evolution of the 
entrepreneurial cluster: (1) Stanford University has been as a source of trained 
engineers and an anchor of networks that gave chances for the successes of ventures 
such as FTC and Hewlett-Packard; (2) Electronics, as a new technology, has offered 
market opportunities to the series of ventures such as FTC, Hewlett-Packard, and 
Fairchild.  The opportunities had been further enhanced by the defense procurements; 
(3) two major inflection points that had had big impacts on the evolution of 
entrepreneurship are identified: Terman and Fairchild Semiconductor. 
A schematic summary of the analysis on the evolutionary dynamics of the cluster 
is presented in Figure 3-15.  In the series of self-reinforcing loops of the diamond 
since the early 20th century, we see several points that inflected from the regressed 
expectation of the previous tendency and worked as a fuel to the positive flow of the 
loop.  In the early 20th century, Stanford University and its trained engineers were 
existent conditions since the universitys foundation of 1891.  Then a trained engineer 
established Federal Telegraph Corporation (FTC) in 1909.  This would not have 
happened without the emergence of electronics and the risky investment of San 
Francisco financiers who were attracted by the possibility of the new technology.  
These abnormal events triggered the start of FTC: the electronics as a kick input to 
the market conditions and the investment as a kick input to the input conditions.  
FTCs success with the help of the defense procurement formed the self-reinforcing 
loop of high impact venture creation and the following spin-offs from it formed the 
self-reinforcing loop of spin-off creation, improving the profile of the diamond. 
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Termans role in the late 1930s is characterized as a catalyst and his emergence 
was a major abnormal event that had many influences.  He encouraged his students, 
helped the students to get finance, worked as a bridge between the students and 
Stanford University, and invited Shockley to settle there.  Through this catalyst, 
Hewlett-Packards success with the help of the defense procurement formed another 
self-reinforcing loop of high impact venture creation, leading to the improvement of 
the profile of the diamond.  Another major abnormal event of the cluster is the 
emergence of the eight individuals of Fairchild Semiconductor from Shockley 
Semiconductor Laboratory in the late 1950s.  Also, the individuals at a New York 
bank worked as an abnormal input to the input conditions to help start Fairchild 
Semiconductor in 1957.  Then the self-reinforcing loop of high impact venture 
creation and the self-reinforcing loop of spin-off creation were formed again.  The 
results include the improved input conditions by the creation of venture capitals of 
the success entrepreneurs, the improved entrepreneurial context by the spread of the 
Fairchilds corporate culture, and the improved networking conditions by the ties of 
the networks of the spin-offs.  Once the diamond gets this size of inertia, the self-
reinforcing loop continues itself.  Today Silicon Valley stands as the most advanced 
entrepreneurial cluster in the world. 
In addition to the very strong profile of the national diamond, Silicon Valley has 
the outstanding profile of the cluster diamond amongst any regions of the United 
States because of the accumulation of the evolution of technology entrepreneurship of 
almost 100 years. 
 
The analysis demonstrated how the entrepreneurial diamond framework works.  
It helped streamline many factors involved, state the conditions of the technology 
entrepreneurship both at the national level and the regional level, and extract the 
abnormal points such as chance events and emerging catalysts from a lot of events in 
the evolution of the cluster. 
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Figure 3-14  Analysis of the entrepreneurial cluster diamond of Silicon Valley  
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Figure 3-15  Analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of Silicon Valley 
Notes:  Boxes represent the four attributes of the diamond (right: input conditions, 
top: entrepreneurial context, bottom: networking conditions, left: market 
conditions).  Statements under the boxes represent existent conditions at times.  
Solid arrows represent abnormal events.  Circles represent major abnormal events.  
Shades are for illustrating gradual improvements, not absolute evaluations. 
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4 Case Studies 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Evolving Clusters 
In order to further demonstrate how the entrepreneurial diamond framework 
works and understand the determinants and dynamics of entrepreneurial clusters, 
three case studies were conducted: Cambridge, the United Kingdom; Munich, 
Germany; and Tokyo, Japan. 
Table 4-1  shows locations of Europes 50 hottest tech firms of the innovative 
products and services and the promising business models with the future potential 
that TIME identified by interviewing venture capitalists, industry experts and 
entrepreneurs in May 20027.  We can see some locations have plural hot tech firms: 
Cambridge of biotech, Cambridge of semiconductors, Glasgow of Optics, and 
Stockholm of wireless.  Cambridge has the most hot tech firms.  At the country level, 
the United Kingdom has 21 firms, and Germany and Sweden each has 6 firms. 
 
Table 4-1  Locations of Europes 50 hottest tech firms 
 
Biotech 
Semi-
conduc-
tors 
Optics Wireless 
Business 
Appli-
cation 
Emerging 
Tech-
nology 
Total 
UK 7 5 2 4 2 1 21 
  (Cambridge) (4) (3)   (1) (1) (9) 
  (London) (1) (1)  (1) (1)  (4) 
  (Glasgow)   (2)    (2) 
Germany 2 2   1 1 6 
  (Munich)  (1)     (1) 
Sweden    5 1  6 
  (Stockholm)    (3) (1)  (4) 
France 2 1 1   1 5 
Switzerland 2 1  1   4 
Belgium 1    1  2 
Ireland  1  1   2 
Netherlands 1  1    2 
Czech     1  1 
Finland    1   1 
Note: Cities cited are those who have multiple firms and Munich. 
Source: TIME Digital 2002, Europes 50 Hottest Tech Firms, May 2002. 
                                                
7 TIME Digital 2002, Europes 50 Hottest Tech Firms, May 27, 2002. 
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The author chose Cambridge and Munich because, at the country level, the U.K. and 
Germany are among the G7 counties and, at the location level, Cambridge has the 
most hot tech firms and Munich is known as the highly developing region in 
Germany.  The third country was chosen Japan because it is considered one of the 
least favorable environments for entrepreneurship among the G7 countries, and was 
considered to exhibit an interesting contrast.  Yet, as is rare in Japan, Tokyo is 
identified as a location that has relatively many young Internet ventures having 
emerged around 1999 and 2000. 
Although we dont pick up Sweden as a subject, it is known to have several high 
tech clusters such as Stockholm and Lund.  One of them is Linkoping, and is 
described here as a short example of an evolving cluster as it is reported in academic 
literature.  Klofsten and Jones-Evans (1996) describe the Linkoping area as one of the 
regions in Sweden at the forefront in the creation and development of new 
technology-based firms.  During the ten years, over 350 small technology-based spin-
offs have been established in the Linkoping region, with approximately 70 of these 
emerging directly as a result of academic research activities (Klofsten and Jones-Evans 
1996).  The Linkoping region has Saabs aircraft division, Ericson Radio, Mjardevi 
Science Park, Swedish Defense Research Establishment, and Linkoping University.  A 
number of firms have also evolved from business ideas conceived by one or more 
students during their studies.  Shedding light on a successful model of a close link 
between an institution founded by a group of business leaders and individuals from 
the university, and the universitys entrepreneurship center, they extract the links 
roles to encourage entrepreneurial activities, promote collective learning of 
management skills, and facilitate networking activities.  The case exhibits a good 
example of the evolution of an entrepreneurial cluster with a distinctive role of the 
favorable profile of the networking conditions. 
 
4.1.2 Interview 
Because the three locations that the author picked up are the relatively recent 
clusters, literature and articles were limited compared with Silicon Valley.  Therefore, 
the author conducted interviews to gain information on determinants and dynamics 
of these entrepreneurial clusters. 
Yet it is hard to identify legitimate determinants and dynamics from interviews 
because the information of this kind of social phenomenon resides basically in 
peoples vague perception until they are well written and known.  Further it would 
take thorough interviews with a lot of inside people to compensate the biases often 
involved in this kind of phenomenon.  In order to overcome this nature of the case 
study interview, and let both the purpose of the study that needs plural cases and the 
time and resource constraint be taken into account, the author adopted a unique 
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interview method based on a language analysis technique called the Language 
Processing (LP) Method. 
The LP Method was originally developed by a professor Shiba in the area of Total 
Quality Management to solve management problems such as manufacturing process 
improvement with non-quantitative data (Center for Quality of Management 1995).  
In order to compensate the ambiguous nature of qualitative data due to the fact that 
each person perceives the meaning of language differently, the LP Method uses 
semantics rules to make qualitative language data uniform and suitable for analysis.  
Take for example that somebody wants to solve an organizational culture problem.  
First, the method distinguishes the language of report that conveys the same meaning 
to everybody from the language of affection that conveys a sentiment.  Only using the 
language of report to the utmost, the participant writes down key symbolic 
statements about the problem based on his/her experience.  The number of the 
statements should be around twenty, or at least twelve, in order to capture the whole 
aspects of the problem and let later analysis easier.  Second, the statements will be 
grouped into several groups so that each of the groups has a common thread of a 
mental image, rather than the words themselves.  The number of the statements in a 
group should be three or lower than three.  Third, titles are given to each of the 
groups by using language of a higher level of abstraction going up from the level of 
the original statements.  Again, mental image should be used for developing titles.  
This is the first-level abstraction.  Finally, the second-level of abstraction is done from 
the first level groups with the same methodology of the previous stage.  The output is 
an extraction or a straight-forward identification of the organizational culture 
problem without a mix of different levels of statements and ambiguity.  (For further 
information of the method, see Center for Quality of Management 1995.) 
This LP Method is adopted for the interviews for this study, asking What were 
the essences of the entrepreneurship evolution in your location?  (The questionnaire 
and explanation of the method sent to interviewees are shown in Exhibit 4-1.)  Yet 
because applying semantics rules, grouping, and abstracting need some training that 
interviewees are not supposed to have taken, the interview becomes a collaborative 
way.   The interviewees are asked to describe about sixteen key symbolic statements 
to answer the question in language of report with the authors help.  After collecting 
the statements, the author groups them and abstracts them with the interviewees 
help, finally coming up with an output diagram for each of the interviewees. 
The purpose of the interviews is (1) gain information on determinants and 
dynamics of entrepreneurial clusters from the statements of key symbolic facts that 
are supposed to be language data suitable for analysis; and (2) grasp the perception of 
inside people on determinants and dynamics of entrepreneurial clusters from the 
abstracted titles that are supposed to be uniform qualitative language data.  The 
results of the interviews are used for complementing the information from the 
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available literature and articles, as well as checking if the descriptions of the 
entrepreneurial clusters are aligned with the perception of the inside people. 
The interviewees are inside players such as entrepreneurs and venture capitalists 
or close watchers such as academic researchers in Cambridge, Munich, and Tokyo.  
Because of the time-taking nature of the interview, the author first sought 
commitments to participate in the interview from interviewees, then conducted the 
interviews.  The collaborative LP interviews were done mainly via email sessions 
supplemented by telephone communication.  For the interviewees in Japan, a 
translation in Japanese of the questionnaire was used, and the results were translated 
in English by the author.  The results are shown in Exhibits at the end of each section 
of the case studies.  One interview for Cambridge, two interviews for Munich, and 
three interviews8 for Tokyo were conducted according to the extent of the need to 
achieve the purpose of the interviews for each of the cases. 
 
                                                
8 One of them is an LP diagram abstracted from a collection of publications of one individual. 
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Exhibit 4-1  The interview questionnaire used for the interviews (Collaborative LP 
interview) 
--- 
Please list down about 16 facts to answer the question. 
 
Question:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in XXX? 
The question is about environments or mental models surrounding entrepreneurs and start-up 
activities, which include but not limited to: 
! Input condition (e.g. risk money, managers, technology availability) 
! Entrepreneurial culture, legal framework 
! Networking opportunities 
! Market conditions for start-ups outputs such as products and companies stocks 
Essences include: 
! Events that had impact on them. 
! Changes that represent evolution of them. 
! Prerequisite conditions that the location has had. 
 
How to do: 
1. Remember your perception or image about the issue in your mind.  (Thought or opinion level) 
2. Dont try to describe your perception at this level, but first put your perception down to many facts. 
(Fact or experience level) 
3. Describe about 16 key symbolic facts, each in one sentence.  Sentences should be concrete including 
preferably proper nouns and all of (when), (where), (what/who) and (how). 
Please try to describe facts by visible or noticeable actions that can be recognized by others, not by 
inferred emotional words that cannot be recognized by others.  (Example: not My boss is angry, but 
My boss sits at his desk looking at me and saying nothing.) 
Because we will examine causal relationships later, you dont have to try to include causal explanations 
in all the sentences. 
 
Examples: 
- In spring of 1999, a success of three-year old company XXX at Munich became obvious to everybody 
in Germany by an article of YYY newspaper describing the companys profits. 
- During 1998-1999, at least 5 start-up companies were established continuously at AAA Park at 
Cambridge, right after US-based venture capital BBB opened its branch at AAA Park in fall of 1998. 
- Last year, Mr. CCC could contact with graduates from DDD university engineering school at the 
monthly conference about EEE that started a few years ago, resulting in him hiring two graduates for 
his start-up company. 
- In the late 1990s, venture capital investment in Munich region increased 80% per year to 3,333 
million euro in 2000. 
- FFF Government reduced paper work by about half to register company in 1997. 
- Company XXX has spun off at least 10 companies at Munich since it came to Munich in 1995. 
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4.2 Cambridge, UK 
Cambridge is located 50 miles north of 
London, historically having been a market 
town with the University of Cambridge.  The 
university, with 16,500 full-time students and 
31 Colleges such as Trinity College and St 
Johns College, has a world-wide reputation for 
outstanding academic achievement and the 
high quality of research undertaken in a wide 
range of science and arts subjects9. 
It was in 1985 when a study of the so-
called Cambridge Phenomenon (Segal Quince 
Wicksteed 1985) was published by a 
consultancy.  The study, sponsored by private 
companies, the University of Cambridge, and 
the government, first revealed the growing 
numbers of advanced technology companies established in and around the university 
and the market town of Cambridge, although it had been known for at least the past 
five years in some banking quarters and in the area itself that something interesting 
was happening in Cambridge by way of the startup and growth of indigenous high 
technology companies linked in some way to the university.  The study identified a 
total of 322 high technology firms in the Cambridge area by the end of 1984, having 
grown from 100 companies 10 years before and 30 companies 25 years before. 
Today, with a similar population around 100,00010, there are around 1,500 high 
tech businesses with 40,000 employees in the Cambridge area.  20 businesses are listed 
on stock markets11.  The firms are mostly in computing hardware and software, 
scientific instruments, electronics and telecommunications, technology consultancy 
and R&D, and increasingly biotechnology. 
 
National Level Analysis 
 
At the national level, the United Kingdom has Total Entrepreneurial Activity 
index of 6.1% for the average of 2000-2002 (Table 2-3).  Not as high as the United 
States and Canada, but higher than France and Japan.  Figure 4-1 shows the entry and 
exit rate in the U.K. in the last two decades.  The entry rate fluctuates from over 10 
percent to about 16 percent in the late 1980s.  The exit rate exceeds the entry rate 
                                                
9 University of Cambridge website as of April 2003. 
10 Surrounding area of the City of Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, has a population of 684,000.  
11 St. Johns Innovation Centre website as of April 2003. 
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right after the low GDP growth in the early 1990s although the entry rate is on the 
steady level in recent years.  The overall entrepreneurial activities that include from 
low impact entrepreneurship to high impact entrepreneurship seem moderate among 
the G7 countries. 
 
Exit/Entry Rate and GDP Growth
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Year
G
DP
 G
ro
w
th
 (%
)
-6.0
-3.0
0.0
3.0
6.0
9.0
12.0
15.0
18.0
Ex
it/
En
try
 R
at
e 
(%
)
GDP Growth
Entry Rate
Exit Rate
 
Figure 4-1  Entry/exit rate and GDP growth of the United Kingdom 
Notes: Entry and exit rates are percentages of the total stock (enterprises registered for VAT) 
at the start of the current year.  VAT registration threshold were changed in 1991 
and 1993. 
Sources: U.K. Small Business Service. 
GDP data  World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
 
As we did in the national analysis of the United States, the same benchmarking 
measures related to the entrepreneurial diamond are adopted for assessing relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the profiles of the national diamond (Figure 4-2). 
Input Conditions.  Concerning the quality people with management skills, the 
U.K. is ranked 6th on Quality of Management Schools, fourth but still among the 
leading group of the G7 countries with the United States, France, and Canada.  The 
U.K. is ranked 37th on Availability of Scientists and Engineers, and this is the lowest 
position among the G7 countries.  Concerning the risk money, the U.K. is ranked 9th 
on Venture Capital Availability, right behind the Canadas second position among the 
G7 countries.  Concerning the knowledge creation, Quality of Scientific Research 
Institutions of the U.K. is ranked 7th, third after the United States and France, and 
Company Spending on Research and Development is ranked 12th, the third worst 
among the G7 countries to Canada and Italy.  The U.K. has the 16th position on the 
U.S. patents per capita, the second worst among the G7 countries.  The United 
Kingdom has relatively low availability of scientist and engineers, moderate 
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Figure 4-2  Country rankings concerning the entrepreneurial diamond of the U.K. 
Notes: Values are relative positions among 75 countries.  Ranks are determined basically by 
the average of the scaled points scored by senior business leaders in the 75 countries.  
The United Kingdom ranks 7th on Company Operations and Strategy and 8th on 
Quality of the National Business Environment.  () indicates rankings among the G7 
countries.  * The value is ranked opposite to the favorable direction.  (Prestige of 
Entrepreneurs) is a complement measure. 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
 
availability of risk money, and low level of knowledge creation as measured by 
patents per capita in spite of good scientific research institutions among the G7 
countries on the profile of the input conditions. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  Concerning the prestige, only 38 percent say that 
entrepreneurs are respected, much lower fraction compared among the G7 countries 
except Japan that has 8 percent.  The moderate fraction of people with 
entrepreneurial activity (TEA index) and the fluctuating entry rate and exit rate in 
the last two decade indicates that the familiarity with entrepreneurs is not as high as 
Input Conditions 
Quality of Management School         6 (4)
Availability of Scientists and Engineers37 (7)
Venture Capital Availability         9 (3)
Ease of Access to Loans        11 (2)
Quality of Scientific Research 
     Institutions           7 (3)
Company Spending on R&D       12 (5)
Patents per Capita (2000)        16 (6)
Intellectual Property Protection         9 (4)
Local Availability of Specialized 
     Research and Training Services         3 (2)
Market Conditions
Technological Sophistication       11 (5)
Buyer Sophistication          7 (3)
Extent of Marketing          4 (3)
Entry into Local Markets          7 (2)
Intensity of Local Competition         6 (4)
Effectiveness of Anti-Trust Policy         5 (3)
Government Procurement of 
     Advanced Technology Products     32 (7)
Local Equity Market Access       13 (5)
Entrepreneurial Context
(Prestige of Entrepreneurs)               (6)
Hiring and Firing Practices          29 (3)
Administrative Burden for Start-ups        9 (2)
Days to Start a Firm             2 (1)
*Extent of Bureaucratic Red Tape          16 (5)
Networking Conditions
University/Industry Research 
     Collaboration             17 (5)
Decentralization of Corporate Activity    7 (3)
Willingness to Delegate Authority           9 (3)
United Kingdom 
70 
the United States.  Concerning the labor mobility, the U.K. is ranked 29th on Hiring 
and Firing Practices, the third position among the G8 countries,  which is still much 
higher than the other European countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, and 
inferring moderate labor mobility.  Concerning the regulatory frameworks, the 
median response of the Days to Start a Firm is 7 days and ranked 2nd (top among the 
G7 countries), and Administrative Burden for Startups is considered easy and ranked 
9th, just behind the United States.  Further, the U.K. is ranked 16th on Extent of 
Bureaucratic Red Tape that ranks in the opposite way, being favorable above the 
United States as well as Japan and Germany. 
Networking Conditions.  University/Industry Research of the U.K. is ranked 17th, 
fifth among the G7 countries above Italy and Japan.  Concerning open corporate 
culture, the U.K. is ranked 7th on Decentralization of Corporate Activity and 9th on 
Willingness to Delegate Authority both of which are the middle positions among the 
G7 countries.  It can be said that the United Kingdom has moderate possibility of 
having favorable networking conditions compared with the other G7 countries. 
Market Conditions.   The U.K.s position in Technological Sophistication, a broad 
measure for the innovativeness of market demand, is ranked 11th, fifth among the G7 
countries.  Buyer Sophistication, another measure, is ranked 7th, third among the G7 
countries.  Extent of Marketing of the U.K. is ranked 4th, third among the G7 
countries.  Concerning the pro-competition conditions of markets, the U.K. is ranked 
7th on the occurrence of Entry into Local Market, second among the G7 countries to 
Germany ranked 4th.  Intensity of Local Competition is ranked 6th, fourth among the 
G7 countries but still in the leading group.  Effectiveness of Anti-Trust Policy is 
ranked 5th, behind Germany and the United States.  The United Kingdom has the 
middle position on the innovativeness and diversity of market demand within the G7 
countries, and among the highest on pro-competition conditions.  On the other hand, 
concerning Government Procurement of Advanced Technology Products, the U.K. is 
ranked 32nd, worst among the G7 countries.  Finally, concerning the equity stock 
market, Local Equity Market Access is ranked 13th, the third worst to Japan and the 
United States among the G7 countries.  It is not an only measure for the conditions of 
stock market, but it is relatively hard to raise money in local equity market in the U.K. 
From the view point of this analysis, the United Kingdom has (1) a skewed profile 
of the input conditions such as lack of scientists and engineers, the moderate venture 
capital availability, and good management schools and scientific research institutions; 
(2) low administrative burden for startups but a low profile of social aspect of the 
entrepreneurial context; (3) a moderate or low potential for the networking 
conditions; and (4) a middle level potential for the market conditions.  Overall, the 
country does not have a very strong profile of the entrepreneurial national diamond 
among the G7 countries, except for some potential such as venture capital, 
management schools and scientific research institutions, and market conditions.  
Summary is shown in Figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3  Analysis of the entrepreneurial national diamond of the U.K. 
 
Early Evolution of the Cambridge Cluster 
 
The early history of the entrepreneurial cluster of Cambridge is relatively well 
written.  The interview result (Exhibit 4-2), which helped identify some key events, 
supports what is written. 
In Cambridge it had long been that the only industrial activity was in electronics 
and scientific instruments in a few firms (Garnsey and Smith 1998).  One of them is 
Cambridge Instruments, an oldest startup related to Cambridge University, formed in 
1881 by a son of Charles Darwin who was a member of Trinity College.   
Late history starts around a report in 1969 by the Mott Committee, a Cambridge 
University committee set up under the chairmanship of Sir Nevill Mott.  The report, 
as a response to an initiative of the labor government, recommended an expansion of 
'science-based industry' close to Cambridge to take maximum advantage of the 
concentration of scientific expertise, equipment and libraries and to increase feedback 
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from industry into the Cambridge scientific community 12 .  Although Cambridge 
Science Park was started by Trinity College in the following year, there were many 
opposed to the developments recommended by the Mott report.  But authoritative 
endorsement of these recommendations swung influential opinion in their favor and 
brought round local government, with the consequence relaxation of planning 
restrictions on high-tech firms in the 1970s (Garnsey and Smith 1998). 
Segal (1986) writes an interesting aspect of the Mott Committee.  A few key 
individuals, influenced by what they saw happening around Stanford and MIT, 
perceived the importance of there being in the vicinity of the university a good 
number and diversity of science-based companies, leading to the formation of the 
Mott Committee.  He also writes that after much argument and lobbying they have 
created a relaxed and generous attitude in the university toward the dealings with the 
outside business world, and have made it easy for faculty to enter into commercial 
activity while retaining their academic posts and salaries. 
In the 1970s, new opportunities for entrepreneurs were available as a result of 
technological and scientific development.  In particular, the development of the 
micro-processor led to the foundation of a number of computer firms producing 
hardware.  Subsequently software houses proliferated.  The presence of the Computer 
Aided Design (CAD) Centre in Cambridge was a major contributor to these 
developments (Garnsey and Smith 1998).  One success example of this period is Acorn, 
a computer company, founded in 1978 by Hermann Hauser.  Acorn made a success 
when the BBC approached them to design a computer.  Their prototype became the 
hugely successful BBC computer, which sold 100,000 in its first year alone.  Acorn 
was floated on the stock exchange in 1981 and Hauser and his co-founder became 
millionaires overnight (Beveridge 2001).  Hauser later founded a venture capital and 
became one of the founders of Cambridge Network, a limited company aimed at 
creating and supporting the Cambridge community. 
The potential for a cluster in Cambridge was first recognized by Barclays Bank13 in 
197814.  Certain bank managers, notably Matthew Bullock of Barclays Bank, were by 
the late 1970s sympathetic to high-tech ventures (Garnsey and Smith 1998).  Barclays 
Bank took a strategic decision to invest not just money but, more crucially, the time 
of one of its business advisory managers in development and implementation of the 
business plan of first-time technological entrepreneurs (Segal 1986).  During the early 
days of the phenomenon it was noticeable that many spin-offs were driven more by 
the desire of the founders to exploit their proprietary technology than in trying to 
create real businesses.  Part of the role of Barclays Bank has therefore been to try to 
                                                
12 Cambridge Science Park website. 
13 One of the largest financial services groups in the United Kingdom with many branches today. 
14 St Johns Innovation Centre website. 
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encourage a more commercial approach to exploitation15.  It also formed a club and 
invited key speakers to help improve the business knowledge.  The purpose of the 
club was also to encourage networking between individual members16.  Barclays Bank 
encouraged other forms of financial institutions operating nationally and 
internationally, as well as other local investors, to finance the local high technology 
companies both at start-up and later rounds of financing (Segal 1986). 
By 1985 when the Cambridge Phenomenon report was published, firms engaged 
in innovative software applications multiplied, with clusters of firms specializing in 
CAD, geographic information systems and image processing.  In Cambridge job 
mobility and interaction ensured the circulation of know-how among these firms.  
Cambridge Consultants Ltd, founded in the 1960s by university engineering 
department staff was a key catalyst, stimulating spin-offs of a cluster of ink jet 
printing firms with common suppliers.  A cluster of technical consultancies, deriving 
ultimately from Cambridge Consultants Ltd, in turn gave rise to further firm 
formation (Garnsey and Smith 1998).  Technology consultancies, a distinctive 
element of the cluster, have continued to prosper and are evolving into more rounded 
technology houses.  Finance and professional services have greatly increased their 
scale and focused on the needs of high-tech businesses. All the big five 
accountants/consultancies have significant offices in the city, and legal specialists on 
intellectual property rights and related issues operate from Cambridge and there is an 
active, locally based, investor community17. 
 
The Entrepreneurial Diamond 
 
According to Segal Quince Wicksteed which published Cambridge Phenomenon 
Revisited in 2000, the process of new firm spin-offs continues to be a feature of the 
Cambridge scene, with founders coming from both existing high-tech firms and the 
research community18.  As we saw, an evolutionary dynamics within the small town 
since the Mott Committee is notable.  The evolution has placed Cambridge University 
in a center of dynamics, not always directly but rather in various indirect ways.  
According to Segal (1986), Cambridge University has two distinctive aspects.  The 
first aspect is to do with the terms of employment of staff.  Most other U.K. 
universities have a uniform and highly specific structure for all employment contracts 
with little margin for flexibility.  Cambridge, by contrast, has a variety of loose 
contractual relationships which place rather more emphasis on academic staff living 
close to the city.  The second is to do with the authorities policy towards links with 
                                                
15 St Johns Innovation Centre website. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Segal Quince Wicksteed website. 
18 Ibid. 
74 
industry.  The university has a benign and supportive posture towards faculty 
members involvements with industry. Policy in Cambridge was essentially laissez 
faire (Garnsey and Smith 1998).  With this in mind, lets review key features of the 
cluster of Cambridge along the four attributes of the entrepreneurial diamond. 
Input Conditions.  It is no doubt that Cambridge University has been a main 
source of both quality people with scientific and technical knowledge, and knowledge 
creation.  Although among over 300 high technology businesses in 1984 only some 45 
in the area had been set up by individuals coming straight from the university, first 
generation spin-offs from the university have themselves spawned new companies 
(Segal 1986), hiring employees from the university. 
The initiatives of the individuals at Barclays Bank started in the late 1970s were 
the catalytic events.  It provided not only finance, but also management skills and 
mentor.  This kind of support is not usually seen at banks.  A guess is that the 
individuals seeing a future in small high tech businesses encouraged and moved the 
organization of a large bank branch.  This bold movement prompted followers of the 
local business community and others.  Interestingly, at least until the 1980s, the 
venture capital industry had not been particularly active on the Cambridge scene 
(Segal 1986).  It is inferred that finance from Barclays Bank had worked as risk money 
available in the area.  Later, three small venture capital funds were set up in 
association with the university, with a dozen or so investments by the early 1990s 
(Garnsey and Smith 1998).  Today, technology consultancies are not only a major 
source of spin-offs but also active in the seed and venture capital business19.  Further, 
there is a business angels network based in Cambridge, called Great Eastern 
Investment Forum.  It was established in 1995 and its members have invested in over 
70 early stage companies since then20. 
There is another enhancement of the input conditions.  In 1987 St Johns College 
founded Innovation Centre and Innovation Park playing a role of incubator by 
providing physical space, seed capital fund, and in-house management support for 
startup firms.  It houses 50 businesses and works with around 400 earlier stage or 
embryonic businesses in 1999.  The failure rate over 13 years has been around 15% 
compared to the 50% that might have been expected.  One of the success firms is 
Autonomy, founded in 1996, which is valued at over 3 billion dollars on NASDAQ21. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  It can be said that Cambridge Universitys hands-off 
but positive (Segal 1986) posture of the administration led to the Mott Committee, 
and the Mott Committee further created a generous attitude toward entrepreneurship 
of staff.  Segal points out the fact that there has never been heavy industry, or 
industries in which large plants and large unionized labor forces have been prominent 
                                                
19 Segal Quince Wicksteed website. 
20 Great Eastern Investment Forum website, as of April 2003. 
21 St Johns Innovation Centre website. 
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has helped create a labor market and a general attitude in which flexibility and 
individualism have never been suppressed in Cambridge.  The Mott committee also 
affected the regional legal framework with the consequence of relaxation of planning 
restrictions which meant a lot in a small old town. 
Today the fact that 1,500 high tech businesses in a small town with a population 
of 100,000 means that the familiarity with entrepreneurs is really high.  Further, the 
existence of role models and the prestige is inferred by a book published in 2001 
describing the positive profiles and stories of 41 entrepreneurs and key players in the 
entrepreneurial scene in Cambridge (Beveridge 2001), which also appeared on a local 
business newspaper.  Cambridge University began Cambridge Entrepreneurship 
Centre in 1999 following the seed funding from the government, signaling the 
evolution reaching to a certain level.  It provides entrepreneurship education to 
would-be entrepreneurs at the university, as well as networking opportunities to 
them.  Further, in the same year, Cambridge University and Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology established the Cambridge-MIT Institute, a joint venture backed by 
the U.K. government and private sector.  It is to enhance the competitiveness, 
productivity, and entrepreneurship in the U.K. economy by improving the 
effectiveness of knowledge exchange with educational programs and research 
projects22. 
Networking Conditions.  There is no question that Cambridge University has 
played the anchor role of networks in the small town.  There are numerous 
interlocking networks of talented, influential and accessible individuals, which make 
for informal, congenial and efficient business dealings (Segal 1986).  In the early days, 
the Mott Committee not only affected the entrepreneurial context but also improved 
the networking conditions by creating a generous attitude toward university/industry 
collaboration in the university.  Further, it is impressive that Barclays Bank 
recognized the importance of networking opportunities and formed a club for 
enhancing networking opportunities. 
Today there are several institutions that promote the networking conditions.  St 
Johns Innovation Centre not only works as an incubator but also works as a node of 
dense networks.  It helped establish Cambridge Entrepreneurship Centre at the 
university, and closely works with other communities such as Cambridge University 
and Business Link23.  Cambridge Network, a limited company founded in 1998 by 
private firms and Cambridge University, aims to create and support a community 
from business and academia in the Cambridge region and link the community to the 
global high-tech network for the benefit of the Cambridge region24.  It offers cohesion 
of the community ideal for dense networks and forums to over 1000 members.  
                                                
22 The Cambridge-MIT Institute website. 
23 St Johns Innovation Centre website. 
24 Cambridge Network website as of April 2003. 
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Eastern Region Biotechnology Initiative (ERBI), organized in 1997 by the local 
biotech community, improves communications and networking through newsletters, 
meetings and conferences, and provides surveys, reports, and database for the biotech 
community25. 
Market Conditions.  Segal (1986) says that Cambridges short and modest industry 
history and the towns small size and its relative remoteness and compactness make 
specialist market opportunities readily identifiable locally, generated originally by 
demand mostly from the university, and later by already established larger local firms.  
It is worth noting that the technology development in computers opened ways to 
early entrepreneurs in the related academics in Cambridge in the 1970s.  Further, 
technology consultancies, derived from the demand of the local high tech firms, has 
evolved and spun out a lot of firms and venture capitals. 
 
A narrative summary of the analysis is presented in Figure 4-4.  The Cambridge 
cluster from this analysis shows several important features of the evolution of the 
entrepreneurial cluster: (1) a small-sized community with an accumulation and 
concentration of knowledge and technical expertise has had a decentralized and open 
context, distinctive from other regions, shaped by the posture of the university; (2) 
key individuals at the university formed the Mott Committee succeeding to influence 
the entrepreneurial context rather rapidly within the small community; (3) around 
the same time, an advent of microprocessors opened new possibilities for early 
entrepreneurs; and (4) key individuals at Barclays Bank made a bold move for a bank 
to offer finance, mentoring, and networking opportunities for entrepreneurs within 
the community, leading to the entrants of many followers. 
A schematic summary of the analysis on the evolutionary dynamics of the cluster 
is presented in Figure 4-5.  Since around 1970, several abnormal events that fueled the 
positive flow in the series of self-reinforcing loops of the diamond are identified.  In 
around 1970, Cambridge University, its technical knowledge, and its specialist 
demand were existent conditions, and its generous policy was favorable for the 
entrepreneurial context.  Then Mott Committee started lobbying with its 1969 report, 
creating generous attitudes toward entrepreneurship and university/industry 
collaboration among the faculty.  Together with microprocessors as a new technology, 
Cambridge saw the creation of computer ventures in the 1970s, forming the self-
reinforcing loop of high impact venture creation and spin-off creation.  Mott 
Committee worked as a catalyst, as well as kick inputs to the entrepreneurial context 
and the networking conditions.  Microprocessors were an abnormal input to the 
market conditions to prompt computer venture creation.  At this time, Cambridge 
Consultants had already existed, working as a catalyst to prompt ink jet and 
consultancy spin-offs.  In the late 1970s, individuals at Barclays Bank started offering 
                                                
25 ERBI website. 
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finance, mentoring, business skills, and networking opportunities to technology 
ventures.  This is an inflection point of the Cambridge cluster, and the emergence of 
the Barclays individuals were a major abnormal event, working as kick inputs to the 
input conditions and the networking conditions.  After that, we saw a dramatic 
improvement in the input conditions by followers of Barclays Bank.  Now Cambridge 
is considered to have already been in motion of the self-reinforcing loop. 
The United Kingdom as a nation has the weaknesses in the national diamond such 
as lack of scientists and engineers, and the low profile of social aspect of the 
entrepreneurial context.  But Cambridge has had ample scientists and engineers, and 
the small-size community with the accumulation of technology entrepreneurship of 
30 years is considered to help compensate the low profile of the social aspect of the 
entrepreneurial context. 
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Figure 4-4  Analysis of the entrepreneurial cluster diamond of Cambridge 
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Figure 4-5  Analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of Cambridge 
Notes:  Boxes represent the four attributes of the diamond (right: input conditions, 
top: entrepreneurial context, bottom: networking conditions, left: market 
conditions).  Statements under the boxes represent existent conditions at times.  
Solid arrows represent abnormal events.  Circles represent major abnormal events.  
Shades are for illustrating gradual improvements, not absolute evaluations. 
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Exhibit 4-2  Interview result (Cambridge, Dr. T.M.) 
Language Processing Diagram built from the interview in March 2003 of Dr. T.M., a university 
researcher who earned Ph. D from Cambridge University and had worked at St. Johns 
Innovation Centre. 
 
 
Theme:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in Cambridge, UK? 
 
 
Cambridge has a history of technology ventures since 1881, and more recently, 
the 1970s. 
 
After Cambridge Science Park was established in 1970, some high-tech start-ups attracted 
national attention and Barclays Bank started supporting high-tech start-ups in the late 
1970s. 
 
• Trinity College established the Cambridge Science Park in 1970. 
• In the 1970s, companies that attracted a lot of national attention such as Acorn 
Computers and Sinclair Research were established in Cambridge. 
• In an unusual move for a bank, in the late 1970s Barclays Bank began actively 
supporting the growth of new technology ventures. 
 
 
• In 1881 Horace Darwin establishes 'Cambridge Instruments' (now part of Leica 
Microsystems) that many people regard as the first university technology-based spin-
out venture. 
 
 
 
 
Start-up creation and technology consulting businesses grew up moderately 
throughout the 1980s. 
 
Cambridge Phenomenon report was published in 1985 and an institution to support high-
tech start-ups was established in 1987. 
 
• The 'Cambridge Phenomenon' report was published in 1985 by consultants SQW 
and this gave a new 'label' to what was happening in Cambridge. 
• St. John's College established an Innovation Centre to support the growth of new 
technology based ventures in 1987. 
 
 
Technology consulting businesses grew throughout the 1980s, kick starting new industry 
sectors, and from the 1990s becoming incubators. 
 
• Throughout the 1980s, Cambridge saw the growth of technology consulting firms that 
not only attracted high quality consulting business to the region, but also kick started 
whole new industry sectors - industrial inkjet printing is one example of such. 
• In the late 1990s, Cambridge consulting businesses become incubators for new 
technology ventures - many new companies are created. 
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The appearance of clustering opportunities had become more apparent around 
1997-98, and business communities started exploiting from them actively. 
 
From 1997, young growing companies with more than US$1 billion valuations have 
become visible even to the US investors, attracting more investment. 
 
• In 1997, the telephone company Ionica plc became the first publicly floated 
Cambridge company to have valuation of more than US$1bn and hence put 
Cambridge in the radar screen for US investors. 
• In the late 1990s, a number of publicly quoted Cambridge companies, including ARM 
and Autonomy, reached multiple billion US$ valuations and this attracted more and 
more investment to Cambridge. 
 
 
In 1997-98, two private organizations were formed by business communities to facilitate 
networking and collaboration. 
 
• 1997: Eastern Region Biotechnology Initiative established to provide coherence to 
the community of biotechnology companies. 
• In 1998 the Cambridge Network was formed to bring together and provide a voice for 
the high-technology business community in Cambridge. 
 
 
 
 
 
Academics and government started more actively being engaged in technology 
entrepreneurship around 1997-99. 
 
• In 1997 1st Cambridge Enterprise Conference held - this was the first conference to 
be held in Cambridge that brought together academics and practitioners to help 
improve the performance of new technology ventures. 
 
In 1999, government and university established university-sited programs to promote 
entrepreneurship. 
 
• In 1999 the University of Cambridge established an 'Entrepreneurship Centre' to help 
train, develop and support the people who will make new technology ventures 
successful. 
• At the end of 1999, the UK Government decides to award the University of 
Cambridge UK£65m to establish the Cambridge MIT Institute to promote 
entrepreneurship, productivity and competitiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the late 1990s, the success of Cambridge cluster has been more and more 
widely recognized. 
 
From the late 1990s, the fame of Cambridge as a high-tech cluster has been reinforced by 
publications, news, and government action. 
 
• Throughout the late 90s and early 00s, Cambridge appeared in numerous 
publications as "Europe's answer to Silicon Valley." 
• News stories begin to talk of ' the future being plastic' (referring to the development of 
Cambridge companies such as Cambridge Display Technology and Plastic Logic 
who are leading the development of 'plastronics') and its home being in Cambridge. 
• In 1998, the British PM Tony Blair chose to launch the Government's e-commerce 
strategy from St John's Innovation Centre in Cambridge giving very high visibility to 
what was happening in Cambridge. 
 
 
Role models of successful entrepreneurs at Cambridge have been publicized widely since 
1999. 
 
• In 1999, the Entrepreneurship Centre begins a portrait gallery of Cambridge 
entrepreneurs to highlight successful entrepreneurs and boost their capacity as role 
models. 
• In 1999, 'Cambridge Entrepreneurs' was published providing case studies and role 
models of successful entrepreneurs. 
 
 
• In 2000 & 2002, Cambridge was recognized by the European Commission as being a 
"region of excellence for the support of high tech start-ups". 
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4.3 Munich, Germany 
Munich is the capital city of the State of Bavaria in 
Germany, with a population of 1.25 million, 80,000 
companies, 900,000 jobs, and 10 universities with 
80,000 students26. 
Munich is Europes largest high-tech cluster in the 
areas of life science, technology, information, media 
and entertainment, and financial services, comprised 
of global players (e.g. Siemens, BMW Allianz), fast 
growing startups, and foreign-owned high-techs.  The 
city accommodates Germanys largest skilled labor, 
venture capital, real estate markets, and Germanys best rates of job creation and 
purchasing power27.  In Munich, 14,000 new companies are founded per year, and 13 
business incubators are located in the Munich area28. 
Concerning information and communication technology (ICT), Bavaria has been 
the most important region for years in Germany.  ICT enterprises of worldwide 
reputation located either their German or European headquarters in Bavaria (e.g. 
3Com, Cisco, Compaq, Lucent Technologies, Microsoft, Oracle, Netscape, SAP, 
Siemens, SUN)29.  19% of all new Internet companies in Germany are set up in 
Munich.  Concerning biotechnology, in the last few years the Munich has 
experienced an exceptional rate of development.  The number of small and medium-
sized biotechnology companies increased from 34 in 1996 to 115 in 2002, employing a 
total of over 3,000 people, ten times larger than in 199630.  There are two sub-regional 
clusters situated southwest of Munich (Martinsried) and north of Munich 
(Weihenstephan).  Martinsried itself has 46 young biotech companies.  Both of them 
have the incubators called Innovation and Foundation Center for Biotechnology (IZB) 
funded by Bavarian and local governments31.  Among the 115 biotech companies, five 
companies are listed on the stock exchange. 
 
National Level Analysis 
 
At the national level, Germany has Total Entrepreneurial Activity index of 5.6% 
for the average of 2000-2002 (Table 2-3), a little behind the United Kingdom, but 
higher than France and Japan. 
                                                
26 The population of the State of Bavaria is 12 million. 
27 The City of Munich website as of April 2003. 
28 Ibid. 
29 gotoBavaria website. 
30 Bio-M website as of April 2003. 
31 IZB mbH website. 
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Like the national analysis of the United States and the United Kingdom, the same 
benchmarking measures related to the entrepreneurial diamond are adopted to assess 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the profiles of the national diamond (Figure 4-6). 
 
 
 
Figure 4-6  Country rankings concerning the entrepreneurial diamond of Germany 
Notes: Values are relative positions among 75 countries.  Ranks are determined basically by 
the average of the scaled points scored by senior business leaders in the 75 countries. 
Germany ranks 4th on Company Operations and Strategy and 4th on Quality of the 
National Business Environment.  () indicates rankings among the G7 countries. 
* The value is ranked opposite to the favorable direction. 
(Prestige of Entrepreneurs) is a complement measure. 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
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leading group of the G7 countries.  Germany is ranked 32nd on Availability of 
Scientists and Engineers, and this is among the lowest group of the G7 countries, a 
little ahead of Italy and the United Kingdom.  Concerning the risk money, Germany 
is ranked 10th on Venture Capital Availability, among the second group of the G7 
countries with Canada, the United Kingdom, and France.  Concerning the knowledge 
creation, Quality of Scientific Research Institutions of Germany is ranked 10th, fourth 
after the United Kingdom.  Company Spending on Research and Development is 
ranked 4th, consisting the first group of the G7 countries with Japan and the United 
States.  Germany has the 7th position on the U.S. patents per capita, third behind the 
United States and Japan among the G7 countries.  Germany has relatively low 
availability of quality people, moderate availability of risk money, and middle-high 
level of knowledge creation as measured by patents per capita on the profile of the 
input conditions. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  Concerning the prestige, 73 percent say that 
entrepreneurs are respected, much higher than the United Kingdom and Japan.  
Concerning the labor mobility, Germany is ranked 72nd on Hiring and Firing Practices, 
among the lowest with France and Italy, inferring possibly low labor mobility.  
Concerning the regulatory frameworks, the median response of the Days to Start a 
Firm is 30 days and ranked 19th (same as France, Japan, and the United States), but 
Administrative Burden for Startups is considered rather heavy and ranked 27th, 
considerably lagging behind the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.  
Further, Germany is ranked 6th on Extent of Bureaucratic Red Tape, the second worst 
to Japan.  Germany has a low profile of the entrepreneurial context except for the 
middle-high prestige of entrepreneurs. 
Networking Conditions.  University/Industry Research of Germany is ranked 12th, 
fourth among the G7 countries above the United Kingdom.  Concerning open 
corporate culture, Germany is ranked 2nd on Decentralization of Corporate Activity, 
second only to the United States, and 12th on Willingness to Delegate Authority, 
fourth among the G7 countries.  It can be said that Germany has moderate possibility 
of having favorable networking conditions compared with other G7 countries. 
Market Conditions.   Germanys position in Technological Sophistication, a broad 
measure for the innovativeness of market demand, is ranked 7th, third among the G7 
countries.  Buyer Sophistication, another measure, is ranked 10th, fifth among the G7 
countries.  Extent of Marketing of Germany is ranked 5th, fourth among the G7 
countries.  Concerning the pro-competition conditions of markets, Germany is ranked 
4th on the occurrence of Entry into Local Market, first among the G7 countries.  
Intensity of Local Competition is ranked 2nd, lagging only behind the United States.  
Effectiveness of Anti-Trust Policy is ranked 2nd, top among the G7 countries.  
Germany has the middle position on the innovativeness and diversity of market 
demand within the G7 countries, but the highest on pro-competition conditions.  
Concerning Government Procurement of Advanced Technology Products, Germany 
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is ranked 10th, fourth among the G7 countries.  Finally, concerning the equity stock 
market, Local Equity Market Access is ranked 5th, second among the G7 countries to 
France. 
From the view point of this analysis, Germany has (1) a skewed profile of the 
input conditions such as lack of quality people, the moderate venture capital 
availability and middle-high level of knowledge creation; (2) a low profile of the 
entrepreneurial context except for middle-high prestige; (3) a moderate or low 
potential for the networking conditions; and (4) a middle-high level potential for the 
market conditions with high occurrence of entry to local markets and easy access to 
local equity market.  Overall, the country does not have a distinctively strong profile 
of the entrepreneurial national diamond among the G7 countries, except for some 
potential such as venture capital, knowledge creation, prestige, and market conditions.  
Summary is shown in Figure 4-7. 
 
Figure 4-7  Analysis of the entrepreneurial national diamond of Germany 
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The Munich area has several high tech clusters, notably biotechnology and 
information technology.  In order to trace the dynamics of technology 
entrepreneurship, biotechnology is mainly focused for the case.  Although literature 
that treats the evolution of the Munich cluster is scarce, here with the help of the 
interview results, the effort to describe the evolution is done.  (The interview results 
themselves describe the evolution of the cluster.  See the Exhibits at the end of the 
section.) 
There seems to be an evolutionary change in entrepreneurial activities in Munich 
in the 1990s.  Until the early 1990s, entrepreneurship didnt seem to be widely 
recognized.  An interviewee says, When I graduated from Technical University 
Munich in 1991 everyone wanted to join large firms such as Siemens or BMW.  
Entrepreneurship was not part of the curriculum32.  But that German companies have 
been downsizing in the domestic economy (Audretsch 2000) and the recession in the 
early 1990s seemed to change the atmosphere a little bit.  Downsizing of large 
companies set free a pool of highly qualified and eager managers in the early 1990s, 
several of which became entrepreneurs.  In the 1990s, a growing number of managers 
came out of mid to large size industrial firms33 to engage in entrepreneurial activities. 
According to a report of the regional initiative for the Munich biotechnology 
cluster, the development of a German biotechnology industry started in the middle of 
the 1990s34.  However, in fact the foundations of four of the five Munich-based 
biotech companies that were later listed on the stock market during 1998-2000 were 
before the mid 1990s.  MWG Biotech was founded in 1990; MophoSys was founded in 
1992; and Bavarian Nordic and MediGene were founded in 1994.  The latter three of 
them are located closely in Martinsried, a southwest region of Munich, where there 
had already been biomedical research institutions such as a university hospital, Max-
Planck Institute for Biochemistry and Neurobiology, the pharmacy and chemistry 
faculties of Ludwig Maximilians University, and the Gene Center of the University of 
Munich.  For example, MediGene is a spin-off firm from the Gene Center35. 
Around 1995 the government effort for fostering entrepreneurial activities and 
clusters became apparent. 
Innovation and Foundation Center for Biotechnology (IZB) was founded in 1995 
funded by the State of Bavaria and local governments.  IZB offers inexpensive 
building infrastructure for biotech startups as an incubator.  Their first site was 
located in Martinsried that had already exhibited a concentration of the biomedical 
                                                
32 Interview of Mr. F.F. (see Exhibit 4-3) 
33 Interview of Dr. C.S. (see Exhibit 4-4) 
34 BioTech-Region Munchen Annual Report 2002. 
35 MediGene website. 
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research institutions.  IZB reports that there had been also about 60 biotech-related 
companies around Martinsried then36.   
Bayern Kapital is another initiative by the Bavarian State as a hundred percent 
subsidiary of a state-owned bank.  Since its formation in 1995, Bayern Kapital has 
invested in more than 100 companies primarily in the areas of life sciences and 
healthcare, software, communication, and engineering. 
At the federal level, in 1995, German Federal Government started the BioRegio 
contest in which Germanys regions interested in biotech competed for a given 
amount of public funding.  Falling behind other countries such as the U.S. and the 
U.K. in the biotechnology industry was a matter of concern for German policy makers 
in the early 1990s, therefore the contest was designed to work as the motor of the 
catch up process, stimulating biotech firm startups, the growth of existing companies, 
and the provision of venture capital (Dohse 2000).  The policy differed from German 
traditional technology policy in that it addresses the regions and stimulates 
interregional competition while the traditional system tends to be in favor of existing 
industries and incremental rather than radical innovation (Dohse 2000; Giesecke 
2000). 
Munich was chosen as one of the three winners among 17 regions in 199637.  The 
criteria for choosing the three winners included conditions on existing companies and 
research institutions as well as interaction and cooperation of different branches.  
Three winners were entitled to receive 150 million DM and priority in the 
appropriation of funds amounting to about 1.5 billion DM from 1997 to 2001.  At the 
national level of Germany, small or medium-sized biotech firms increased from 75 in 
1995 to 222 in 1998 which is the highest increase in all European countries (Dohse 
2000). 
In response to the award, Bio-M, a financing and consulting company for biotech 
entrepreneurs, was founded as the central point of contact for the regional biotech 
initiative, named BioTech-Region Munchen, in 1997 in Munich.  The Bavarian State 
is the largest shareholder, and other shareholders include banks, venture capitals, 
pharmaceutical and chemical companies.  It provides capital for the seed and startup 
phase of biotech firms and other support services.  The current managing director 
since 1998 is Horst Domdey, who co-founded MediGene in 1994 and another biotech 
company in 1997.  Domdey also chaired the regional biotech initiative from 1996 to 
199738. 
The situation had changed.  The number of small and medium-sized 
biotechnology firms have dramatically increased during the latter half of the 1990s 
(Figure 4-8).  In 1996, the first Munich Business Plan Competition was held in which 
                                                
36 IZB website.  60 biotech companies probably include large firms and related firms. 
37 The other two regions are Rhineland (inc. Cologne) and Rhine-Neckar Triangle (inc. Heidelberg). 
38 Bio-M website. 
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would-be entrepreneurs compete for award money that can be used for the seed fund.  
The idea of the competition was brought to Munich by the management consulting 
firm McKinsey drawing a hint from the MITs 50k Competition.  The first 
competition itself produced several new companies by the following year39.  Further, 
in the late 1990s entrepreneurship programs were established at universities in 
Munich.  The interviewee who was a student in 1991 says, Today many more 
graduates are willing to join start-ups40. 
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Figure 4-8  Number of small and medium-sized biotechnology companies in the 
Munich area 
Source:  BioTech-Region Munchen Annual Report 2002. 
 
It may seem that a catalyst were the governments since the mid 1990s.  But more 
importantly there had been entrepreneurial activities such as MediGene around a 
strong science base of biomedical research institutions before then, and it is more 
rational to say that the pre-condition of those activities moved the governments and 
they facilitated entrepreneurial activities by the financial support. 
With this context of the evolution in mind, lets review key features of the cluster 
of Munich along the four attributes of the entrepreneurial diamond. 
 
Input Conditions.  As we saw previously, Munich has a strong science base for 
biotechnology: two major universities (Ludwig Maximilians University Munchen and 
Technical University Munich), two polytechnic schools, two university hospitals, 
three Max Planck Institutes, the Gene Center of the University of Munich, and a 
                                                
39 Munich Business Plan Competition website. 
40 Interview of Mr. F.F. (see Exhibit 4-3) 
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national research laboratory for environment and health.  They are the sources of 
both quality people with scientific and technical knowledge, and knowledge creation. 
Concerning risk money, in addition to government-sponsored Bayern Kapital and 
Bio-M, there are more than 35 Munich-based venture capitals, which comprise of all 
major German and many international venture capitals41.  More than half of them are 
investing in biotech42.  Bio-M itself has reviewed more than 150 business plans since 
1997, and in 2003 its seed portfolio comprises 26 young biotech companies with 4.9 
million euros.  An interviewee points out that at the same time when venture capitals 
were starting to provide money in the late 1990s, good ideas about business 
opportunities have come out of professors and students from universities around 
Munich 43 .  Further, there are individual angles emerging in Munich.  Munich 
Business Angels Network has 60 angels, one of the largest networks within Germany44.  
Today there are successful entrepreneurs who give advice and angel investment45, 
says one interviewee.  On the contrary, the interview results reveal several negative 
points: German institutional investors are still hesitant to invest in venture capitals; 
the legal framework is still not conducive to venture capitals; and many angel 
investors have stopped investing due to heavy losses incurred from the Internet boom 
(Exhibits at the end of this section). 
There are 30 incubators in Bavaria State46 and 13 of them in the Munich area in 
which the foundation of new companies is being continuously supported.  
Martinsried site of the government-sponsored IZB has now 24 small and medium-
sized biotech firms, and IZB opened another incubator in Weihenstephan, a north 
region of Munich, in 2001.   
Entrepreneurial Context.  The change of attitude toward entrepreneurial activities 
among students and managers at mid to large-sized companies has been seen in the 
1990s.  The successes of the five IPOs during 1998-2000 and a growing number of 
startups may have accumulated to the prestige and the familiarity.  Munich Business 
Plan Competition since 1996 and entrepreneurship programs at universities play a 
role to improve them and lower the psychological barrier also.  On the contrary, an 
interviewee reports, Still not enough qualified people leave big companies such as 
Siemens, Infineon, or BMW to start their own company. 
The regional initiative, BioTech-Region Munchen, started from the BioRegio 
contest, seems to have created cohesion and shared strategy among governments, 
venture capitals, and private industries.  The cohesion and shared strategy is favorable 
to improve the entrepreneurial context and the networking conditions because it is 
                                                
41 Interview of Mr. F.F. (see Exhibit 4-3) 
42 Bio-M website as of April 2003. 
43 Interview of Dr. C.S. (see Exhibit 4-4) 
44 Bio-M website as of April 2003. 
45 Interview of Mr. F.F. (see Exhibit 4-3) 
46 gotoBavaria website as of April 2003. 
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much easier to form collaboration and collective actions.  Interestingly, there seems 
to be a key individual behind this movement, Domdey, the managing director of Bio-
M, who is the serial entrepreneur and holds a doctorate degree in biochemistry from 
the University of Munich and worked at the Gene Center before he started a spin-off 
in 1994.  Domdey was a chairman of the regional biotech initiative from 1996 to 1997. 
Networking Conditions.  The proximity of locations of research institutions in 
Martinsried is favorable to the networking conditions, which is further improved by 
spin-offs such as MediGene.  The annual report of BioTech-Region Munchen 
identifies a total of 350 collaborative agreements between Munich biotech companies 
and research institutions, more than one third of which are with institutions in the 
Munich area.  There are some organizations that promote the networking conditions.  
Bio-M assists startups though its networks that include public offices, scientific 
institutions, venture capitalists and biotech companies.  It also offers seminars and 
workshops, and connects entrepreneurs with related conferences.  Munich Network 
supports foundation, expansion and sustainable success of technology based high 
growth businesses by its programs that include promotion of entrepreneurship 
education and network conferences47.  Munich Business Angel Network provided 
excellent networking opportunities for entrepreneurs and investors, bringing 
together the people for the crucial, early seed phase financing48. 
Market Conditions.  Munich itself is a large market with a population of 1.25 
million and good purchasing power, as well as home bases of large companies and 
regional offices of multi national companies.  Concerning biotechnology, no products 
originating from German biotechnological research have been approved for the 
market as yet, although MediGene is expecting an approval of their product next 
year49 .  Concerning the stock market, Neuer Markt was established for growing 
companies at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 1997.  After the establishment, five 
IPOs of Munich biotech companies were made. 
An interview result indicates an interesting aspect of the market conditions.  It 
says indeed for many start-ups in Munich the existence of a local market was not 
important. This is because many start-ups do not have customers for years or they 
have very few and those may be in the U.S.  Therefore, the presence, or better the 
absence, of a local market was not a deterrent to settling in Munich50.  For the 
settlement of each startup, various factors of the four attributes matter.  Priority to 
weigh the importance of those factors may differ in different settings, but for highly 
knowledge-based startups such as biotech startups and Internet startups, proximity of 
                                                
47 Munich Network website. 
48 Interview of Dr. C.S. (see Exhibit 4-4) 
49 BioTech-Region Munchen Annual Report 2002. 
50 Ibid. 
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direct customer markets may not be the important priority compared with other 
factors such as knowledge availability that is crucial to research-oriented startups. 
 
A narrative summary of the analysis is presented in Figure 4-9.  The Munich 
cluster from this analysis shows a dramatic evolution of biotech startups.  Several 
important features of the evolution of the entrepreneurial cluster include: (1) a strong 
concentrated science base of research institutions; (2) the downsizing of large firms 
affecting the entrepreneurial context and a growing possibility of biotechnology as an 
opener of market opportunities in the period of the early entrepreneurs; (3) the early 
entrepreneurial activities were fueled by active government finance support since the 
mid 1990s; (4) the cohesion and shared strategy among governments and private 
sector, represented by BioTech-Region Munchen, seems to have been formed through 
the BioRegio contest and an individual Domdey, and to have been acting as strength 
to improve the profiles of the entrepreneurial diamond; and (5) the current market 
conditions are not the significant attribute compared with other attributes especially 
for biotechnology startups that have no products yet.  Biotechnology is considered 
working as a potential to the future market conditions. 
A schematic summary of the analysis on the evolutionary dynamics is presented in 
Figure 4-10.  Although we see the rapidly improved profile of the entrepreneurial 
cluster of biotechnology now, the profile in 1990 is considered to have been the same 
as the current middle-low profile of the national diamond of Germany, except that 
Munich has had a strong science base as a source of scientists and engineers. 
In around 1990, many research institutions and their proximate locations in 
Martinsried were existent conditions.  From these existent conditions, several key 
biotechnology firms were created.  Although it is not clear from the case survey what 
prompted the creation of these key firms, the downsizing of large firms may have 
worked as an abnormal input to the entrepreneurial context and the emergence of the 
new possibility of biotechnology had become apparent.  During this period, 
Martinsried added up its constituents by the creation of startups and spin-offs such as 
MediGene of Domdey, inferring the increase in the networking conditions.  It also 
seems to have formed a tiny indication of the positive flow of the self-reinforcing loop. 
This indication working as a precondition, the intensive government-funded 
efforts started around 1995, and the regional initiative was formed around Domdey.  
The government efforts were the kick inputs to the input conditions and the 
networking conditions.  The regional initiative, or Domdey, can be evaluated as a 
catalyst because it seems to have created the cohesion and shared strategy among the 
constituents and enhanced every effort to improve the profile of the diamond.  Many 
biotech startups were established after this, leading to the rapid rotation of the self-
reinforcing loop.  The opening of the Neuer Markt in 1997 was another abnormal 
kick input to the market conditions that enhanced entrepreneurial activities.  Today 
Munich has the outstanding profile of the diamond in Germany. 
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Figure 4-9  Analysis of the entrepreneurial cluster diamond of Munich 
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Figure 4-10  Analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of Munich 
Notes:  Boxes represent the four attributes of the diamond (right: input conditions, 
top: entrepreneurial context, bottom: networking conditions, left: market 
conditions).  Statements under the boxes represent existent conditions at times.  
Solid arrows represent abnormal events.  Circles represent major abnormal events.  
Shades are for illustrating gradual improvements, not absolute evaluations. 
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Exhibit 4-3  Interview result (Munich, Mr. F.F.) 
Language Processing Diagram built from the interview in March 2003 of Mr. F.F., a German 
venture capitalist who was born in Landshut (an hour north of Munich), did undergraduate 
study in Munich and has worked in Munich for 3 years. 
 
 
Theme:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in Munich, Germany? 
 
 
VCs and institutions have dramatically evolved their activities over the past 10 
years. 
 
 VCs have come to Munich, giving more than 10x increase in VC funding. 
 
• All major German and many international VCs have offices in Munich. 
• US and Asian investors are investing in German VCs. 
• VC funding in the Munich area has increased by more than 10x over the past 10 
years. 
 
 
Some organizations started offering good entrepreneur-programs, which didnt exist 10 
years ago. 
 
• When I was in TUM, entrepreneurship was not part of the curriculum, today there is a 
successful entrepreneurship program. 
• Munich Network, an organization promoting education and support helps would-be 
entrepreneurs to get started. 
 
 
• BioM, a state-sponsored program to fund biotechnology start-ups has funded many 
start-ups. 
 
 
 
 
A cluster of start-ups has formed and successful entrepreneurs have become 
apparent. 
 
• The bio tech cluster Martinsried has attracted over 40 biotech start-ups. 
• Today there are successful entrepreneurs who give advice and angel investment. 
 
 
 
 
Many more students became aspiring, but not prevailing in big companies. 
 
• When I graduated from Technical University Munich (TUM) in 1991 everyone wanted 
to join large firms such as Siemens or BMW, today many more graduates are willing 
to join start-ups. 
• Still not enough qualified people leave big companies such as Siemens, Infineon, or 
BMW to start their own company. 
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A few traditional entities are still not conducive to VCs. 
 
• German institutional investors are still hesitant to invest in VC. 
• The political and legislative framework is still not as conducive to VC as it is in other 
countries, e.g. taxation of carried interest for VC is still not decided. 
 
 
 
 
Start-ups and VCs benefit from local information exchange. 
 
Local start-ups have partnership with large companies. 
 
• Large companies such as Siemens, Infineon, BMW, or Audi are important partners 
for local start-ups. 
• Our portfolio company, FAST technologies, has had trials of their revolutionary torque 
sensors with BMW and Audi. 
 
 
• The high density of start-ups, VCs, universities and high-tech companies provides the 
networks that draw even more VCs and start-ups to the Munich area. 
 
 
 
 
• Munich has many highly qualified employees. 
 
 
 
General principles of business economics are also affecting evolution of start-up 
businesses. 
 
Many start-ups have difficulties in their businesses, which are applicable to all the 
businesses. 
 
• Many start-ups have since failed since their business model proved not to be viable. 
• The current recession has made it much harder for start-ups to generate sales. 
 
 
 
• Many angel investors have stopped investing due to heavy losses incurred from the 
internet boom. 
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Exhibit 4-4  Interview result (Munich, Dr. C.S.) 
Language Processing Diagram built from the interview in March 2003 of Dr. C.S., a German 
venture capitalist who studied veterinary medicine in Munich and has 11 years of industrial 
biotech experience, comprising six years in US and three years in Munich biotech firms as well as 
2 years in a Munich venture capital group. 
 
 
Theme:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in Munich, Cambridge? 
 
 
Start-up and VC activities had soared in Munich in the late 1990s, attracting even 
more. 
 
 Star companies emergence and clustering has become apparent since the late 1990s, 
attracting even more. 
 
• Munich has become famous as one of the preeminent clusters of both IT and life 
science in Europe in late 1990s, which motivated and encouraged people living 
around Munich to start their own companies. 
• Life science companies such as Medigene, GPC, and Morphosys in Munich became 
role models, which triggered even more life science start-ups. 
• Munich IT industry's success and the move of several IT firm headquarters (Microsoft, 
Sun, Oracle, etc.) during 1999 to 2000 attracted entrepreneurs to settle close-by in 
the area. 
 
 
An increasing number of VCs had come to create the highest density of VCs and money 
available in the late 1990s in Germany. 
 
• An increasing number of VC firms plus an increasing amount of VC money, which 
had not been there until then, have increased the number of start-ups starting in the 
late 1990s. 
• In late 1990s, VC companies founded at Munich had matured to a stage that created 
the highest density of VCs and money available in Germany. 
 
 
• Several British and American VCs created satellite offices in Munich in the recent 
years increasing the feeling of a technology hot-spot even further. 
 
 
 
 
Competent managers at mid to large companies have started to leave their companies to 
join start-ups since the early 1990s. 
 
• Downsizing of large companies set free a pool of highly qualified and eager 
managers in the early 1990s, several of which became entrepreneurs. 
• In 1990s, a growing number of managers came out of mid to large size industrial 
firms. These managers have become more available as entrepreneurs, or more 
available to entrepreneurs who seek good managers to build up companies. 
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Government has supported start-up activities by fueling input condition and 
networking function. 
 
• Bavarian government has provided increasing amounts of soft money funds through 
various state-run and private/public entities starting in the mid 1990s. 
• Bavarian government has provided incubators (in Munich and elsewhere in Bavaria) 
which have been offering reasonable housing and networking function for 
entrepreneurs. 
 
 
 
 
Universities, professors, and students around Munich became interested in 
entrepreneurial activities in the late 1990s. 
 
• In late 1990s, the first entrepreneurship programs were established at universities in 
Munich, which have produced the first graduates in 2000/2001. 
• At the same time when VCs were starting to provide money in the late 1990s, good 
ideas about business opportunities have come out of professors and students from 
universities around Munich. 
 
 
 
 
Bavaria is a nice place for knowledge-based industries and people. 
 
Bavaria has become an attractive location for knowledge-based industries since 1970s. 
 
• Bavaria culturally and socially has changed from an agricultural state into an 
industrial state in the 1970s (by the aggregate initiatives of the government and 
industries to attract "clean" high tech companies to Bavaria). 
• Two Universities and several Universities of Applies Science in Munich with over 
100,000 students total in all faculties were significantly enlarged in The 1970s and 
have delivered a large number of highly-educated people to the Munich cluster since 
then. 
 
 
• Social attractiveness of the region in terms of human resources, cultural and natural 
richness (lakes, alpes, skiing, closeness to Austria/Italy, etc.) and educational 
opportunities attract people to come to this region. 
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Institutions facilitating networking opportunities were established. 
 
• Bio-M, the regional, government sponsored Biotechnology organization started from 
the beginning to bring together people that would be able to help the fledging 
business such as patent attorneys, accountants, lawyers, business angels, and VCs. 
• The Munich Business Angel Network provided excellent networking opportunities for 
entrepreneurs and investors, bringing together the people for the crucial, early seed 
phase financing. 
 
 
 
 
• Only a few start-ups in and around Munich settled here because they wanted to be 
close to their customers. These companies would mostly fall into the category ITC or 
automotive. But indeed for many start-ups in Munich the existence of a local market 
was not important. This is because many start-ups do not have customers for years 
or they have very few and those may be in the US. Therefore, the presence, or better 
the absence, of a local market was not a deterrent to settling in Munich. 
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4.4 Tokyo, Japan 
Tokyo is the capital of Japan 
with a population of 12 million, 
770,000 business establishments, 
and 9 million jobs51.  The Tokyo 
Megalopolis spreads to 
neighboring prefectures to 
constitute the Greater Tokyo 
Metropolitan Region of over 30 
million residents.  Tokyo 
exhibits the huge concentrations 
of politics, governments, 
businesses, universities, culture, 
and virtually every activity.  Although many clusters can be identified such as 
manufacturing, trading services, financial services, publishing, broadcasting, and so 
on in Tokyo as well as throughout the country, it is hard to identify high technology 
clusters with a lot of entrepreneurial activities in the country where the level of 
entrepreneurship is considered very low. 
Yet there is an indication of entrepreneurial activity.  A survey done by a think 
tank and the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in June 200152 revealed that 
there are 1,514 Internet-related businesses in Tokyo 23 Wards, the central districts of 
Tokyo, a third of which were founded since 1998.  Those Internet businesses are 
software application, intermediary, infrastructure, e-commerce, and others, and have 
the average of 33 employees.  80 percent of the full-time staff is under 34 years old.  
Further, the survey found that there are concentrations of 311 businesses in Minato 
Ward and 295 businesses in Shibuya Ward, both of which are several miles away 
from the central district of businesses in Chiyoda Ward that accommodates 
headquarters of Japanese large companies. 
The concentration phenomenon started being publicized in 1999 when several 
young entrepreneurs named it Bit Valley which is from bitter valley, literal 
translation of Shibuya53.  Shibuya Ward and Minato Ward are the places of trendy 
restaurants, night spots, and shopping, where trend-leading teenagers, coolest 
university students, and art elite hang out54 .  Partly because of its sense of the 
fashionable trend and the potential of the Internet, the phenomenon was noised 
                                                
51 Tokyo Metropolitan Government website. 
52  Fujitsu Research Institute and Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry; Survey on Internet 
enterprises in Tokyo (In Japanese); June 2001. 
53 Japan Inc. Magazine; How Bit Valley got its name; May 2000. 
54 Japan Inc. Magazine; Where is Bit Valley? May 2000. 
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around by mass media from the end of 1999 to 2000, which Economist depicted as 
the Internet venture boom55.  NASDAQ and Softbank established NASDAQ Japan in 
June 1999 and opened the stock market for growing firms a year later.  Tokyo Stock 
Exchange relaxed the listing requirement and opened a stock market called Mothers 
in November 1999.  Although the boom itself was soon over keeping step with the 
Internet bubble burst around the world and NASDAQ and Softbank withdrew from 
NASDAQ Japan in 2002, the venture creation of this size was quite a phenomenon 
that the country saw for the first time in the recent decades.  Tokyo Stock Exchanges 
Mothers now has 48 listed companies.  19 of them are information and 
communication technology companies.  And among them 17 are located in Tokyo 
and 8 of them are in Shibuya Ward and Minato Ward56. 
   
National Level Analysis 
 
At the national level, Japan has Total Entrepreneurial Activity index of 2.7% for 
the average of 2000-2002 (Table 2-3), considerably low among the G7 countries.  
Figure 4-11 shows the entry and exit rate in Japan in the last two decades.   
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Figure 4-11  Entry/exit rate and GDP growth of Japan 
Note: Entry and exit rates are percentages of the total stock (establishments covered by 
unemployment insurance) at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
Sources: Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare; Annual Report on Unemployment 
Insurance Programs. 
GDP data (fiscal year)  ESRI, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. 
                                                
55 Economist; In search of the new Japanese dream; February 17, 2000. 
56 The authors count from the information on Tokyo Stock Exchange website as of April 2003. 
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The entry rate has gradually decreased from 6 to 8 percent in the 1980s to the level of 
5 percent.  As the economy went worse in the late 1990s, the exit rate increased to 
match the entry rate in 2001.  Together with the low TEA index, Japan seems to have 
come to the most severe era for entrepreneurial activities among the G7 countries. 
Like the national analysis of others, the same benchmarking measures related to 
the entrepreneurial diamond are adopted for assessing relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the profiles of the national diamond (Figure 4-12). 
 
 
Figure 4-12  Country rankings concerning the entrepreneurial diamond of Japan 
Notes: Values are relative positions among 75 countries.  Ranks are determined basically by 
the average of the scaled points scored by senior business leaders in the 75 countries. 
Japan ranks 8th on Company Operations and Strategy and 18th on Quality of the 
National Business Environment.  () indicates rankings among the G7 countries. 
* The value is ranked opposite to the favorable direction. 
(Prestige of Entrepreneurs) is a complement measure. 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
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Input Conditions.  Concerning the quality people with management skills, Japan is 
ranked 49th on Quality of Management Schools, far lowest among the G7 countries.  
Japan is ranked 9th on Availability of Scientists and Engineers, second to the United 
States and in the top group of the G7 countries.  Concerning the risk money, Japan is 
ranked 31st on Venture Capital Availability, far lowest among the G7 countries with 
Italy.  Concerning the knowledge creation, Quality of Scientific Research Institutions 
of Japan is ranked 12th, fifth after the United Kingdom and Germany.  Company 
Spending on Research and Development is ranked 2nd, first among the G7 countries.  
Japan has the 2nd position on the U.S. patents per capita, behind the United States.  
Japan has the lowest availability of quality people with management skills, high 
availability of scientists and engineers, the lowest availability of risk money, and high 
level of knowledge creation by private companies on the profile of the input 
conditions. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  Concerning the prestige, only 8 percent say that 
entrepreneurs are respected, stunningly lowest among the G7 countries.  The lowest 
fraction of people with entrepreneurial activity (TEA index) and the declining entry 
rate in the last two decades indicate that the familiarity with entrepreneurs is very 
low among the G7 countries.  Concerning the labor mobility, Japan is ranked 41st on 
Hiring and Firing Practices, inferring possibly low labor mobility.  Concerning the 
regulatory frameworks, the median response of the Days to Start a Firm is 30 days and 
ranked 19th (same as France, Germany, and the United States), but Administrative 
Burden for Startups is considered rather heavy and ranked 32nd, considerably lagging 
behind the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.  Further, Japan is ranked 
1st on Extent of Bureaucratic Red Tape, worst among the G7 countries. 
Networking Conditions.  University/Industry Research of Germany is ranked 26th, 
worst among the G7 countries with Italy.  Concerning open corporate culture, Japan 
is ranked 12th on Decentralization of Corporate Activity and 23rd on Willingness to 
Delegate Authority, both of which is the sixth only above Italy among the G7 
countries.  It can be said that Japan has among the lowest possibilities of having 
favorable networking conditions compared with other G7 countries. 
Market Conditions.   Japans position in Technological Sophistication is ranked 5th, 
second to the United States.  Buyer Sophistication is ranked 13th, second worst among 
the G7 countries.  Extent of Marketing is ranked 13th, worst among the G7 countries.  
Concerning the pro-competition conditions of markets, Japan is ranked 61st on the 
occurrence of Entry into Local Market, worst among the G7 countries.  Intensity of 
Local Competition is ranked 23rd, second worst among the G7 countries.  
Effectiveness of Anti-Trust Policy is ranked 23rd, worst among the G7 countries.  
Japan has the worst position on the innovativeness and diversity of market demand 
and pro-competition conditions within the G7 countries, except for the potential of 
technological sophistication.  Concerning Government Procurement of Advanced 
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Technology Products, Japan is ranked 7th, third among the G7 countries.  Finally, 
concerning the equity stock market, Local Equity Market Access is ranked 22nd, worst 
among the G7 countries. 
From the view point of this analysis, Japan has (1) a low profile of the input 
conditions except for the availability of scientists and engineers and high level of 
knowledge creation by private companies; (2) a lowest profile of the entrepreneurial 
context with the extremely low prestige; (3) a lowest potential for the networking 
conditions; and (4) a lowest potential for the market conditions except for 
government procurement.  Overall, the country has a very weak profile of the 
entrepreneurial national diamond among the G7 countries, except for some potential 
such as scientists and engineers, and knowledge creation by private companies.  
Summary is shown in Figure 4-13. 
 
Figure 4-13  Analysis of the entrepreneurial national diamond of Japan 
 
The low profile of Japans entrepreneurial national diamond is astonishing.  It 
means that it is quite hard for technology entrepreneurship to flourish in the country 
at least in the short run.  However, concerning entrepreneurial activity itself, it does 
not always mean that Japan has had no entrepreneurship ever.  Figure 4-14 shows the 
entry and exit rates since the WWII was over in 1945.  We can see very high entry 
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rates during the decade after the WWII.  Because the whole country was devastated 
by the war, it is not surprising to see high rates of entry right after the war.  Yet more 
importantly, it was in this period of high entry rates when entrepreneurial activity 
produced many Japanese firms that later have become global players and become the 
migration force of the economy.  Examples include Sony (established in 1946), Honda 
(1946), Nintendo (1947), Sanyo (1947), and Omron (1948).  They were the part of the 
economic engine that has driven the miracle of the economy recovery.  Although 
they are now established firms, many of them perform relatively better than the 
established firms that were founded before the WWII such as Matsushita, Toshiba, 
and NEC. 
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Figure 4-14  Entry/exit rate of Japan since 1945 
Note: Entry and exit rates are percentages of the total stock (corporate registrations) at the 
end of the previous fiscal year. 
Source: Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, White Paper on Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Japan. 
 
Recognizing the current weak environment for fostering entrepreneurial activity, 
the government seems to make efforts to improve the business environment for 
entrepreneurs recently.  Table 4-2 is a collection of recent regulatory changes 
concerning entrepreneurial activity.  These changes are intensively implemented 
since the late 1990s.  Concerning the input conditions, it has become easier to transfer 
knowledge created at universities by the new laws in 1998 and 1999.  Venture capital 
partnerships have been allowed to assume limited liability, which opens the way for 
the pension funds to form venture capital funds because members of the pension 
funds no longer have to assume full liability.  Concerning the entrepreneurial context, 
stock options were allowed, which is favorable to startups that typically have 
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difficulties in cash flows for rewarding their employees.  The reduced top personal 
income tax facilitates the concentration of wealth, which encourages people to 
become rich and may lead to an increase in investments.  The exemption of the 
minimum requirement of equity capital works as a strong incentive to establish 
ventures.  Concerning the networking conditions, the environment for the 
university/industry collaboration has been improved significantly by the relaxation of 
bureaucratic rules enforced to national universities.  Finally, concerning the market 
conditions, the relaxation of the listing requirement of the stock market opens the 
opportunities of exits both for entrepreneurs and risk money providers. 
 
Table 4-2  Recent regulatory changes concerning entrepreneurial activity in Japan 
Input Conditions 
1998 Technology Licensing Offices become legitimate and entitled to financial support from the 
government. (A new law) 
1999 Exclusive licensing of government financed research is allowed for universities. (A new law) 
1999 Venture capital partnerships are allowed limited liability partnership. (A new law) 
  
Entrepreneurial Context 
1997 Stock options are allowed to give. (Commercial Law amendment) 
1999 Top personal income tax is reduced from 65% to 50%. (A related law amendment) 
2001 Treasury stocks are allowed to possess. (Commercial Law amendment) 
2002 Restrictions on issuing of stock options are eliminated. (Commercial Law amendment) 
2002 Limitation of liability of corporate executives is allowed. (Commercial Law amendment) 
2003 Exemption of the minimum requirement of equity capital (10 million yen) for the first five 
years becomes possible to startups. (A new law) 
  
Networking Conditions 
2000 Faculty of national universities is allowed to become corporate executives. (A new law)  
2000 Multiple-year contracts between national universities and private firms are allowed. 
(administrative notice) 
2002 University spin-offs are allowed to use facilities of national universities. (administrative 
notice) 
2002 Process of admitting faculty for corporate executives becomes short. (administrative notice) 
  
Market Conditions 
1999 Tokyo Stock Exchange opened Mothers for growing young companies. 
  
Sources: various. 
 
 
Evolution of the Tokyo Cluster and the Entrepreneurial Diamond 
 
The case treats information and communication technology (ICT) businesses 
especially Internet businesses in Shibuya Ward and Minato Ward.  According to the 
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survey mentioned above, 60 percent of young Internet ventures in Tokyo are located 
in the two wards57.  But in fact IT venture creation is not a phenomenon only in 
Tokyo.  A survey done by Japan External Trade Organization in February 2001 
observes several concentrations of ICT ventures other than in Tokyo in large cities 
such as Sapporo, Kyoto, and Fukuoka58.  However Tokyo is considered the best case in 
the sense that the concentration of firms in particular places is observed and several 
successful firms have emerged.  Because the literature that treats the Tokyo Internet 
cluster is rare, here with the help of the interview results, the effort to describe the 
evolution is done.  (The three interview results59 themselves describe the evolution of 
the cluster.  See the Exhibits at the end of the section.) 
Yukawa (2001) finds that Internet businesses in Tokyo can be traced back to 1994 
to 1995.  The first website in Japan, Tomigaya, was created in 199460.  It was an 
apartment room of an individual, named Joichi Ito 61 , where the website was 
established and students interested in the dawn of the Internet hung out.  Together 
with the students, Ito established a corporation at the apartment room in Tomigaya, a 
north area of Shibuya Ward in 1994.  The corporation became Digital Garage Inc., an 
Internet business consultant, next year.  In that year a website production firm, 
Kinotrope, was established and a music edutainment software firm, Oracion, was 
located in Tomigaya area (Yukawa 2001).  These firms are still alive today, but 
Tomigaya area accommodates only 7 Internet businesses now compared with 121 
companies in adjacent Shibuya area that is the center of Shibuya Ward and more 
convenient in terms of transportation and commerce.  Ito seems so-called a serial 
entrepreneur.  He later established a venture capital for Internet businesses, Neoteny, 
in 1999. 
Between 1996 and 1998, two listed Internet ventures were formed in Shibuya 
Ward, with some listed subsidiaries of established firms excluded.  An Internet service 
firm Edge was formed in 1996 and an Internet content firm Cyber Agent was formed 
in 1998.  Later both of them went public in 2000, exhibiting the successes of young 
Internet ventures.  A Japanese entrepreneur mentioned in the interview that Cyber 
Agent shows a model of IPO of ventures. 
From 1999, a rapid and dramatic change started.  In February 1999, several 
entrepreneurs based in Shibuya named a concentration phenomenon of firms around 
Shibuya as Bit Valley while drinking at a bar62.  They include Kiyoshi Nishikawa and 
Satoshi Koike.  Nishikawa was a founder of Internet venture incubator firm Net Age 
                                                
57 Young ventures are defined as companies established after 1994. 
58  Japan External Trade Organization; APEC region industry survey on IT ventures (In Japanese); 
February 2001. 
59 One of them is an LP diagram abstracted from a collection of publications of one individual. 
60 Digital Garage Inc. website. 
61 Joichi Ito grew up in the U.S. and studied at U.S. universities. (Cassiopeia Magazine Vol.4) 
62 Japan Inc. Magazine; Interview; May 2000. 
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established in Shibuya in 1998.  Koike had become a CEO of a subsidiary of a Japanese 
firm in the U.S. and did management buyout in 1998.  Later he opened an incubator 
firm Net Year in Shibuya in 1999.  The two figures had met at a wine-tasting party in 
Tokyo a year ago.  The notion of the region-oriented community spread rapidly with 
Nishikawas email magazine63.  They held parties hoping to bring entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists together.  The party culminated in more than 2,000 guests at a 
night club in February 200064 , drawing some critique that they are just a party 
organizer.  The party itself went down since then. 
This was the time when the Internet bubble accumulated.  In April 1999, Net Age 
became famous by selling its car price estimate website business to a joint venture of 
Softbank, Microsoft, and Yahoo! for several hundreds of million yen65.  In June 1999, 
Softbank and NASDAQ announced that they would open NASDAQ Japan.  Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, the most prestigious stock market, and JASDAQ, traditionally a stock 
market for smaller-sized companies, followed suit in the following months by 
announcing that they would also relax their listing requirements and open stock 
markets for growing firms.  At Mothers, two firms were listed in 1999 and 27 firms in 
2000.  Nishikawa observes that right after the openings of these markets, venture 
capitalists started seeking Internet startups and people who quit large firms and start 
their own companies started to appear66.  Hikari Tsushin, a mobile phone sales agent 
later forming a venture capital for Internet ventures in 1999, was once ranked 
seventh in terms of market capitalization on the Tokyo Stock Exchange during the 
Internet bubble67.  Around the mid 2000, the bubble burst.  Newly listed firms at 
Mothers were seven in 2001 and eight in 2002.  Hikari Tsushin now strives just to 
survive as a distributor of communications-related equipment.  The boom left the 
image held by the corporate mainstream that Bit Valley is kids stuff: people say Bit 
Valley is for youngsters, they are just playing, they are not real businesses68.  
Yet this rapid change in 1999 and 2000 around the Internet bubble seems to have 
left several things.  First, stock markets such as Mothers have been created, which 
opens an exit for the efforts of entrepreneurs and risk money providers.  Second, 
young ventures and entrepreneurs were publicized, which lets people to recognize 
that there is another way than staying at large firms.  Third, the venture capitals in 
Japan, traditionally good at later stage investments, started to invest in young firms.  
Finally, many Internet ventures are still doing their businesses although weak 
ventures have been wiped out.  With this context of the evolution in mind, lets 
                                                
63 Japan Inc. Magazine; Interview; May 2000. 
64 Economist; In search of the new Japanese dream; February 17, 2000. 
65 Ascii24.com news; April 12, 1999. 
66 See Exhibit 4-7. 
67 Nikkei Weekly; Former IT stars still plugging away; May 13, 2002. 
68 Japan Inc. Magazine; Bit Valley grows up; May 2001. 
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review key features of the cluster of Tokyo along the four attributes of the 
entrepreneurial diamond. 
 
Input Conditions.  Concerning the quality people, Nishikawa mentions that 
Shibuya is a convenient place for hiring students who are often strong and good 
candidates for the workforce as programmers and sales agents for Internet startups69.  
Students are familiar and eager with the Internet and offer cheaper labor.  Tokyo has 
a concentration of universities in Japan and railways and subways cross at the Shibuya 
station.  Some of the leading universities such as Tokyo University and Keio 
University are located along the railways to Shibuya.  One of the entrepreneurs who 
proposed Bit Valley with Nishikawa and Koike is Haruo Miyagi70 who founded an 
NPO ETIC promoting entrepreneurship.  ETIC has an internship program that 
introduces Tokyo students to startups.  Yukawa (2001) points out that the region 
around Shibuya Ward and Minato Ward is one of the towns that have the densest 
locations of amenities for young people such as movie theatres and night clubs in 
Japan, and that it is the place that tends to gather people with creative talents.  About 
40 percent of design firms in Tokyo 23 Wards are located in the two wards.  
Kinukawa and Yukawa (2001) find by econometric analysis that the concentration of 
the amenities, especially small and diverse facilities like music clubs, has association 
with the Internet venture creation in the earlier year of the clustering.  Although the 
high context knowledge creation by research institutions doesnt seem to play a large 
role in this cluster, the availability of people with creative talents and the proximity 
of firms that facilitates the exchange of information are considered to work as a 
favorable force for the innovation in the cluster. 
Concerning the risk money, it is said that there are a few hundreds of venture 
capital firms in Japan, and that the amount of venture capital investment increased to 
over 400 billion yen in 2000 from the level of 100 to 200 billion yen in the 1990s 
although there is no official statistics71 .  An interviewees remark represents the 
current status of the risk money; the availability of risk money such as venture 
capital has improved significantly compared with five years ago.  Now excellent firms 
can gain investments72.  From the evolution of the cluster, it is notable that the 
opening of the new stock markets has affected the behavior of venture capitals.  
Contrasting the previous behaviors that they had invested only in ventures that were 
about to go public after a long time of meeting the strict listing requirements since the 
foundations, they became motivated to invest in ventures from their startup phases 
                                                
69 See Exhibit 4-7. 
70 One of the interviewees is Mr. Miyagi.  See Exhibit 4-6. 
71 Murase, M.; Venture capital in Japan; in Forum on sustainable scenario for creating new industries 
(The 21st Public Policy Institute); February 2002. 
72 See Exhibit 4-6. 
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because of the existence of the shorter exit for them.  The fraction of the total venture 
capital investment in Japan to young ventures less than five years increased from 
around 20 percent in 1995 to over 50 percent in 199973.  An American entrepreneur 
who founded an Internet venture incubator firm Sun Bridge in Shibuya mentions that 
around 2000, venture capitals who give hands-on advice started to appear such as 
General Atlantic Partners, Mobile Internet Capital, Academy Capital Investments, 
and Sun Bridge74.  However, he also mentions that it is said that there are only several 
thousand angels in Japan, significantly smaller than over 1 million in the U.S. and tens 
of thousands in the U.K. 
Entrepreneurial Context.  High publicity of the Internet bubble and the events 
around it is considered to have increased the familiarity with entrepreneurs.  
Emerging successful firms such as Cyber Age and Net Age are working as the role 
models for followers.  In addition to that, a book written by a failure entrepreneur in 
199875 became a best-seller.  The book is about his upturn and downturn experience 
of an Internet venture that went bankrupt in 1997.  He went personal bankrupt 
finally but wrote about his experience.  The best-seller book prompted another 
several books written by him also, showing a model of a person surviving from a 
failure. 
Another aspect is that Shibuya accommodates counter-culture against the 
establishment in the central district of Chiyoda Ward.  As a place attracting young 
people and people with creative talents, Shibuya has a sub-culture atmosphere, a 
contrast to the atmosphere of Chiyoda Ward where established large firms and 
governments have suffered from the long-lasting recession throughout the 1990s.  
Nishikawa says that the recession throughout the 1990s spread feelings of oppression 
and blockage among large firms, and that many people who start businesses in 
Shibuya are young people in their 20s and 30s who want to jump out from those 
feelings76. 
Further, it is notable that many entrepreneurs have experience in working at 
foreign companies or studying abroad.  Ito grew up in the U.S. and studied at U.S. 
universities.  Nishikawa, after graduating from Tokyo University, joined an 
established company but quitted to work outside Japan.  It was in 1990 when he 
worked at Arthur D. Little in the U.S. when he aspired to become an entrepreneur, 
seeing young promising colleagues quit the company and start their businesses.  Koike 
did management buyout in the U.S. from his company.  Nishikawa describes that 
quite a number of entrepreneurs at Shibuya are the people who earned MBA outside 
                                                
73  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; White Paper on Science and 
Technology 2002. 
74 Miner, A.; Column: Things about ventures 1-17 (In Japanese); Nikkei Net Front Runner; May 2001 to 
March 2003. 
75 The book is Shacho Shikkaku (meaning failed as a president) written by Yuichiro Itakura. 
76 See Exhibit 4-7. 
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Japan and who are from foreign consulting firms such as McKinsey and Boston 
Consulting Group77.  For example, Rakuten, a rapid growing e-commerce firm, has 
four executives who earned MBA or law degree from leading universities in the U.S. 
such as Harvard Business School78 .  Those who studied in the U.S. especially at 
business schools are considered to have familiarity with entrepreneurship and may 
have aspired to become entrepreneurs.  Also, employees at foreign service firms may 
have touched a different corporate culture and seen management and markets from 
different views.  In fact employees at foreign service firms have been increasing.  
Figure 4-15 shows an increasing number of employees at foreign firms in Japan.  The 
employment in services has grown from 7,000 in 1995 to 24,000 in 2000, potentially 
becoming a labor force that has little psychological barrier to join entrepreneurial 
activities.  Those who have foreign experience are accumulating their number and are 
considered to have been bringing a different taste into Tokyos entrepreneurial 
context. 
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Figure 4-15  Employment at foreign firms in Japan 
Source: Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry; Foreign firms survey 1996-2001. 
 
Networking Conditions.  From the informal interactions among several 
entrepreneurs, the name Bit Valley was born.  It is interesting to see those 
entrepreneurs gather without specific formal ties and the places that facilitated the 
interactions were bars.  Shibuya has a lot of amenities that can serve as networking 
opportunities.  They gathered to create a region-oriented commu 
                                                
77 See Exhibit 4-7. 
78 Rakuten website.  Rakuten (founded in 1997) is located in Meguro Ward, an adjacent ward to 
Shibuya Ward. 
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nity where they could have face-to-face meetings for information/opinion 
exchange to accelerate Net business here79.  The proximity within Shibuya may have 
been facilitating informal networks that help entrepreneurs in terms of hiring and 
finding customers and suppliers.  Unfortunately the effort largely seems to have 
ended up with holding meetings and parties.  It didnt evolve into strong formal 
networks such as organized networking organizations, although there are some 
organizations such as Bit Valley Association, Jingumae.org, and Web Design 
Consortium (Yukawa 2001).  These organizations dont seem to offer strong programs. 
Market Conditions.  It is clear that the advent of the Internet has opened new 
possibilities of markets for entrepreneurs to start their businesses.  If it had not been 
for the Internet there, no venture creation of this size could have been materialized, 
because no other big changes in the environment than the creation of pioneering 
startups in the early years are recognized before the Internet bubble and the opening 
of the new stock markets.  Those pioneering startups may have been in the hardship 
with the very low profile of the diamond and no precedents before them. 
The Internet was totally new market opportunities that the established firms in 
Japan were not good at seizing.  It doesnt need large office space or large capital to 
start Internet businesses, which works as advantage for startups in Tokyo.  Further 
the rapid increase of Internet users helped startups to grow rapidly (Figure 4-16). 
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Figure 4-16  Internet users in Japan 
Note: Companies are the ones with over 300 employees. 
Source: White paper on information and communications in Japan 2002. 
 
                                                
79 Japan Inc. Magazine; Interview; May 2000. 
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Concerning the stock market, with the support of the Internet bubble, the 
decisions to open the new stock markets were made in 1999.  The decisions made a 
big difference in terms of venture capital availability and visible successes of IPOs 
that fueled another entrepreneurial activity. 
 
A narrative summary of the analysis is presented in Figure 4-17.  The Tokyo 
cluster from this analysis shows a dramatic evolution of Internet startups.  Several 
important features of the evolution of the entrepreneurial cluster include: (1) Shibuya 
Ward and Minato Ward have been an attracting and convenient place for students 
and people with creative talents, who worked as key labor force for Internet startups; 
(2) the advent of the Internet opened huge market opportunities for entrepreneurship; 
(3) people with foreign experience are among entrepreneurs who endeavored to 
challenge in the midst of the low profile of the entrepreneurial diamond, and around 
the same time, the downsizing of large firms has been seen; (4) the rapid growing 
Internet users helped early successes of ventures and the expectation of further 
success led to the Internet bubble; and (5) the Internet bubble prompted the decision 
to open the new stock markets, which fueled entrepreneurial activity by improving 
venture capital availability and visibility of successes. 
A schematic summary of the analysis on the evolutionary dynamics is presented in 
Figure 4-18.  Although the profile of the national diamond of Japan is the least 
favorable for technology entrepreneurship among the G7 countries, Tokyo is 
considered to have several key existent conditions.   Shibuya Ward and Minato Ward 
have had the attractive amenities for young people and creative talents and a 
convenient node of dense traffic systems that many university students use.  Further, 
with its concentration of every activity of Japan, Tokyo is considered to have a largest 
portion of the people with foreign experience. 
Since the early 1990s, several abnormal events are identified.  The downsizing of 
large firms by the low economic growth since the early 1990s and the accumulation 
of people with foreign experience worked as abnormal inputs to the entrepreneurial 
context throughout the 1990s. Then in the mid 1990s, the advent of the Internet 
brought the huge possibilities of new markets, working as a huge abnormal input to 
the market conditions.  Several key firms were created before the Internet bubble.  
During the Internet bubble, the opening of new stock markets worked as a kick input 
to the market conditions, prompting further entrepreneurial activities.  Regulatory 
changes now seem in progress.  Today Tokyo has an unusually improved profile of the 
diamond from the standard of Japan. 
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Figure 4-17  Analysis of the entrepreneurial cluster diamond of Tokyo 
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Figure 4-18  Analysis of the evolutionary dynamics of Tokyo 
Notes:  Boxes represent the four attributes of the diamond (right: input conditions, 
top: entrepreneurial context, bottom: networking conditions, left: market 
conditions).  Statements under the boxes represent existent conditions at times.  
Solid arrows represent abnormal events.  Circles represent major abnormal events.  
Shades are for illustrating gradual improvements, not absolute evaluations. 
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Exhibit 4-5  Interview result (Tokyo, Mr. K.M.) 
Language Processing Diagram built from the interview in April 2003 of Mr. K.M., a Japanese 
entrepreneur who co-founded an Internet venture in Tokyo in 1996. 
 
 
Theme:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in Tokyo, Japan? 
 
 
From the late 1990s, pioneering entrepreneurs, university education, and new 
stock market emerged. 
 
From the late 1990s, some entrepreneurs pioneered a new way of entrepreneurship, 
becoming prompts for followers. 
 
• A book written in 1998 by an entrepreneur named Yuichiro Itakura, who had 
experienced rapid upturn and downturn of an Internet venture, became a best-seller, 
showing a way for Japanese entrepreneurs as a role model. 
• In April 1999, an Internet venture, Net Age, sold its car website business to Yahoo! 
for 400 million yen, showing a model of incubation.  After it, several venture 
incubators were formed such as the one in July 1999 by Net Year Group, a US-
based firm. 
• An Internet venture, Cyber Agent, established in March 1998, went IPO in March 
2000 at Mothers, showing a model of IPO of ventures. 
 
 
New stock markets for growing firms opened from 1999, and affected creation of new IPO 
support services. 
 
• In November 1999, Tokyo Stock Exchange opened Mothers, a stock market for 
growing firms.  NASDAQ also started NASDAQ Japan in 2000 (although it withdrew 
in 2002 after the dot com bubble).  They have lower hurdles for startups than 
established stock markets. 
• Security printing firms such as Asia Security Printing started consulting services for 
IPO for startup firms after the emergence of Mothers in 1999. 
 
 
• Hitotsubashi University and Waseda University, both of them are among the leading 
universities in Japan, established MBA programs in 1998 offering courses related to 
entrepreneurship. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Shibuya (Tokyo) has a concentration of office buildings with office spaces of about 60 
 100 m2, which are called pencil buildings, making it easy for nascent ventures 
looking for small offices to find them. 
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Internet opened new possibilities for Internet ventures. 
 
Technology and Internet infrastructure advance made it possible for small businesses to 
develop Internet-related products. 
 
• Linux, established in 1994, started making it possible for small offices/home offices to 
develop inexpensive Internet systems by using cluster servers with browsers. 
• The event that Intel invested in RedHat in 1998 made Linux more recognized and 
credible, enabling it easier to sell Linux-based systems that dont require large initial 
investments. 
• NTT Communications, established in 1999, started providing inexpensive high-speed 
Internet accesses with flat rates of 24 hours, affordable for small firms in Japan. 
 
 
• An Internet BBS provider, 2ch, emerged as a huge website which counts 2 million 
hits a day, showing an advantage of new ventures for a different strategy for investor 
relations that established firms are not capable to adopt. 
 
 
 
 
 
Education reform and the collapse of large established firms has affected the attention of 
students averting from ordinary employed works. 
 
• A shift toward the individual-oriented education incorporated in a report of Ministry of 
Education in 1987 has affected primary education students since then, who started 
graduating universities in the latter half of 1990s and seeking other jobs than ordinary 
employed workers. 
• One of the large established firms, Yamaichi Securities, went bankrupt in November 
1997, prompting the fall of the belief in large established firms among graduates. 
 
 
 
 
 
From the latter half of 1990s, loose money also increased, which sometimes increases 
immature ventures. 
 
• After a law to promote finance for SMEs was passed in 1995, finance support for 
startups increased, but known for the loose following monitor after investment. 
• A venture capital business, started by Hikari Tsushin in 1999, propagated a false 
dream to many immature ventures that they can make money by IPO. 
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Exhibit 4-6  Interview result (Tokyo, Mr. Haruo Miyagi) 
Language Processing Diagram built from the interview in April 2003 of Mr. Haruo Miyagi, a 
Japanese entrepreneur who founded an organization promoting entrepreneurship since 1993. 
 
 
Theme:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in Tokyo, Japan? 
 
 
The entrepreneurial scene has developed to a higher level compared with five 
years ago. 
 
Many Internet ventures were created and the availability of risk money has improved 
significantly compared with five years ago. 
 
• Since the latter half of the 1990s, many Internet ventures were created to accumulate 
to 1,500 in spring of 2001.  Entry rate and exit rate are said to be around 10 percent, 
higher than other industries in Japan. 
• The availability of risk money such as venture capital has improved significantly 
compared with five years ago.  Now excellent firms can gain investments, although it 
is not to the extent as in three years ago when the abnormal Internet bubble was 
there. 
 
 
Winners and losers have become apparent since 2001, and succeeding ventures often 
move to Roppongi. 
 
• Winners and losers have become apparent among the ventures established around 
the Internet bubble.  Since 2001, the tendency is continuing that ventures with 10 
employees and unique services have been acquired by the winners such as Rakuten, 
Cyber Agent, GMO, and Edge.  Recent M&As include many cases in which 
employees of acquired companies continue to work steadily without leaving. 
• In addition to Shibuya, Roppongi, with the opening of Roppongi Hills, is drawing 
attention for concentration of ventures such as Internet businesses.  Yahoo!, 
Softbank, and Rakuten have moved to Roppongi in the recent months.  It is often 
seen that succeeding ventures in Shibuya move to Roppongi and Akasaka, but 
Shibuya maintains its popularity.  Younger generations seem to be attracted by the 
culture of the town itself. 
 
 
• Although the stock index has been low, ventures with competitive advantages such 
as technical superiority are popular among investors, including the ventures listed at 
Mothers. 
 
 
 
 
• Still quality people with technical or management skills can be hardly obtained from 
graduates of universities.  Rather, it is necessary to train them on-the-job-training 
through the growth of startups. 
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Some people started to change their attitudes toward entrepreneurial activity 
positively since 1998 and 1999. 
 
Since 1998 and 1999, students attitudes have changed favorable toward entrepreneurship, 
and some started to create their own companies. 
 
• Since around 1998, students at top national universities such as Tokyo University 
and Hitotsubashi University, who typically had gone to large firms, started to use the 
startup support service of ETIC. 
• Since around 1999, students motivation to participate the internship program has 
changed toward starting their own companies or developing their own businesses. 
• Although it was rare cases for students to start companies up to recently, about 5 
cases can be seen every year where students participating in the internship program 
later start their companies and startups established by students are identified for the 
internship program. 
 
 
• Although quitting large companies had been considered to involve large risk until the 
latter half of the 1990s, people who quit and start their companies started to appear 
within acquaintances since around 1998. 
 
• The first business plan competition for social entrepreneurs was held in 2002, 
attracting 71 participants.  The startup support program for students attracted 51 
students and selected 5 teams for the awardees. 
 
 
 
Government is implementing serious policies fostering entrepreneurial activity recently. 
 
• Government is making efforts to nurture entrepreneurs through education such as 
universities.  Its famous plan to prompt 1000 spin-off ventures from universities until 
2003 already counts 424 ventures so far. 
• Government is implementing various efforts to prompt startups to the level of 360 
thousand entries per year until 2006 (currently 150 thousand entries per year). 
• The exemption of the minimum requirement of equity capital for the first five years of 
startups began in February 2003, making it possible to establish corporation with one 
yen.  The applications totaled 1500 for the first two months, and the policy is well 
spoken.  It indicates government commitment for fostering entrepreneurship. 
 
 
 
Many Internet ventures around Shibuya are young small companies with young 
entrepreneurs. 
 
• Many entrepreneurs of Internet ventures are in their 20s and 30s, quite younger than 
the impression of the average age of typical Japanese entrepreneurs so far. 
• 100 companies participating in the internship program of ETIC are mainly small-sized 
companies (80 percent have less than 30 employees and 40 percent have less than 
10 employees).  Many of the entrepreneurs of those companies are in their 20s or 
30s.  Nearly half of the companies are located in places such as Shibuya, Akasaka, 
and Roppongi, the center of so-called Bit Valley. 
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Exhibit 4-7  LP result from Mr. Nishikawas publications (Tokyo) 
Language Processing Diagram built from the publications of Mr. Kiyoshi Nishikawa, a 
Japanese entrepreneur who founded Net Age, an Internet incubation venture, in Tokyo in 1998. 
Sources: CNET Japan, Column: Entrepreneurs as a career 1-4 (In Japanese), April 2003. 
Japan External Trade Organization, Keynote speech at APEC SME Business 
Network Promotion Forum (In Japanese), February 2001. 
Note: Elements are the authors translations of the excerpts from the sources.  Tiles are 
the authors abstraction. 
 
 
Theme:  What were the essences of entrepreneurship evolution in Tokyo, Japan? 
 
 
Dramatic changes such as the Internet bubble and the opening of the new stock 
markets happened to the entrepreneurial scene in 1999 and 2000. 
 
The opening of the new markets in 1999 attracted venture capitals and people at large 
firms to startups. 
 
• Right after the NASDAQ Japan announcement and Tokyo Stock Exchanges opening 
of Mothers in 1999, venture capitals started seeking Internet venture startups. 
• At the same time in 1999, people who quit large firms and start their own companies 
started to appear. 
 
 
• When he founded his company in 1998, he could find friends investing his company 
but nobody intended to quit their jobs and join his company. 
 
• From the late 1999 to the first half of 2000, the Internet bubble happened in Japan. 
 
 
 
 
A number of recent entrepreneurs have foreign experience. 
 
A number of entrepreneurs including Mr. Nishikawa have experience in working at foreign 
companies or studying abroad. 
 
• In 1990 working at Arthur D. Little in Cambridge, MA, he first became interested in 
starting business seeing young promising colleagues quit the company and start their 
businesses. 
• Quite a number of entrepreneurs at Shibuya are the people who earned MBA outside 
Japan and who are from foreign consulting firms such as McKinsey and Boston 
Consulting Group. 
 
 
• Japanese traditional entrepreneurs were typically outside the mainstream such as 
lone wolves or outsiders.  Most brilliant students go to large firms or governments. 
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Shibuya is a convenient place for startups and can accommodate counter-culture 
against the establishment. 
 
Shibuya is a convenient place for hiring students and working late at nights. 
 
• He opened his office in Shibuya because it was an attractive place for students who 
were the strong and good candidates for the workforce as programmers and sales 
agents for an Internet startup. 
• Shibuya has a lot of restaurants open late at nights, which are convenient for startups. 
 
 
Entrepreneurs in Shibuya have counter-culture against the establishment. 
 
• Startups at Shibuya have casual corporate culture without suits and ties. 
• Starting companies in Shibuya may convey a meaning of a kind of counter-culture 
against the establishment around Chiyoda Ward. 
• The recession throughout the 1990s spread feelings of oppression and blockage 
among large firms.  Many people who start businesses at Shibuya are young people 
in their 20s and 30s who want to jump out from those feelings. 
 
 
• Shibuya has a sub-culture atmosphere of disorder and chaos that can accommodate 
creativity. 
 
 
 
 
• Many venture capitals dont follow their investments or cant follow because the 
things are new for them also in 2001. 
 
• Typical IT ventures around Shibuya dont pay well, but use stock options. 
 
• The company has so far incubated 10 startups, including spin-offs from its employees.  
The total revenue is about 4 billion yen ($33 million) and the total employment is 
about 300. 
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4.5 Discussion 
We have seen the evolutionary dynamics of Silicon Valley, Cambridge, Munich, 
and Tokyo.  Those entrepreneurial clusters have the characteristics of the self-
reinforcing loop, and through the creation of high impact ventures and spin-offs, the 
entrepreneurial clusters improve themselves in terms of their ability to let create 
entrepreneurial opportunities and another wave of ventures and spin-offs.  We have 
also seen the features of the early evolution of the clusters.  The evolution of the 
clusters has not happen overnight.  In the early periods, the indications of the 
evolution were tiny and slow in the presence of the force of inertia of the self-
reinforcing loop.  What made the self-reinforcing loop start rotating around against 
the force of inertia were abnormal events that work as kick inputs to the self-
reinforcing loop.  Abnormal events can be characterized as the events that arise from 
the outside of the expectation regressed from the previous tendency in the cluster.  
They are sometimes merely a chance event; they are sometimes eagerness or efforts of 
an individual.  Abnormal events range from just one input to the system to a major 
abnormal event that has broad influence on the system such as the emergence of a 
catalyst and a genius. 
Each cluster had its own path of the evolution with unique events.  Silicon Valley 
has the history of almost 100 years whereas Tokyo has seen the evolution only in the 
recent years.  In Table 4-3, the key features of the studied clusters along with the 
abnormal events identified through the analyses with the entrepreneurial diamond 
framework are presented.  Although those clusters differ significantly in terms of the 
population, the time when the evolution started, and the type of the industry, we can 
see some similar features of the evolution.  First, all of them had the key existent 
conditions as a potential to embrace technology entrepreneurship before the dawn of 
the evolution.  Silicon Valleys Stanford University and Cambridges Cambridge 
University have been a source of scientifically and technically-trained people and 
knowledge creation, as well as an anchor of networks of faculty and graduates.  
Munich has had a strong science base consisted of universities, hospitals, and research 
institutions with latest knowledge of biotechnology and qualified scientists within 
proximate locations.  Tokyo has had concentration of students and creative talents 
working as key labor force for Internet startups.  These existent conditions belong to 
the input conditions in terms of people and knowledge creation, as well as a potential 
for the improvement of the networking conditions. 
One of the first abnormal events in each case was an arrival of new technology 
wave that brought new possibilities for entrepreneurial activities in the cluster: 
electronics for Silicon Valley, microprocessors for Cambridge, biotechnology for 
Munich, and the Internet for Tokyo.  Early entrepreneurs were attracted by the 
potential of the technology as an opener of market opportunities.  Then around the 
same time or a little later in the evolution history, abnormal events that affected the 
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entrepreneurial context were seen: Terman in Silicon Valley, Mott Committee in 
Cambridge, the downsizing of large firms in Munich, and the downsizing of large 
firms and the accumulation of people with foreign experience in Tokyo.  They 
worked as inputs to the entrepreneurial context to let happen climate changes, and 
prompted the creation of early ventures such as Hewlett-Packard in Silicon Valley. 
 
Table 4-3  Abnormal events in the evolution of the entrepreneurial clusters 
 
Silicon Valley Cambridge 
Munich 
(biotech) 
Tokyo 
(Internet) 
Population 2.3 million 0.1 million 
(0.7 million1) 
1.25 million 12 million 
sIdentified dawn 
of evolution 
1900s 1970s Early 1990s Mid 1990s 
Key existent 
conditions 
Stanford 
University 
Cambridge 
University 
Strong science 
base of 
institutions 
Students and 
creative talents 
Technology 
wave * 
Electronics Microprocessors Biotechnology Internet 
Climate 
change ** Terman Mott Committee Downsizing 
Downsizing/ 
Foreign 
experience 
Abnormal 
finance *** 
Local financiers, 
Individuals at NY 
bank 
Individuals at 
Barclays Bank Government fund (Internet bubble) 
A
bn
or
m
al
 e
ve
nt
s 
Others 
Defense 
procurement, 
Shockley and 
eight individuals 
Cambridge 
Consultants 
New stock 
market 
Internet bubble 
New stock 
market, 
Regulatory 
changes 
Notes: * Market conditions.  ** Entrepreneurial context.  *** Input conditions. 
 1 Population of Cambridgeshire 
 
The input conditions in terms of finance exhibited an interesting aspect.  In the 
early periods of all the cases, there were no formal risk money providers for risky 
startups.  However, abnormal events helped the early entrepreneurs.  FTC in Silicon 
Valley was helped by local financiers who were also attracted by the possibility of 
electronics; Hewlett and Packard were given endorsement by Terman for the access 
to local financiers; the eight individuals from Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory 
were helped by the sympathetic individuals at a New York bank; and in Cambridge 
the bold move of the individuals at Barclays Bank helped finance of technology 
ventures.  In Munich it was the government fund that formed pioneering formal risk 
money.  In Tokyo it was the Internet bubble and the opening of new stock markets 
that prompted certain investments into young ventures for the first time.  In all the 
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cases, venture capital industry emerged way after the accumulation of the self-
reinforcing loops. 
The role of the defense procurement in the early evolution of Silicon Valley 
exhibited an important aspect of the market conditions.  A new technology alone may 
not be a strong input to the market conditions.  A new technology assured by the 
steady and lump-sum procurement of the government turned into a promising 
improvement of the market conditions. 
The improvement of the networking conditions seems to be a late starter.  Apart 
from the existent conditions as a potential, the substantial improvement tends to be 
seen in the later stage of the evolution.  It was after the creation of the spin-offs from 
Fairchild when the huge enhancement of the networking conditions happened in 
Silicon Valley.  In Cambridge, although Mott Committee improved the attitude 
toward university/industry collaboration and Barclays formed a club for networking, 
it was in the later stage when the local awareness and attention to the phenomenon 
prompted to create the formal organizations such as St. Johns Innovation Centre and 
Cambridge Network.  The same thing can be said in the case of Munich.  Tokyo 
doesnt seem to have a solid profile of the networking conditions yet. 
However, this characteristic of the networking conditions does not mean that the 
importance of the networking conditions is undermined.  Saxenian (1996) argues that 
the rapid growth of Silicon Valley over the Route 128 has come from a regional 
network-based industrial system of Silicon Valley that promotes collective learning 
and encourages more experimentation and entrepreneurship, which the Route 128 
area in contrast lacks due to a small number of relatively integrated corporations.  
Network-based interactions are more likely to lead to innovations and 
entrepreneurial opportunities.  The profile of the networking conditions seems to 
have the increasing importance as the cluster matures in the later stage of the 
evolution. 
 
From these observations, the characteristics of the evolutionary dynamics of the 
entrepreneurial clusters are summarized as the following.  (1) Entrepreneurial clusters 
had the existent conditions that exhibited the good profile of the input conditions in 
terms of people and knowledge creation, as well as a potential for the improvement of 
the networking conditions.  (2) An advent of new waves of technology worked as an 
opener of market opportunities; government procurement assured the new 
opportunities in one case.  (3) Abnormal events enhanced the profile of the 
entrepreneurial context to let happen climate changes and prompted the creation of 
early ventures.  (4) Abnormal events helped the key early entrepreneurs to get 
finance for their startups; venture capital industry emerged way after the 
accumulation of the self-reinforcing loops.  (5) The substantial improvement of the 
networking conditions happened in the later stage of the evolution, although the 
networking conditions are considered important for further evolution of the cluster.  
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(6) The opening of new stock markets fueled the evolution of the cluster.  A 
schematic expression of this summary is presented in Figure 4-19. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-19  Characteristics of the dynamics of the entrepreneurial clusters 
 
Entrepreneurial 
Context
Networking
Conditions
Input 
Conditions 
Market 
Conditions
1 People and knowledge 
(existent conditions) 
2 New technology 
3 Abnormal events to 
change climate 
4 Abnormal events 
to help early 
entrepreneurs 
finance 
(Formal risk 
money to emerge 
much later) 
5 Networking conditions 
to substantially 
improve later 
New stock markets to 
fuel evolution 
6
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5 Conclusion 
The conclusion of this research on the evolutionary dynamics of entrepreneurial 
clusters is threefold.  (1) The proposed entrepreneurial diamond framework is useful 
to understand and analyze both static conditions and dynamic characteristics of 
entrepreneurial clusters.  (2) The dynamics of an entrepreneurial cluster is 
characterized as the self-reinforcing system through the creation of high impact 
ventures and spin-offs.  (3) Observations from the case studies exhibit similar 
characteristics of the evolutionary paths of the entrepreneurial clusters. 
 
First, technology entrepreneurship as a social phenomenon is a broad and complex 
issue that involves a lot of factors from micro level to macro level.  The proposed 
entrepreneurial diamond framework exhibited its usefulness to streamline many 
factors involved, state the conditions of the technology entrepreneurship both at the 
national level and the regional level, and extract the characteristics of the evolution of 
the clusters.  The diamond framework, consisted of the four attributes of a region 
representing the ability of the region to let create entrepreneurial opportunities, can 
be used as a tool to overview the conditions of an entrepreneurial cluster, to 
understand the dynamics of the cluster, and to identify the strengths and the 
weakness of the cluster.  It should be of interest to anyone who is interested in the 
development of a region through technology entrepreneurship.  Researchers, key 
constituents of a region such as leading entrepreneurs and promoters, and policy 
makers may find it useful for setting a priority of actions to enhance entrepreneurial 
opportunities, and for generating consensus on policies among the constituents of the 
region. 
 
Second, building a successful entrepreneurial cluster like Silicon Valley has been 
an attracting idea for many regions, but it will not happen overnight.  The 
examination of the dynamics of entrepreneurial clusters using the diamond 
framework exhibited their characteristics of the self-reinforcing system that wont 
start rotating easily in the presence of the force of inertia of the system.  The System 
Dynamics models, with the entrepreneurial diamond embedded within it, showed 
that once a flow in the self-reinforcing system accumulates, the profiles of the four 
attributes of the diamond (the input conditions, the entrepreneurial context, the 
networking conditions, and the market conditions) improve themselves through the 
creation of high impact ventures and spin-offs, and their influences on the diamond 
and ripple effects within the diamond.  However, to let a massive flow happen in the 
self-reinforcing system from a point of condition with little flow in the system 
encounters the obstacles of deterrents.  The deterrents are often perceived in the real 
life as the large personal risks involved in starting ventures, the psychological barrier 
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to become entrepreneurs, the low availability of quality people with management 
skills, the low prestige of entrepreneurs, and so on.  The analysis of the System 
Dynamics models showed that these deterrents are the exhibitions of the 
characteristics of the force of inertia that the self-reinforcing systems inherently have, 
and that the force of inertia persists until the system starts rotating.  The force of 
inertia is considered heavier in larger economies. 
 
 Then, the question becomes what breaks the obstacles of the force of inertia.  The 
observations from the studied cases of Silicon Valley, Cambridge, Munich, and Tokyo 
exhibited similar patterns of the evolutionary paths through which the obstacles were 
gradually removed.  Those patterns are characterized as the series of the abnormal 
events and the subsequent evolutions happened in the clusters.  The abnormal events 
worked as kick inputs to the self-reinforcing system, which prompted the 
incremental rotations in the system, aggregately overcoming the force of inertia.  The 
abnormal events were sometimes merely a chance event such as a success in getting 
startup finance from traditional financiers, and sometimes eagerness or efforts of an 
individual such as Terman in Silicon Valley.  The key observations from the cases 
include: the would-be clusters with good profiles of the input conditions in terms of 
people and knowledge creation had an advent of new technology as first abnormal 
events; abnormal events such as the emergence of an eager individual and the 
downsizing of the large firms enhanced the profile of the entrepreneurial context in 
the early evolution, prompting the creation of early ventures together with the 
advent of new technologies; abnormal events such as the emergence of sympathetic 
bankers helped the key early entrepreneurs to finance their startups; and the 
substantial improvement of the risk money availability and the networking 
conditions occurred in the later stage of the evolution.  Although these observations 
are made from a handful of the cases, the implication of them is expected to serve as a 
good benchmark to practitioners, as well as stimulating interests to researchers. 
 
The notion of entrepreneurial clusters is a powerful and attracting issue for every 
stakeholder in the knowledge-driven economies.  A success of building such a cluster 
may contribute to the promising growth of an economy and the vitality of the people 
by continuously generating entrepreneurial opportunities for them, like a fresh spring 
in the diversely flourishing ecology having the spring at the center of it.  The main 
actors in the ecology are of course brave entrepreneurs and growing ventures, but the 
author thinks that the roles of other organizations such as universities, institutions, 
and governments are becoming more important.  The governments at all levels from 
local governments to federal governments have the prime responsibility to create a 
favorable environment that can foster, or at least does not undermine, entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  It seems that the central roles of the governments are not the direct 
ones that might distort the natural orders of the ecology, but the indirect ones that 
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nourish the natural powers of the ecology.  Also, together with the governments, the 
universities and the institutions should be proactive, collaborative constituents of the 
ecology, not independent entities that are indifferent to the potential and the 
importance of the entrepreneurial clusters.  As we saw in an implication of the 
presence of the cohesion and shared strategy behind the rapid success of the Munich 
biotech community, entrepreneurs, private businesses, universities, institutions, and 
governments can create a tremendous environment for generating entrepreneurial 
opportunities by the collaborative attitudes and the collective actions. 
As for further research, the author would like to expect the accumulation of the 
descriptive cases that analyze the evolutions of the entrepreneurial clusters probably 
happening in many knowledge-driven economies.  Also further understandings of the 
dynamic mechanisms, especially the ones that limit or hinder the evolutions perhaps 
by some characteristic of balancing loop, are expected.  The author hopes that the 
findings of this research may be of interest to any stakeholders in the world of 
technology entrepreneurship, and that the approach of this research may serve as a 
further prompter of the awareness and the attention to the entrepreneurial clusters. 
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